Russian Funding Canadian Influencers — Canadian Digital Media Research Network
OCTOBER- NOV 2025 updates
Incident Update 8︱Pro-Russian narratives among Tenet Media influencer podcasts — Canadian Digital Media Research Network
Russia links with Trump, US influence
Before she allegedly became a Russian asset, Lauren Chen was the darling of conservative YouTube
Long before she allegedly aided a Russian propaganda operation, Chen built an audience posting right-wing videos under the name “Roaming Millennial.”
Tenet Media #notpaidbyrussia
Russia
Treasury Takes Aim at Third-Country Sanctions Evaders and Russian Producers Supporting Russia’s Military Industrial Base
thinking about kingdom honey.....turkish and russian business collaboration
Autonomous Non Profit Organization Institute for Testing and Certification of Armament and Military Materiel develops certification technologies and quality control systems for the Russian Ministry of Defense and U.S.-designated Russian defense companies.
Joint Stock Company Intellect Mashine develops weapons, including drones used in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Joint Stock Company Scientific Research Institute of Communication Systems and Automated Control Systems develops automatic control and communication systems and other military equipment for the Russian military.
Limited Liability Company Astron Aero develops drones and combat anti-drone systems and has presented its products at a Russian defense exhibition.
Japan to take all steps to ensure uninterrupted Sakhalin-2 LNG supply from Russia
TOKYO :Japan will take all possible measures to prevent disruptions in securing a stable supply of liquefied natural gas from Russia's Sakhalin-2 project following new U.S. sanctions, Japan Industry Minister Yoji Muto said on Friday.The United States imposed new sanctions on Russia's Gazprombank on Thursday,
New U.S. sanctions probably spell end of EU energy payments through Russia's Gazprombank
New U.S. sanctions on Moscow may shut down the only way European customers can pay for Russian gas, increase volatility on Russia's FX market and push Moscow closer to Beijing's orbit, Russian economists said on Friday.
U.S. Sanctions Russian TV Stations, Prohibits Accounting Services After G7 Leaders Meet
The United States has unveiled sanctions against three Russian television stations and executives from Gazprombank along with a ban on Americans providing accounting and consulting services to Russians after the leaders of the Group of 7 (G7) met to discuss Russia's war against Ukraine.
The sanctions also prohibit Americans from providing accounting, trust, corporate formation, and management consulting services to Russians, though providing legal services is still permissible.
The sanctions against Channel One, Russia-1, and NTV prohibit any U.S. company from financing them through advertising or selling them equipme
Promtekhnologiya,
Channel One Russia personality indicted over alleged violations of US sanctions
In exchange for his work at sanctioned station, Justice Department says, Dimitri Simes received over $1 million, car and stipend for apartment
Pres EO specifying exceptions to the telecom exemption on russian sanctions
Damage to Baltic Sea cables was sabotage, German minister says
Boris Pistorius says ‘no one believes’ two undersea fibre-optic communications cables were cut accidentally
STATISTICS | Kaspersky Cyberthreat live map
Find out if you’re under cyber-attack here #CyberSecurityMap #CyberSecurity
Amanda Super Rough - Cyber War Is Here
1 - bg - Cyber-offensive targeting Ukraine wasn’t as effective as desired, potentially due to lack of coordination This analysis argues that the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine signaled a convergence between the domains of cyber and kinetic warfare, defying the previous consensus that cyber-war...
These are America's most intense electronic weapons
Control of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum is a major asset in military operations. The Marines have demonstrated their painful "heat ray,"
Nov 2025 to read inbox
Cyberspace is an Analogy, Not a Domain: Rethinking Domains and Layers of Warfare for the Information Age
The buzzwordification of the term domain has long passed the point of diminishing returns, and nowhere is that a greater hazard than with cyber operations. It’s time to re-think cyber to reflect the realities of modern war, and with it the broader lexicon of what constitutes domains and layers of wa
North Korea accused of GPS jamming attacks on South Korean ships and aircraft
Seoul’s military says several vessels and dozens of civilian planes disrupted, a week after Pyongyang fired what it called its most powerful solid-fuel ICBM missile
Interference 2024
The DFRLab's Foreign Interference Attribution Tracker (FIAT) is an interactive, open-source database that captures allegations of foreign interference relevant to the 2024 election.
