Phase 1 - Mobilize Locally

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Russia: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report | Freedom House
Russia: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report | Freedom House
See the Freedom on the Net 2024 score and learn about democracy and freedom in Russia.
In the process of implementing of the 2019 Sovereign Internet Law, Roskomnadzor expanded its ability to censor the internet in Russia. The installation of Technical Measures to Combat Threats (TSPU) equipment, which is based on the use of DPI technology on telecommunications networks, allows Roskomnadzor to restrict access and block websites
A new measure set to take effect in September 2024, after the coverage period, prevents operators from providing services without installing TSPU equipmen
Insider, a Russian investigative outlet that operates in exile in Latvia, reported that the government had acquired technology to conduct “protocol-based blocking” under TSPU. With the ability to block unique protocols that specific platforms rely on,
the government ran another test to disconnect the Runet from the international internet.40 The government reported that the test was successful, though many international and government websites were inaccessible during the two-hour test
The Runet law also gave Roskomnadzor a new role as the government representative at Russia’s country code top-level domain (ccTLD) registrar, which administers the .ru and .РФ domains.
In January 2024, Roskomnadzor blocked the websites of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and “a number of resources belonging to state structures of ‘hostile’ countries for disseminating material aimed at destabilizing the social and political situation in Russia.”112 Roskomnadzor alleged that the CIA and FBI had published false information about the invasion.
In March 2024, a law banning the promotion of bypass-blocking methods came into force.
A July 2023 report from the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab found that takedown orders issued to VK, which is effectively owned by the state through Gazprom and Sogaz, had increased by 3,000 percent since the start of the invasion
Other blocked websites include Ukrainian news sites, international news sites, and Russian news sites that tried to accurately report on the invasion (see B1). After the invasion, a wide range of media outlets shut down, reduced their coverage, or moved their websites outside of the Runet.
Authorities have taken a range of measures, including ordering website blocking271 and content removal,272 to stifle the late opposition figure Aleksey Navalny and individuals associated with his Smart Voting movement
In July 2023, Roskomnadzor announced It would begin issues fines ranging from one to five million rubles ($11,220 to $56,120) to ISPs and mobile operators that fail to install the TSPU system
In December 2021, Roskomnadzor ordered the blocking of Tor and blocked the service using DPI technology, but after lawyers from Roskomsvoboda appealed the ruling, it was overturned in May 2022 (see B1). In July 2022, Roskomnadzor briefly unblocked the Tor browser,362 though a court banned Tor again in the same month.
The law on sovereign Runet also obliges operators to install deep packet inspection (DPI) systems on their networks to filter subscribers’ internet traffic.
·freedomhouse.org·
Russia: Freedom on the Net 2024 Country Report | Freedom House
‘User X with driver Y traveled from point A to point B’ Yandex is set to start sharing Yango taxi ride data with the FSB. Users in Israel, Europe, and elsewhere may find their privacy rights compromised by Russia’s new surveillance law. — Meduza
‘User X with driver Y traveled from point A to point B’ Yandex is set to start sharing Yango taxi ride data with the FSB. Users in Israel, Europe, and elsewhere may find their privacy rights compromised by Russia’s new surveillance law. — Meduza

What prompted a wave of concern was the news that Russia was about to pass a new law granting its Federal Security Service (FSB) round-the-clock access to all the traffic data aggregated by certain taxi services. Due to a quirk in its formulation, the law, in fact, applied to only one Russian company: Yandex Go, the only taxi service on the Russian register of information distributors.

Until then, companies in Russia were only obliged to share their data with the law enforcement and security services if petitioned formally by the officials. Now, concerned customers were writing to Yandex from outside of Russia, asking for explanations about their data and whether it would be handed over to the secret police. This prompted an internal message exchange, in which the management clarified that “data from all of Yango” is “stored in Russia,” and there is no “material or logical division” between data collected from users inside and outside of the country. All of Yandex’s data centers, the messages stated, were located in Russia, but mentioning this information should be avoided when talking to customers.

Every single installation of the app is linked to a concrete location, and you can differentiate and granulate everything city-by-city. So it’s perfectly possible to move, say, the Istanbul or the Tbilisi data. The problem is that, come September, the secret services will gain access to the common data that flows into Yandex. And that includes the foreign rides. Yandex has long claimed that its European operations were in strict compliance with the GDPR. These protections are also mentioned in the confidentiality policies published by Yango and Yandex Go. Inside Russia, though, European privacy norms may well be compromised where they come in conflict with the applicable Russian law.

The former Yandex executive Grigory Bakunov says that he can see two possible ways in which the FSB could make use of the data obtained from Yandex:

Imagine that you have two possibilities. Either you can work bare-handed with a heap of raw data, or you can, figuratively speaking, get an email report based on certain variables: “User X with driver Y traveled from point A to point B.” It’s really in the hands of the FSB whether they want to work with the big pile of data. If they have enough specialists, maybe they wouldn’t mind reading the whole trove.

If the FSB were to choose the second option, Bakunov suggests, Russians who left the country for former CIS countries since the start of the Ukraine war will be especially at risk:

That trove contains ride data from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Georgia, and other places where Russians moved since the start of the war. This, I would say, is more of a threat than access to data on Finland, Norway, or Algeria.

·meduza.io·
‘User X with driver Y traveled from point A to point B’ Yandex is set to start sharing Yango taxi ride data with the FSB. Users in Israel, Europe, and elsewhere may find their privacy rights compromised by Russia’s new surveillance law. — Meduza