What's New Industry Day in Paris, France On October 18, 2022, the SM ICG hosted Industry Day in Paris, France. Industry Day marks a unique opportunity for aviation service providers in France to hear directly from a group of authorities from across the world, and for those authorities to receive feedback on SM ICG products. The full day session was divided into two parts—Safety Management Systems (SMS) as a Tool to Overcome Crises and Innovative Approaches to SMS after the COVID Crisis. Read more Change Management at the State Level This document focuses on the need for, and benefits of, change management and the type of changes commonly seen at the State level from the perspective of Aviation Regulatory Authorities. This document also includes a typical change management process, tools, and guidance, and provides examples to illustrate the change management process. Read more Safety Manager's Role in SMS The objective of this document is to provide guidance on the roles and responsibilities of the Safety Manager; associated knowledge, skills, and attitudes; examples of do and don'ts; considerations on the scalability of the Safety Manager tasks based on the size and complexity of the organization; and training syllabus for consideration. Read more SM ICG Description The Safety Management International Collaboration Group (SM ICG) was founded by the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) and is a joint cooperation between many regulatory authorities for the purpose of promoting a common understanding of safety management and Safety Management System (SMS)/State Safety Program (SSP) principles and requirements, facilitating their implementation across the international aviation community. The current core membership of the SM ICG includes the Aviation Safety and Security Agency (AESA) of Spain, the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) of Brazil, the Civil Aviation Authority of the Netherlands (CAA NL), the Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA NZ), the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS), Civil Aviation Department of Hong Kong (CAD HK), the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia, the Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (DGAC) in France, the Ente Nazionale per l'Aviazione Civile (ENAC) in Italy, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Federal Office of Civil Aviation (FOCA) of Switzerland, the Dominican Republic Civil Aviation Institute (IDAC), the Finnish Transport and Communications Agency (TRAFICOM), the Irish Aviation Authority (IAA), Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB), the United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Aviation Safety Organization, Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation Authority (UAE GCAA), and the Civil Aviation Authority of United Kingdom (UK CAA). Additionally, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is an observer to this group. Members of the SM ICG: Collaborate on common SMS/SSP topics of interest Share lessons learned Encourage the progression of a harmonized SMS Share products with the aviation community Collaborate with international organizations such as ICAO and civil aviation authorities that have implemented or are implementing SSP/SMS Notifications To receive notification when new SM ICG content is published, contact smicg.share@gmail.com.   SM ICG Products All SM ICG products are accessible from the category navigation menu to the right. The SM ICG welcomes feedback on its products. For further information regarding the SM ICG or to provide feedback, please contact Bernard Bourdon, Eugene Huang, or Andrew Larsen.   Points of Contact (POCs) Eugene Huang Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Aviation Safety +1 202-267-7577 Eugene Huang Neverton Novais National Civil Aviation Agency - Brazil (ANAC) +55 61 3314 4606 Neverton Novais Andrew Larsen Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) +1 613 993-9158 Andrew Larsen Charles Galea Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia +07 3144 7487 Charles Galea Bernard Bourdon European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) +49 221 89990 2022 Bernard Bourdon Further Reading ICAO Integrated Safety Management website Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) SMS European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Safety Management Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) SMS Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) of Australia SMS Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand (CAA NZ) SMS National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) of Brazil State Safety Program (SSP)

Description On this page you will find articles with material relating to Helicopter Safety.

Description Accident Investigation is carried out in accordance with national regulations which are largely compliant with ICAO Annex 13. Read more here.

Description The Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) was founded in 1997 with a goal to reduce the commercial aviation fatality risk in the United States by 80 percent by 2007. To achieve this ambitious goal, the CAST developed and started implementing a comprehensive Safety Enhancement Plan. By 2007, CAST was able to report that, by implementing the most promising safety enhancements, the fatality rate of commercial air travel in the United States was reduced by 83 percent. CAST continues to develop, evaluate and add Safety Enhancements to the CAST Plan for continuing fatality risk reduction. CAST Safety Enhancement Plan provides access to the description of each Safety Enhancement and the related other resources. In addition, there are a number of Safety Enhancements Reserved for Future Implementation (SERFIs) Public versions of the CAST Reports that generated these Safety Enhancements will be posted as they become available.

Description This category is under development. This page will contain information and guidance material associated with ICAO Accident Data Reporting system (ADREP).

