Authors: Adrian Reber (Red Hat)
In my previous article, Forensic container checkpointing in
Kubernetes , I introduced checkpointing in Kubernetes
and how it has to be setup and how it can be used. The name of the
feature is Forensic container checkpointing, but I did not go into
any details how to do the actual analysis of the checkpoint created by
Kubernetes. In this article I want to provide details how the
checkpoint can be analyzed.
Checkpointing is still an alpha feature in Kubernetes and this article
wants to provide a preview how the feature might work in the future.
Preparation
Details about how to configure Kubernetes and the underlying CRI implementation
to enable checkpointing support can be found in my Forensic container
checkpointing in Kubernetes article.
As an example I prepared a container image (quay.io/adrianreber/counter:blog )
which I want to checkpoint and then analyze in this article. This container allows
me to create files in the container and also store information in memory which
I later want to find in the checkpoint.
To run that container I need a pod, and for this example I am using the following Pod manifest:
apiVersion : v1
kind : Pod
metadata :
name : counters
spec :
containers :
- name : counter
image : quay.io/adrianreber/counter:blog
This results in a container called counter running in a pod called counters .
Once the container is running I am performing following actions with that
container:
$ kubectl get pod counters --template ''
10.88.0.25
$ curl 10.88.0.25:8088/create?test-file
$ curl 10.88.0.25:8088/secret?RANDOM_1432_KEY
$ curl 10.88.0.25:8088
The first access creates a file called test-file with the content test-file
in the container and the second access stores my secret information
(RANDOM_1432_KEY ) somewhere in the container's memory. The last access just
adds an additional line to the internal log file.
The last step before I can analyze the checkpoint it to tell Kubernetes to create
the checkpoint. As described in the previous article this requires access to the
kubelet only checkpoint API endpoint.
For a container named counter in a pod named counters in a namespace named
default the kubelet API endpoint is reachable at:
# run this on the node where that Pod is executing
curl -X POST "https://localhost:10250/checkpoint/default/counters/counter"
For completeness the following curl command-line options are necessary to
have curl accept the kubelet 's self signed certificate and authorize the
use of the kubelet checkpoint API:
--insecure --cert /var/run/kubernetes/client-admin.crt --key /var/run/kubernetes/client-admin.key
Once the checkpointing has finished the checkpoint should be available at
/var/lib/kubelet/checkpoints/checkpoint-pod-name_namespace-name-container-name-timestamp.tar
In the following steps of this article I will use the name checkpoint.tar
when analyzing the checkpoint archive.
Checkpoint archive analysis using checkpointctl
To get some initial information about the checkpointed container I am using the
tool checkpointctl like this:
$ checkpointctl show checkpoint.tar --print-stats
+-----------+----------------------------------+--------------+---------+---------------------+--------+------------+------------+-------------------+
| CONTAINER | IMAGE | ID | RUNTIME | CREATED | ENGINE | IP | CHKPT SIZE | ROOT FS DIFF SIZE |
+-----------+----------------------------------+--------------+---------+---------------------+--------+------------+------------+-------------------+
| counter | quay.io/adrianreber/counter:blog | 059a219a22e5 | runc | 2023-03-02T06:06:49 | CRI-O | 10.88.0.23 | 8.6 MiB | 3.0 KiB |
+-----------+----------------------------------+--------------+---------+---------------------+--------+------------+------------+-------------------+
CRIU dump statistics
+---------------+-------------+--------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| FREEZING TIME | FROZEN TIME | MEMDUMP TIME | MEMWRITE TIME | PAGES SCANNED | PAGES WRITTEN |
+---------------+-------------+--------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
| 100809 us | 119627 us | 11602 us | 7379 us | 7800 | 2198 |
+---------------+-------------+--------------+---------------+---------------+---------------+
This gives me already some information about the checkpoint in that checkpoint
archive. I can see the name of the container, information about the container
runtime and container engine. It also lists the size of the checkpoint (CHKPT SIZE ). This is mainly the size of the memory pages included in the checkpoint,
but there is also information about the size of all changed files in the
container (ROOT FS DIFF SIZE ).
The additional parameter --print-stats decodes information in the checkpoint
archive and displays them in the second table (CRIU dump statistics ). This
information is collected during checkpoint creation and gives an overview how much
time CRIU needed to checkpoint the processes in the container and how many
memory pages were analyzed and written during checkpoint creation.
