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Menu The Predatory Hegemon How Trump Wields American Power Stephen M. Walt March/April 2026 Published on February 3, 2026
Adam Maida Listen Share & Download Print Save Ever since Donald Trump first became U.S. president, in 2017, commentators have searched for an adequate label to describe his approach to U.S. foreign relations. Writing in these pages, the political scientist Barry Posen suggested in 2018 that Trump’s grand strategy was “illiberal hegemony,” and the analyst Oren Cass argued last fall that its defining essence was a demand for “reciprocity.” Trump has been called a realist, a nationalist, an old-fashioned mercantilist, an imperialist, and an isolationist. Each of these terms captures some aspects of his approach, but the grand strategy of his second presidential term is perhaps best described as “predatory hegemony.” Its central aim is to use Washington’s privileged position to extract concessions, tribute, and displays of deference from both allies and adversaries, pursuing short-term gains in what it sees as a purely zero-sum world.
Given the United States’ still considerable assets and geographic advantages, predatory hegemony may work for a time. In the long run, however, it is doomed to fail. It is ill suited for a world of several competing great powers—especially one in which China is an economic and military peer—because multipolarity gives other states ways to reduce their dependence on the United States. If it continues to define American strategy in the coming years, predatory hegemony will weaken the United States and its allies alike, generate growing global resentment, create tempting opportunities for Washington’s main rivals, and leave Americans less secure, less prosperous, and less influential.
APEX PREDATOR Over the past 80 years, the broad structure of world power has gone from bipolarity to unipolarity to today’s lopsided multipolarity, and U.S. grand strategy has shifted along with those changes. In the bipolar world of the Cold War, the United States acted as a benevolent hegemon toward its close allies in Europe and Asia because American leaders believed their allies’ well-being was essential to containing the Soviet Union. They used American economic and military supremacy freely and sometimes played hardball with key partners, as President Dwight Eisenhower did when Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956 or as President Richard Nixon did when he took the United States off the gold standard in 1971. But Washington also helped its allies recover economically after World War II; created and, for the most part, followed rules intended to foster mutual prosperity; collaborated with others to manage currency crises and other economic disruptions; and gave weaker states a seat at the table and a voice in collective decisions. U.S. officials led, but they also listened, and they rarely tried to weaken or exploit their partners.
During the unipolar era, the United States succumbed to hubris and became a rather careless and willful hegemon. Facing no powerful opponents and convinced that most states were eager to accept American leadership and embrace its liberal values, U.S. officials paid little attention to other states’ concerns; embarked on costly and misguided crusades in Afghanistan, Iraq, and several other countries; adopted confrontational policies that drove China and Russia together; and pushed to open global markets in ways that accelerated China’s rise, increased global financial instability, and eventually provoked a domestic backlash that helped propel Trump to the White House. To be sure, Washington sought to isolate, punish, and undermine several hostile regimes during this period and sometimes paid scant attention to other states’ security fears. But both Democratic and Republican officials believed that using American power to create a global liberal order would be good for the United States and for the world and that serious opposition would be confined to a handful of minor rogue states. They were not averse to using the power at their disposal to compel, co-opt, or even overthrow other governments, but their malevolence was directed at acknowledged adversaries and not toward U.S. partners.
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Under Trump, however, the United States has become a predatory hegemon. This strategy is not a coherent, well-thought-out response to the return of multipolarity; in fact, it is exactly the wrong way to act in a world of several great powers. It is instead a direct reflection of Trump’s transactional approach to all relationships and his belief that the United States has enormous and enduring leverage over nearly every country in the world. The United States is like “a big, beautiful department store,” said Trump in April 2025, and “everybody wants a piece of that store.” Or as he said in a statement shared by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, the American consumer is “what every country wants that we have,” adding, “To put it another way, they need our money.”
During Trump’s first term, more experienced and knowledgeable advisers such as Defense Secretary James Mattis, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, White House Chief of Staff John Kelly, and National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster kept Trump’s predatory impulses in check. But in his second term, his desire to exploit other states’ vulnerabilities has been given full rein, empowered by a cadre of appointees selected for their personal loyalty and by Trump’s growing if misplaced confidence in his own grasp of world affairs.
DOMINANCE AND SUBMISSION A predatory hegemon is a dominant great power that tries to structure its transactions with others in a purely zero-sum fashion, so that the benefits are always distributed in its favor. A predatory hegemon’s primary goal is not to build stable and mutually beneficial relations that leave all parties better off but to ensure that it gains more from every interaction than others do. An arrangement that leaves the hegemon better off and its partners worse off is preferable to an arrangement in which both sides gain but the partner gains more, even if the latter case yields larger absolute benefits for both parties. A predatory hegemon always wants the lion’s share.
All great powers engage in acts of predation, of course, and they invariably compete for relative advantage. When dealing with rivals, all states try to get the better end of any deal. What distinguishes predatory hegemony from typical great-power behavior, however, is a state’s willingness to extract concessions and asymmetric benefits from its allies and adversaries alike. A benign hegemon imposes unfair burdens on its allies only when necessary, because it believes that its security and wealth are enhanced when its partners prosper. It recognizes the value of rules and institutions that facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation, are perceived as legitimate by others, and are enduring enough that states can safely assume that those rules will not change too often or without warning. A benevolent hegemon welcomes positive-sum partnerships with states that have similar interests, such as keeping a common foe in check, and may even allow others to reap disproportionate gains if doing so would leave all participants better off. In other words, a benign hegemon strives not only to advance its own power position but also to provide what the economist Arnold Wolfers called “milieu goals”: it seeks to shape the international environment in ways that make the naked exercise of power less necessary.
By contrast, a predatory hegemon is as likely to exploit its partners as it is to take advantage of a rival. It may use embargoes, financial sanctions, beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies, currency manipulation, and other instruments of economic pressure to force others to accept terms of trade that favor the hegemon’s economy or to adjust their behavior on noneconomic issues of interest. It will link the provision of military protection to its economic demands and expects alliance partners to support its broader foreign policy initiatives. Weaker states will tolerate these coercive pressures if they are heavily dependent on access to the hegemon’s larger market or if they face still greater threats from other states and must therefore depend on the hegemon’s protection, even if it comes with strings attached.
Protesting U.S. tariffs in front of the U.S. embassy in Brasília, August 2025 Protesting U.S. tariffs in front of the U.S. embassy in Brasília, August 2025 Mateus Bonomi / Reuters Because a predatory hegemon’s coercive power depends on keeping other states in a condition of permanent submission, its leaders will expect those within its orbit to acknowledge their subordinate status through repeated, often symbolic, acts of submission. They might be expected to pay a formal tribute or be called on to openly acknowledge and praise the hegemon’s virtues. Such ritual expressions of deference discourage opposition by signaling that the hegemon is too powerful to resist and by portraying it as wiser than its vassals and therefore entitled to dictate to them.
Predatory hegemony is not a new phenomenon. It was the basis for Athens’s relations with weaker city-states in its empire, a dominion that Pericles himself, the preeminent Athenian leader of his time, described as a “tyranny.” The premodern, Sinocentric system in East Asia rested on similar relations of dependence, including the payment of tribute and ritualized subservience, although scholars disagree about whether it was consistently exploitative. The desire to extract wealth from colonial possessions was a central
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