The SKYbrary Just Culture Repository and Knowledge Centre contains a comprehensive overview of both applicable law as well as registered commitments, policies and positions from states, stakeholders, authorities, the judiciary and other organisations; it is managed by a sufficiently independent and experienced entity. The Just Culture (JC) Repository contains clear and transparent commitments signed off by the owners/stakeholders and will be a living space with clear provisions on updating and reporting on relevant developments as well as managing the data and documentation. The repository provides an insight on the status and progress of the application of Just Culture across both state and corporate levels. This is important for a realistic assessment what tasks lies ahead to attain a common application of Just Culture in Europe and beyond. It will also provide examples of reasonable and attainable objectives for states/organisations that currently do not yet have fully implemented a Just Culture. Data and Knowledge is provided to Interested Parties without any restrictions or registrations constraints. An overview of the repository contents is provided in the navigation block to the right. Just Culture Definition A Just Culture has been defined as a culture in which front line operators and others are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not tolerated. Only a very small proportion of human actions that are unsafe are deliberate (e.g. criminal activity, substance abuse, use of controlled substances, reckless noncompliance, sabotage, etc.) and as such deserve sanctions of appropriate severity. A blanket amnesty on all unsafe acts would lack credibility in the eyes of employees and could be seen to oppose natural justice. Read the lead article on Just Culture. Further Reading About Just Culture Just Culture Just Culture and Media Just Culture Knowledge Centre

Description Safety Culture is the way safety is perceived, valued and prioritised in an organisation. It reflects the real commitment to safety at all levels in the organisation. Safety Culture is not something you get or buy; it is something an organisation has. Safety Culture can therefore be positive, negative or neutral. Its essence is in what people believe about the importance of safety, including what they think their peers, superiors and leaders really believe about safety’s priority.  Read the lead article on Safety Culture.

Description Theory of Flight is about how aircraft fly and the related theoretical background which is the inevitable consequence of flight. The content of the articles in this category is generic. Many pilots only encounter the application of some of the underlying principles they originally learned much later on. The purpose of this category in SKYbrary is to provide simple summaries of those parts of the theory of flight for which a good understanding is most likely to support safe flight, both in normal and abnormal circumstances. The full article can be read here.

Description Safety nets are ground-based or airborne system functions that alert controllers or pilots to potentially hazardous situations in an effective manner and with sufficient warning time for the situation to be resolved. The full article can be read here.

Description Safety management implies a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structure, accountabilities, policies and procedures. The objective of safety management in the aviation industry is to prevent human injury or loss of life, and to avoid damage to the environment and to property. The lead article on safety management can be read here. Based on the specific aspects of safety management the articles listed below have been assigned to the following sub-categories: Safety Management Principles, Safety Management System and Safety Management Methods and Tools. To select a sub-category use the filter in the right data block.

Description This category contains articles on specific aircraft systems/systems-of-systems.

Description Cabin safety contributes to the prevention of accidents and incidents; the protection of the aircraft’s occupants, through proactive safety management, including hazard identification and safety risk management; and the increase of survivability in the event of an emergency situation. Read the full article about Cabin safety.

Description The Operator's Guide to Human Factors in Aviation (OGHFA) is a project of the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) European Advisory Committee. OGHFA is an extensive compendium of human factors information focused on further advancing commercial aviation safety. The articles are supported by a series of situational examples, checklists and visual presentations (see below). By way of an introduction, here below is the link to an article  to give you a broad overview of what is the Operator's Guide to Human Factors all about: An Introduction to the Purpose and Use of the Operator's Guide to Human Factors in Aviation

Description On this page you will find articles relating to aviation medicine and human physiology.

Description On this page you will find articles on Human Factors Training. You may find further information of interest in the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) toolkit: "Operators Guide to Human Factors in Aviation".

Description On this page you will find articles on the subject of Organisation and Human Performance.

Description On this page you will find articles on the subject of Models for Human Factors. You may find further information of interest in the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) toolkit: "Operators Guide to Human Factors in Aviation".

Description On this page you will find articles on the subject of Design Philosophy. You may find further information of interest in the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) toolkit: "Operators Guide to Human Factors in Aviation".

Description On this page you will find articles on the subject of Human Behaviour - factors which affect personal performance but also affect interaction with others, which often defines overall safety performance. For a wider view of content in the Human Performance Portal see the separate article Human Performance. You may find further information of interest in the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) toolkit: "Operators Guide to Human Factors in Aviation".