Digging deeper
With the help of checkpointctl I am able to get some high level information
about the checkpoint archive. To be able to analyze the checkpoint archive
further I have to extract it. The checkpoint archive is a tar archive and can
be extracted with the help of tar xf checkpoint.tar .
Extracting the checkpoint archive will result in following files and directories:
bind.mounts - this file contains information about bind mounts and is needed
during restore to mount all external files and directories at the right location
checkpoint/ - this directory contains the actual checkpoint as created by
CRIU
config.dump and spec.dump - these files contain metadata about the container
which is needed during restore
dump.log - this file contains the debug output of CRIU created during
checkpointing
stats-dump - this file contains the data which is used by checkpointctl
to display dump statistics (--print-stats )
rootfs-diff.tar - this file contains all changed files on the container's
file-system
File-system changes - rootfs-diff.tar
The first step to analyze the container's checkpoint further is to look at
the files that have changed in my container. This can be done by looking at the
file rootfs-diff.tar :
$ tar xvf rootfs-diff.tar
home/counter/logfile
home/counter/test-file
Now the files that changed in the container can be studied:
$ cat home/counter/logfile
10.88.0.1 - - [02/Mar/2023 06:07:29] "GET /create?test-file HTTP/1.1" 200 -
10.88.0.1 - - [02/Mar/2023 06:07:40] "GET /secret?RANDOM_1432_KEY HTTP/1.1" 200 -
10.88.0.1 - - [02/Mar/2023 06:07:43] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 -
$ cat home/counter/test-file
test-file
Compared to the container image (quay.io/adrianreber/counter:blog ) this
container is based on, I can see that the file logfile contains information
about all access to the service the container provides and the file test-file
was created just as expected.
With the help of rootfs-diff.tar it is possible to inspect all files that
were created or changed compared to the base image of the container.
Analyzing the checkpointed processes - checkpoint/
The directory checkpoint/ contains data created by CRIU while checkpointing
the processes in the container. The content in the directory checkpoint/
consists of different image files which can be analyzed with the
help of the tool CRIT which is distributed as part of CRIU.
First lets get an overview of the processes inside of the container:
$ crit show checkpoint/pstree.img | jq .entries[] .pid
1
7
8
This output means that I have three processes inside of the container's PID
namespace with the PIDs: 1, 7, 8
This is only the view from the inside of the container's PID namespace. During
restore exactly these PIDs will be recreated. From the outside of the
container's PID namespace the PIDs will change after restore.
The next step is to get some additional information about these three processes:
$ crit show checkpoint/core-1.img | jq .entries[ 0] .tc.comm
"bash"
$ crit show checkpoint/core-7.img | jq .entries[ 0] .tc.comm
"counter.py"
$ crit show checkpoint/core-8.img | jq .entries[ 0] .tc.comm
"tee"
This means the three processes in my container are bash , counter.py (a Python
interpreter) and tee . For details about the parent child relations of these processes there
is more data to be analyzed in checkpoint/pstree.img .
Let's compare the so far collected information to the still running container:
$ crictl inspect --output go-template --template "" 059a219a22e56
722520
$ ps auxf | grep -A 2 722520
fedora 722520 \_ bash -c /home/counter/counter.py 2&1 | tee /home/counter/logfile
fedora 722541 \_ /usr/bin/python3 /home/counter/counter.py
fedora 722542 \_ /usr/bin/coreutils --coreutils-prog-shebang=tee /usr/bin/tee /home/counter/logfile
$ cat /proc/722520/comm
bash
$ cat /proc/722541/comm
counter.py
$ cat /proc/722542/comm
tee
In this output I am first retrieving the PID of the first process in the
container and then I am looking for that PID and child processes on the system
where the container is running. I am seeing three processes and the first one is
"bash" which is PID 1 inside of the containers PID namespace. Then I am looking
at /proc/PID/comm and I can find the exact same value
as in the checkpoint image.
Important to remember is that the checkpoint will contain the view from within the
container's PID namespace because that information is important to restore the
processes.
One last example of what crit can tell us about the container is the information
about the UTS namespace:
$ crit show checkpoint/utsns-12.img
{
"magic": "UTSNS",
"entries": [
{
"nodename": "counters",
"domainname": "(none)"
}
]
}
This tells me that the hostname inside of the UTS namespace is counters .
For every resource CRIU collected during checkpointing...
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