NSO Group claims that its Pegasus spyware is only used to “investigate terrorism and crime” and “leaves no traces whatsoever”. This Forensic Methodology Report shows that neither of these statements are true. This report accompanies the release of the Pegasus Project, a collaborative investigation that involves more than 80 journalists from 17 media organizations in 10 countries coordinated by Forbidden Stories with technical support of Amnesty International’s Security Lab. Amnesty International’s Security Lab has performed in-depth forensic analysis of numerous mobile devices from human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists around the world. This research has uncovered widespread, persistent and ongoing unlawful surveillance and human rights abuses perpetrated using NSO Group’s Pegasus spyware.
In our October 2019 report, we detail how we determined these redirections to be the result of network injection attacks performed either through tactical devices, such as rogue cell towers, or through dedicated equipment placed at the mobile operator.
, but also when using other apps.
WebKit local storage, IndexedDB folders, and more.
Safari’s Session Resource logs provide additional traces that do not consistently appear in Safari’s browsing history.
Maati Monjib visited https://yahoo.fr, and a network injection forcefully redirected the browser to documentpro[.]org before further redirecting to free247downloads[.]com and proceed with the exploitation.
iOS maintains records of process executions and their respective network usage in two SQLite database files called “DataUsage.sqlite” and “netusage.sqlite”
network usage databases contained records of a suspicious process called “bh”.
leveraged a vulnerability in the iOS JavaScriptCore Binary (jsc) to achieve code execution on the device
persistence on the device after reboot
“bh.c – Loads API functions that relate to the decompression of next stage payloads and their proper placement on the victim’s iPhone by using functions such as BZ2_bzDecompress, chmod, and malloc
herefore, we suspect that “bh” might stand for “BridgeHead”, which is likely the internal name assigned by NSO Group to this component of their toolkit.
The bh process first appeared on Omar Radi’s phone on 11 February 2019. This occurred 10 seconds after an IndexedDB file was created by the Pegasus Installation Server
At around the same time the file com.apple.CrashReporter.plist file was written in /private/var/root/Library/Preferences/, likely to disable reporting of crash logs back to Apple.
roleaboutd and msgacntd processes are a later stage of the Pegasus spyware which was loaded after a successful exploitation and privilege escalation with the BridgeHead payload.
Network injection is an effective and cost-efficient attack vector for domestic use especially in countries with leverage over mobile operators
iOS keeps a record of Apple IDs seen by each installed application in a plist file located at /private/var/mobile/Library/Preferences/com.apple.identityservices.idstatuscache.plist