Description An Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) has three components: An autonomous or human-operated control system which is usually on the ground or a ship but may be on another airborne platform; An Unmanned Aircraft (UA); A command and control (C2) system - sometimes referred to as a communication, command and control (C3) system - to link the two. These systems include, but are not limited to, Remotely Piloted Air Systems (RPAS) in which the UA is controlled by a 'pilot' using a radio data link from a remote location. UAS can also include an autonomously controlled UA or, more likely, a semi autonomous UA. In recent years, the tendency to refer to any UA as a Drone has developed but the term is not universally considered appropriate. UAs can vary in size from those which can be hand launched to purpose built or adapted vehicles the size of conventional fixed or rotary wing aircraft. For further informaiton read the entry article about Unmanned Aerial Systems.

Description This category contains articles covering various aspects of Emergency and Contigency. The articles are grouped together under the following sub-categories: Aircraft Emergency & Unusual Situations Emergency Response Planning ANS Contingency Planning To select a sub-category of articles use the filter in the right data block.

Description On this page you will find articles on the subject of Weather. If you are a new vistor to this SKYbrary category, a good starting point is the entry level article Weather. Based on the specific weather-related topics the articles listed below have been assigned to the following sub-categories: Icing, Turbulence, Volcanic Ash, Weather Risk Management, Weather Phenomena, Cloud Formation, Climatic Phenomena and Atmosphere. To select a sub-category use the filter in the right data block. Because of their nature, some articles are listed in more than one sub-category.

Description All aircraft generate vortices at the wing tips as a consequence of producing lift. The heavier the aircraft and the slower it is flying, the stronger the vortex. Among other factors, the size of the vortex is proportional to the span of the aircraft which generates it. At low altitudes, vortices generally persist for as long as 80 seconds, but in very light or calm wind conditions, they can last for up to two and a half minutes. Once formed, vortices continue to descend until they decay (or reach the ground). Decay is usually rapid and occurs more quickly in windy conditions. Cross-winds can carry a vortex away from the flight path of the aircraft. Wake vortices are also a hazard at en-route altitudes: For further informaiton read the lead article about Wake Vortex Turbulence.

Description ICAO defines a Runway Incursion as: “Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take off of aircraft”. A general overview of the topic can be found in the article Runway Incursion. Based on the specific aspects of runway incursion the articles listed below have been assigned to the following sub-categories: Airport Design and Infrastructure, Preventing Incorrect Presence on Runway, Runway Incursion Safety Nets, Organisational Defences Against Runway Incursion and Wrong Runway Use. To select a sub-category use the filter in the right data block. Because of their nature, some articles are listed in more than one sub-category.

Description Runway excursions can occur on takeoff or on landing as well as during taxi. They consist of two types of events: Veer-Off: Excursion in which an aircraft departs the physical edges of a runway/taxiway. Overrun: Excursion in which an aircraft departs the end of a runway In view of the above, the articles related to runway excursions have been assigned to the following sub-categories: Overrun on Take Off: A departing aircraft fails to become airborne or successfully reject the take off before reaching the end of the runway. Overrun on Landing: A landing aircraft is unable to stop before the end of the runway is reached. Veer Off: An aircraft departs the side of the runway after touchdown on landing or departs the side of the runway during line-up or the take off run. To select a sub-category use the filter in the right data block. Because of their nature, some articles are listed in more than one sub-category.

Description Loss of separation between aircraft occurs whenever specified separation minima are breached. Minimum separation standards for airspace are specified by ATS authorities, based on ICAO standards. Types of Loss of Separation Loss of separation between aircraft normally occurs when both the horizontal and the vertical minima are breached (the exception being composite separation) and may ultimately result in a mid air collision. A Level Bust is one scenario where a loss of separation occurs, leading potentially to a mid air collision. Loss of separation from notified airspace is dealt with under Airspace Infringement. Loss of separation from the ground is dealt with under Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT). Loss of separation between aircraft on the ground is dealt with under Ground Operations and Runway Incursion. Wake vortex, which may be a consequence of loss of separation between aircraft on the same track, is covered in the category: Wake Vortex Turbulence. For further information read the lead article about Loss of Separation.

Description On this page you can see all the articles related to the subject of Loss of Control. While many of the subjects covered within this risk category are not in themselves loss of control issues, the mishandling of those events could very rapidly result in a loss of control situation. Loss of control in flight is a major cause of fatal aircraft accidents. Loss of control usually occurs because the aircraft enters a flight regime which is outside its normal envelope. For further information read the lead article about Loss of Control.

Definition A level bust is defined by EUROCONTROL as: Any unauthorised vertical deviation of more than 300 feet from an ATC flight clearance. Description A level bust occurs when an aircraft fails to fly at the level to which it has been cleared, regardless of whether actual loss of separation from other aircraft or the ground results. Level busts are also known as Altitude Deviations. For further information read the lead article about Level Bust.