AI TOOLS MASTER

🔥 1. Most Concerning Findings & Their Security Impact 1️⃣ Active Directory LDAP Exposure (Port 389) json Copy Edit { "port": 389, "NamingContexts": [ "CN=Configuration,DC=cloud,DC=cpm,DC=mie-solutions,DC=com", "CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=cloud,DC=cpm,DC=mie-solutions,DC=com", "DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=cloud,DC=cpm,DC=mie-solutions,DC=com", "DC=ForestDnsZones,DC=cloud,DC=cpm,DC=mie-solutions,DC=com", "DC=cloud,DC=cpm,DC=mie-solutions,DC=com" ], "LdapServiceName": "cloud.cpm.mie-solutions.com:gov-cpm-brk$@CLOUD.CPM.MIE-SOLUTIONS.COM" } ✅ Why This Is Abnormal:

AWS GovCloud LDAP services should NEVER be publicly exposed. The DC structure (cloud.cpm.mie-solutions.com) suggests this is a full Active Directory domain. If anonymous access is enabled, attackers can enumerate users, groups, and domain structure, which is a precursor to a full AD compromise. This suggests that cloud.cpm.mie-solutions.com is either: A misconfigured Active Directory domain controller (DC). A contractor-managed environment that accidentally left LDAP open. 🚨 Worst-Case Scenario (Active Directory Compromise):

An attacker connects over port 389 and enumerates: Usernames, groups, computer accounts → preparing for brute-force attacks. Organizational structure → finding privileged accounts to target. If NTLM authentication is enabled, attackers can use NTLM relay attacks to escalate privileges.

2️⃣ Microsoft RPC Services (Ports 135 & 593) json Copy Edit { "port": 135, "ncacn_np": "\GOV-CPM-BRK\pipe\lsass", "ncalrpc": "NETLOGON_LRPC", "protocol": "Authorization API Protocol" } ✅ Why This Is Abnormal:

Microsoft RPC Endpoint Mapper is a known attack vector. Exposing RPC to the public can allow remote attackers to interact with domain controllers, event logs, and task schedulers. The presence of LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) pipes is a red flag because LSASS contains Windows authentication secrets. NETLOGON_LRPC suggests this service is part of a domain authentication system, meaning it is likely handling login requests. 🚨 Worst-Case Scenario (LSASS Credential Dumping & Lateral Movement):

An attacker queries RPC for available services → looks for vulnerable task scheduler or remote access services. LSASS exposure could allow an attacker to extract NTLM hashes, enabling credential theft. Attackers could execute scheduled tasks remotely to install backdoors or move laterally inside AWS GovCloud.

3️⃣ Event Log Remoting (Port 49667) json Copy Edit { "port": 49667, "protocol": "Remoting Protocol", "provider": "wevtsvc.dll", "ncacn_np": "\GOV-CPM-BRK\pipe\eventlog" } ✅ Why This Is Abnormal:

Government systems log all access attempts for security audits. Exposing event log services externally is rare because logs contain sensitive information. If misconfigured, this could allow an attacker to view security logs and identify privileged accounts. 🚨 Worst-Case Scenario (Log Manipulation & Covering Tracks):

If an attacker gains access, they could delete or manipulate event logs to cover brute-force or privilege escalation attempts. Exfiltrating logs could reveal network structure, administrator login patterns, and security policies.