C-Archief 2021-2025

Warnings From Weimar Why Bargaining With Authoritarians Fails Daniel Ziblatt August 28, 2025 DANIEL ZIBLATT is Professor of Government and Director of the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University. He is the author of Conservative Parties and the Birth of Democracy and a co-author of How Democracies Die.

On March 23, 1933, inside a dimly lit chamber filled with the stale scent of cigar smoke, Ludwig Kaas tried to convince himself he was making the right decision. A Catholic priest and the leader of Germany’s establishment Center Party, he stood at a crossroads. For several years, his party had sought to block Adolf Hitler’s rise. But in 1932, Hitler’s National Socialists (Nazis) became the largest force in parliament, and in January 1933, Hitler became chancellor. As he moved to consolidate power, the Center Party had become the last remaining obstacle to his bid for total control over Germany.

Hitler had introduced the Enabling Act, which would allow him and his cabinet sweeping powers to rule by decree, thereby dismantling democracy at its core. The act needed a two-thirds majority to pass. The Social Democrats—the only other significant group of parliamentarians that still fundamentally supported democracy—were too few to stop it alone. If the Center Party also resisted, it could block the act’s passage.

But Kaas hesitated. He feared what would happen if his party defied the Nazis. Would it survive? Could democracy endure if his party resisted? Hitler’s storm troopers had already begun arresting political opponents. Kaas convinced himself that his best option was to cooperate—to work within the new reality rather than be crushed by it. “We must preserve our soul,” he told his colleagues, “but a rejection of the Enabling Act will result in unpleasant consequences for our party.” The act passed, 444 to 94, opening the path to Hitler’s dictatorship.

This episode illustrates the dangerous logic of abdication: the belief that, faced with a rising threat to democracy, surrender is strategy, cooperating with an autocrat is survival, and sparing oneself or one’s party from immediate punishment is worth opening the door to long-term authoritarian rule. Kaas was not alone in this kind of thinking. In the years leading up to that moment, three catastrophic miscalculations—each rooted in short-term maneuvering and self-justification—paved the way for Hitler’s ascent.

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Today, this chapter of the Weimar Republic’s history should be revisited. At a moment in which democracy is backsliding in places as varied as Hungary, India, Turkey, and the United States, it is a reminder that democracy often erodes slowly at first, via the gradual surrender of those entrusted to defend it. But with each concession, autocrats become bolder, defenses grow weaker, and reversal becomes harder. Responses that, early on, can feel pragmatic—waiting it out, remaining silent, cutting a deal—only embolden autocrats, leading ultimately to the demise of democracy itself.

FATAL TRANSACTIONS The fateful decisions that doomed the Weimar Republic were made in the aftermath of World War I, shortly after the birth of a new democracy in Germany. The Weimar constitution, drafted in 1919 under the influence of luminaries such as the legal scholar Hugo Preuss and the sociologist Max Weber, enshrined civil liberties, expanded rights for women, and established labor protections. Building on wins secured by an already robust civil society, a broad and confident coalition of progressive forces, liberals, Social Democrats, and the Catholic Center Party established Germany’s post–World War I republic.

Yet this republic was also fragile. It was roiled by rampant political violence, frequent political assassinations, and street fights between communists and fascists, both of whom rejected the new regime. Still, after three turbulent years of hyperinflation and political unrest, by 1924 the Weimar Republic had entered a period of relative stability.

Beginning in 1929, however, the crash of the U.S. stock market hit Germany, triggering a catastrophic economic downturn and mass unemployment. The Communist Party and the Nazis gained ground in elections. This made it difficult for the German parliamentary system to form governments, and country’s president had to resort to installing new chancellors at the head of parliament without parliamentary backing—an extraordinary measure. The resulting policy gridlock enhanced the Nazis’ appeal.

The German conservative establishment granted Hitler legitimacy. But the Great Depression alone did not doom the Weimar Republic. Many other embattled republics in Europe and North America survived this era of economic and political turmoil, including two other new European republics, Czechoslovakia and Finland. What mattered most were not just the shocks themselves but German leaders’ responses to them—choices that shaped the republic’s fate.