Russian cyber and information warfare practice
Microsoft Digital Defense Report 2024
The 2024 Microsoft Digital Defense Report (MDDR) addresses cyber threats and AI offering insights and guidance to help enhance security and stay ahead of risks.
(PDF) One, Two, or Two Hundred Internets? The Politics of Future Internet Architectures
PDF | The political future of the Internet is often discussed in terms of three archetypes: 1) a single global Internet, 2) a bifurcated Internet, split... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate
Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Transform, but Do Not Lift, the Fog of War – Evidence from Russia's War on Ukraine
National Cybersecurity Governance Ukraine NATO
Hybrid aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in cyberspace. The aggressor state is constantly expanding its arsenal of offensive cyber weapons, the use of which can have irreparable and irreversible destructive consequences. Cyberattacks of the Russian Federation are aimed, first and foremost, at the ICS of the state bodies of Ukraine and objects of critical information infrastructure to disable them (cyber sabotage), obtain covert access and control, and conduct intelligence and intelligence-subversive activities. Cyber attacks are also actively used by the aggressor state as an element of special information operations to achieve manipulative influence on the population, interfere in election processes and discredit Ukrainian statehood
The Main Directorate of Radio-Electronic and Cyber Warfare of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Main Directorate) is designed to organise the implementation of tasks related to the planning of the cyber defence of Ukraine; the planning and conducting of radio-electronic warfare and cyber warfare; radio frequency spectrum management, and the development of relevant capabilities. The main tasks of the Main Department are the: • planning, organising, preparation and conducting of cyber warfare in the interests of the strategic use of the Defence Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defence forces; • planning and coordination of actions of cyber defence of Ukraine, state authorities, and components of the security and defence sector; • planning, organisation of preparation and conduct of electronic warfare in the interests of strategic use of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other components of the defence forces; • implementation of the powers of the General Staff regarding management in the sphere of use of the radio frequency spectrum by special users by the Law of Ukraine "On Electronic Communications".
The Changing Character of Cyber Warfare | Proceedings - June 2024 Vol. 150/6/1,456
The Russia-Ukraine conflict provides a look at the role cyber operations might play in future conflicts.
Cyber effects that have been successfully integrated into military operations generally overlap with highly specialized and intelligence-reliant operations, although this trend is not evident in the current war except by contrast.
he 2022 invasion has shown that Russia’s cyber forces were insufficient to keep pace with the operational tempo of its conventional forces.25 They were adequate for peacetime competition and internal information control, but when asked to surge to meet the urgencies of war, they struggled. This also has applied to proxies; Russia often uses organized crime to perform cyber operations, but the command and communication structures required to control organized crime during peaceful competition are much looser than those required to integrate them with military forces in a conventional war
However, the evident breakdown in integration and alignment with strategic goals indicates that the stress of a drawn-out war hurts loose cyber command relationships rather than benefiting them.27
The conflict demonstrates very little destructive power flowing from cyberspace. Russia’s emphasis and primary skills in cyberspace have trended toward control of information and suppression of political dissent. At the same time, it is unlikely the Viasat hack and the foiled Industroyer2 attack on a Ukrainian power plant constitute the entirety of Russia’s destructive cyber arsenal.
In conflict, cyber warfare appears not to be inherently offense dominant. It appears primarily to be an intelligence-gathering domain, and specialized intelligence-dependent missions maximize the effects of cyber operations
Russia has instead had to wage a war of attrition because cyber forces were unable to generate the chaos and destruction most analysts anticipated.
