North Korea accused of GPS jamming attacks on South Korean ships and aircraft
Seoul’s military says several vessels and dozens of civilian planes disrupted, a week after Pyongyang fired what it called its most powerful solid-fuel ICBM missile
Nov 2025 to read inbox
Interference 2024
The DFRLab's Foreign Interference Attribution Tracker (FIAT) is an interactive, open-source database that captures allegations of foreign interference relevant to the 2024 election.
RussiaRussian cyber and information warfare practice
Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2024
The 2024 Microsoft Digital Defense Report (MDDR) addresses cyber threats and AI offering insights and guidance to help enhance security and stay ahead of risks.
(PDF) One, Two, or Two Hundred Internets? The Politics of Future Internet Architectures
PDF | The political future of the Internet is often discussed in terms of three archetypes: 1) a single global Internet, 2) a bifurcated Internet, split... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate
Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Transform, but Do Not Lift, the Fog of War – Evidence from Russia's War on Ukraine
National Cybersecurity Governance Ukraine NATO
Hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in cyberspace. The aggressor state is constantly expanding its arsenal of offensive cyber weapons, the use of which can have irreparable and irreversible destructive consequences. Cyberattacks of the Russian Federation are aimed, first and foremost, at the ICS of the state bodies of Ukraine and objects of critical information infrastructure to disable them (cyber sabotage), obtain covert access and control, and conduct intelligence and intelligence-subversive activities. Cyber attacks are also actively used by the aggressor state as an element of special information operations to achieve manipulative influence on the population, interfere in election processes and discredit Ukrainian statehood
The Main Directorate of Radio-Electronic and Cyber Warfare of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Main Directorate) is designed to organise the implementation of tasks related to the planning of the cyber defence of Ukraine; the planning and conducting of radio-electronic warfare and cyber warfare; radio frequency spectrum management, and the development of relevant capabilities. The main tasks of the Main Department are the: • planning, organising, preparation and conducting of cyber warfare in the interests of the strategic use of the Defence Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defence forces; • planning and coordination of actions of cyber defence of Ukraine, state authorities, and components of the security and defence sector; • planning, organisation of preparation and conduct of electronic warfare in the interests of strategic use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defence forces; • implementation of the powers of the General Staff regarding management in the sphere of use of the radio frequency spectrum by special users by the Law of Ukraine "On Electronic Communications".
The Changing Character of Cyber Warfare | Proceedings - June 2024 Vol. 150/6/1,456
The Russia-Ukraine conflict provides a look at the role cyber operations might play in future conflicts.
Cyber effects that have been successfully integrated into military operations generally overlap with highly specialized and intelligence-reliant operations, although this trend is not evident in the current war except by contrast.
he 2022 invasion has shown that Russia’s cyber forces were insufficient to keep pace with the operational tempo of its conventional forces.25 They were adequate for peacetime competition and internal information control, but when asked to surge to meet the urgencies of war, they struggled. This also has applied to proxies; Russia often uses organized crime to perform cyber operations, but the command and communication structures required to control organized crime during peaceful competition are much looser than those required to integrate them with military forces in a conventional war
However, the evident breakdown in integration and alignment with strategic goals indicates that the stress of a drawn-out war hurts loose cyber command relationships rather than benefiting them.27
The conflict demonstrates very little destructive power flowing from cyberspace. Russia’s emphasis and primary skills in cyberspace have trended toward control of information and suppression of political dissent. At the same time, it is unlikely the Viasat hack and the foiled Industroyer2 attack on a Ukrainian power plant constitute the entirety of Russia’s destructive cyber arsenal.
In conflict, cyber warfare appears not to be inherently offense dominant. It appears primarily to be an intelligence-gathering domain, and specialized intelligence-dependent missions maximize the effects of cyber operations
Russia has instead had to wage a war of attrition because cyber forces were unable to generate the chaos and destruction most analysts anticipated.
This war shows that cyberspace is undeniably a domain of intelligence—regardless of its role in warfighting.21 Though offensive Russian cyberattacks slowed significantly after the initial invasion, use of cyberspace to gather intelligence only increased.22
By mid-April, Russia’s offensive cyber operations had fallen to a fraction of the initial effort.9 And the ones it executed have raised several questions about its capability, the most important being: Is Russia able to conduct real-time cyber targeting and widespread destructive cyberattacks? If so, why has it not?
. First, Russia primarily views cyberspace and cyber warfare as a domain of information warfare and houses the majority of its cyber capability in its intelligence community.10 In contrast, its conventional military forces traditionally do not practice a precise, intelligence-driven form of warfare.
Combine a highly proficient but suspicious intelligence community with a military that prioritizes overwhelming force and the result has been a lack of cyber integration into military operations.
In 2014, Russia cut off the information flow to and from Crimea. This lasted long enough for Russia to establish control while simultaneously flooding the global news cycle with enough disinformation to obscure its actions and delay international backlash.
one must first understand its goal: to rapidly seize Ukraine and establish a buffer state between Russia’s western border and NATO.3 It intended to accomplish this by quickly capturing the capital, Kyiv, and most major population centers.
Nazi Germany explored different uses for air power in the Spanish Civil War and developed techniques for air-ground integration that later supported their Blitzkrieg into France.2
n particular, it appears cyber warfare is not offense dominant and instead functions better as an intelligence-gathering domain.