The country’s conservative establishment made the first mistake. In the late 1920s, the mainstream right-wing party, the German National People’s Party, was struggling. Its leader, Alfred Hugenberg, was a powerful businessman and media mogul, but he lacked charisma and mass appeal. As he watched Hitler’s Nazi movement gain popularity in state and national elections in the late 1920s, Hugenberg saw an opportunity—not to stop Hitler, but to use him.

Hugenberg recruited the Nazis into a campaign to undo Germany’s obligation to pay World War I reparations. He hoped that their fervor would help reinvigorate the conservative cause. A 1929 referendum attempting to rally the German public behind annulling the debt—and classifying politicians who agreed to pay it as traitors—failed, but the partnership changed everything. It elevated the Nazis from a band of fringe extremists to a political force that had been granted legitimacy by one of Germany’s most influential political figures.

Hugenberg’s miscalculations did not end there. In 1931, he hosted a major right-wing rally in the spa town of Bad Harzburg, inviting Hitler to stand alongside Germany’s nationalist elite. The idea was to present a united conservative front. Instead, Hitler stole the spotlight. His paramilitary forces marched through the streets in a show of discipline and power as Hugenberg faded into the background. By 1933, Hugenberg had realized the full scale of his mistake. He reportedly told a fellow conservative: “I have committed the greatest stupidity of my life; I have allied myself with the greatest demagogue in human history.” But by then it was far too late. At a pivotal moment, Hugenberg had given Hitler what he needed most: respectability.

A PREVENTABLE DEATH The German political establishment’s next miscalculation was even graver: elevating Hitler to power outright. By 1932, Germany’s parliament remained paralyzed. No governing majority could be formed. Conservatives were desperate to establish a stable government that excluded the Social Democrats and Communists, but they lacked the numbers to govern alone. President Paul von Hindenburg, an aging war hero, continued to cycle through chancellors, unable to find anyone who could command the support of a majority of parliamentarians or contain Germany’s deepening economic crisis. Then former Chancellor Franz von Papen made a bold suggestion: offer the chancellorship to Hitler—but surround him with conservative ministers who could control him.

Von Papen was confident that Hitler could be kept on a leash. “Don’t worry,” he told his right-wing colleagues. “Within two months, we’ll have pushed Hitler so far into a corner he’ll squeal.” In January 1933, Hindenburg signed on to the plan, believing that Hitler would remain a figurehead.

The opposite happened. Hitler immediately began consolidating power, sidelining his handlers and dismantling the opposition by arresting leading figures such as the former Prussian minister of the interior and other Social Democratic and Communist Party members of parliament. The Nazi Party was not the choice of a majority of Germans—about two-thirds of Germans had voted against it in the 1932 national elections—and Hitler’s violent moves to seize more influence caused a new atmosphere of intense fear to grip the country. The gamble that antidemocrats could be tamed if they were granted power had failed spectacularly.

German politicians believed they could bargain away democracy’s protections. The February 1933 Reichstag fire, which did so much damage to the parliament building that it temporarily forced the body to hold sessions in the Kroll Opera House a few blocks away, provided the perfect pretext for repression. Hitler’s new government blamed communists for the blaze, also claiming to have proof that they were stockpiling explosives. The Nazi-led government launched mass arrests, and Hitler immediately promulgated the Reichstag Fire Decree, a draconian measure restricting freedom of the press and assembly and allowing the police to detain suspects indefinitely without a trial.

It was this climate of emergency following the Reichstag fire that allowed Hitler to propose the Enabling Act. Kaas and his fellow Center Party leaders debated it for hours, torn between principle and self-preservation. Some urged resistance, warning that Hitler’s power must be checked. But most feared the consequences of defiance. Still others clung to the hope that by cooperating, they might influence Hitler from within—perhaps by helping weaken their Social Democrat rivals or by carving out protections for Center Party or Catholic leaders. In the final vote, all 73 Center Party parliamentarians capitulated, justifying their surrender as a necessary evil