This war shows that cyberspace is undeniably a domain of intelligence—regardless of its role in warfighting.21 Though offensive Russian cyberattacks slowed significantly after the initial invasion, use of cyberspace to gather intelligence only increased.22
By mid-April, Russia’s offensive cyber operations had fallen to a fraction of the initial effort.9 And the ones it executed have raised several questions about its capability, the most important being: Is Russia able to conduct real-time cyber targeting and widespread destructive cyberattacks? If so, why has it not?
. First, Russia primarily views cyberspace and cyber warfare as a domain of information warfare and houses the majority of its cyber capability in its intelligence community.10 In contrast, its conventional military forces traditionally do not practice a precise, intelligence-driven form of warfare.
Combine a highly proficient but suspicious intelligence community with a military that prioritizes overwhelming force and the result has been a lack of cyber integration into military operations.
In 2014, Russia cut off the information flow to and from Crimea. This lasted long enough for Russia to establish control while simultaneously flooding the global news cycle with enough disinformation to obscure its actions and delay international backlash.
one must first understand its goal: to rapidly seize Ukraine and establish a buffer state between Russia’s western border and NATO.3 It intended to accomplish this by quickly capturing the capital, Kyiv, and most major population centers.
Nazi Germany explored different uses for air power in the Spanish Civil War and developed techniques for air-ground integration that later supported their Blitzkrieg into France.2
n particular, it appears cyber warfare is not offense dominant and instead functions better as an intelligence-gathering domain.
The Interim Years of Cyberspace parallels with air power
The current stage of cyberspace development resembles the interim years between World War I and World War II, when airpower responded to challenges by emerging as a powerful military tool. No comparison does better justice to contemporary cyberspace than airpower during those foundational years
In the years between the world wars, aviation concentrated on defending the nation from adversaries.6 However, some of those defensive capabilities also offered offensive possibilities. T
The cyber mission can work both independently from, and synergistically with, the traditional war-fighting domains across each branch.
Ukraine war: Mobile networks being weaponised to target troops on both sides of conflict
In the first days of 2023, a Ukrainian missile strike in Makiivka killed perhaps hundreds of servicemen - and Russia is blaming it on mobile phone use by its soldiers.
In Ukraine, it is known that the Russians are using the Leer-3 electronic warfare system - comprised two drones and a command truck - as a means to locate Ukrainian forces.
This system can pick up more than 2,000 phones within a 3.7-mile range, potentially enabling a whole host of enemy positions to be found.
something likely to be a problem for Russian forces given reports that their encrypted communication system - called ERA - has not been working well, forcing them to use open radio frequencies and civilian phones.
01 Introduction | Chatham House – International Affairs Think Tank Russian cyber and information warfare in practice
A spike in destructive cyber assaults against Ukraine occurred in January and February 2022, and has been characterized in one analysis as a process of ‘softening up by software’.17
Attacks that sought to suppress communications by Ukraine’s government and military indicate that long-term, coordinated preparation was involved. One example was the attack on the Viasat KA-SAT network immediately before 24 February, which was followed up by conventional and electronic warfare (EW) attacks also designed to blind Ukrainian forces.18
In the early stages of the new invasion, further destructive attacks on communications and other infrastructure were constrained by an assumption that Ukraine would fall without a fight, and that infrastructure would be taken over by Russian authorities. Once that assumption was discovered to be distant from reality, Russia’s forces across the board found themselves fighting an unanticipated war.
there was a change in tempo to what have been described as ‘fast and dirty’ cyber methods,22 as Russian cyber forces transitioned to tactics that required less forward planning and were more straightforward to implement;
One practical result for Russia’s armed forces is the continuing need to integrate cyber effects with conventional warfare at an operational and tactical level, as well as treating them as strategic tools. This was one of the intents behind the establishment of Russia’s ‘Information Operations Troops’;26 and it has led to a distinctive structure for this element of Russia’s armed forces, grouped under the GRU military intelligence service.27
Dashboard ACLED
Ukrainian Drones Strike Crimea, Oil Refinery in Feodosia Ablaze, Saki and Belbek Air Bases Also Hit
noticed uptick in gps spoofing crimea around this time