The Interim Years of Cyberspace parallels with air power
The current stage of cyberspace development resembles the interim years between World War I and World War II, when airpower responded to challenges by emerging as a powerful military tool. No comparison does better justice to contemporary cyberspace than airpower during those foundational years
In the years between the world wars, aviation concentrated on defending the nation from adversaries.6 However, some of those defensive capabilities also offered offensive possibilities. T
The cyber mission can work both independently from, and synergistically with, the traditional war-fighting domains across each branch.
Ukraine war: Mobile networks being weaponised to target troops on both sides of conflict
In the first days of 2023, a Ukrainian missile strike in Makiivka killed perhaps hundreds of servicemen - and Russia is blaming it on mobile phone use by its soldiers.
In Ukraine, it is known that the Russians are using the Leer-3 electronic warfare system - comprised two drones and a command truck - as a means to locate Ukrainian forces.
This system can pick up more than 2,000 phones within a 3.7-mile range, potentially enabling a whole host of enemy positions to be found.
something likely to be a problem for Russian forces given reports that their encrypted communication system - called ERA - has not been working well, forcing them to use open radio frequencies and civilian phones.
01 Introduction | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank Russian cyber and information warfare in practice
A spike in destructive cyber assaults against Ukraine occurred in January and February 2022, and has been characterized in one analysis as a process of ‘softening up by software’.17
Attacks that sought to suppress communications by Ukraine’s government and military indicate that long-term, coordinated preparation was involved. One example was the attack on the Viasat KA-SAT network immediately before 24 February, which was followed up by conventional and electronic warfare (EW) attacks also designed to blind Ukrainian forces.18
In the early stages of the new invasion, further destructive attacks on communications and other infrastructure were constrained by an assumption that Ukraine would fall without a fight, and that infrastructure would be taken over by Russian authorities. Once that assumption was discovered to be distant from reality, Russia’s forces across the board found themselves fighting an unanticipated war.
there was a change in tempo to what have been described as ‘fast and dirty’ cyber methods,22 as Russian cyber forces transitioned to tactics that required less forward planning and were more straightforward to implement;
One practical result for Russia’s armed forces is the continuing need to integrate cyber effects with conventional warfare at an operational and tactical level, as well as treating them as strategic tools. This was one of the intents behind the establishment of Russia’s ‘Information Operations Troops’;26 and it has led to a distinctive structure for this element of Russia’s armed forces, grouped under the GRU military intelligence service.27
Dashboard ACLED
Ukrainian Drones Strike Crimea, Oil Refinery in Feodosia Ablaze, Saki and Belbek Air Bases Also Hit
noticed uptick in gps spoofing crimea around this time
Cyberthreat statistics by Kaspersky Lab russia
ransomware statistics for the last month in Russian Federation
New Warning As ‘Spike’ In GPS Spoofing Attacks Hit Passenger Planes—Fasten Your Seatbelts
Beware—do not read this article at 35,000 feet.
“Many of those incidents involve illicit ground-based GPS systems, particularly around conflict zones, that broadcast incorrect positions to the surrounding airspace in a bid to confuse incoming drones or missiles.”
Update on FPV drone warfare (27-01-2024)
FPV drone usage, stats and analysis As my previous article [1] and thread on X [2] highlighted, assessing the evolving impact of FPV drones is crucial to understanding their role in the dynamics of…
Ukraine rolls out dozens of AI systems to help its drones hit targets
Ukraine is using dozens of domestically made AI-augmented systems for its drones to reach targets on the battlefield without being piloted.
A Ukrainian official told Reuters in July that most first person view units' target strike rate had fallen to 30%-50%, while for new pilots that can be as low as 10%, and that signal jamming was the main problem.
Ukraine is also using interceptor drones to down the vast numbers of Russian camera reconnaissance drones helping target artillery and missile strikes on Ukrainian targets behind the lines.
FPV drone tactics reshape conventional trench warfare in Russo-Ukrainian War
Russia is working hard to catch up with the Ukrainian progress and has almost reached the number of Ukrainian FPV drone strikes. With the total number of only FPV drone strikes on both sides now...
The Russian Spectrum of Conflict
Abstract. Russia is one of the loudest, most prolific users of offensive cyber operations (OCOs). Rather than viewing cyber as a domain, it instead looks a
preparing for a post armed conflict strategic environment
Recent calls for NATO to adopt a proactive cyber posture and descriptions of what that would entail are necessary but insufficient for preparing NATO for this forthcoming strategic challenge – NATO should also establish a proactive cyber operational element that continuously campaigns to ensure the security of its member states and partners. It is further proposed that this element would generate an additional benefit of addressing concerns raised by those who argue that the elevation of China in strategic guidance will distract from addressing the Russian strategic challenge.
GPSJAM GPS/GNSS Interference Map
Maps showing daily possible GPS interference.
Cybersecurity Governance and normative frameworks non western country and international organizations
A notable example of such an operation is the cyber-attack on Viasat Inc.’s KA-SAT satellite, which disrupted Ukrainian civil and military communications just hours before the Russian military aggression on February 24, 20226 . This incident marks the RussianUkrainian conflict as the first to start in the cyber domain.
CCDCOE Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellenc nato national cybersecurity governance ukraine report
Gps spoofing final report opsgroup wg og24
400% increase in GPS Spoofing; Workgroup established
GPS Spoofing Risk changes, grows
900 flights a day on average are now encountering GPS Spoofing
Safety risks changing and growing: EGPWS primary concern
GPS Workgroup established to address issue
Troubling data shows a significant spike in GPS Spoofing over the last few months, wi