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Frozen in transit: Secret Blizzard’s AiTM campaign against diplomats
Frozen in transit: Secret Blizzard’s AiTM campaign against diplomats
Microsoft Threat Intelligence has uncovered a cyberespionage campaign by the Russian state actor we track as Secret Blizzard that has been targeting embassies located in Moscow using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) position to deploy their custom ApolloShadow malware. ApolloShadow has the capability to install a trusted root certificate to trick devices into trusting malicious actor-controlled sites, enabling Secret Blizzard to maintain persistence on diplomatic devices, likely for intelligence collection. This campaign, which has been ongoing since at least 2024, poses a high risk to foreign embassies, diplomatic entities, and other sensitive organizations operating in Moscow, particularly to those entities who rely on local internet providers. While we previously assessed with low confidence that the actor conducts cyberespionage activities within Russian borders against foreign and domestic entities, this is the first time we can confirm that they have the capability to do so at the Internet Service Provider (ISP) level. This means that diplomatic personnel using local ISP or telecommunications services in Russia are highly likely targets of Secret Blizzard’s AiTM position within those services. In our previous blog, we reported the actor likely leverages Russia’s domestic intercept systems such as the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM), which we assess may be integral in facilitating the actor’s current AiTM activity, judging from the large-scale nature of these operations. This blog provides guidance on how organizations can protect against Secret Blizzard’s AiTM ApolloShadow campaign, including forcing or routing all traffic through an encrypted tunnel to a trusted network or using an alternative provider—such as a satellite-based connection—hosted within a country that does not control or influence the provider’s infrastructure. The blog also provides additional information on network defense, such as recommendations, indicators of compromise (IOCs), and detection details. Secret Blizzard is attributed by the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) as Russian Federal Security Service (Center 16). Secret Blizzard further overlaps with threat actors tracked by other security vendors by names such as VENOMOUS BEAR, Uroburos, Snake, Blue Python, Turla, Wraith, ATG26, and Waterbug. As part of our continuous monitoring, analysis, and reporting of the threat landscape, we are sharing our observations on Secret Blizzard’s latest activity to raise awareness of this actor’s tradecraft and educate organizations on how to harden their attack surface against this and similar activity. Although this activity poses a high risk to entities within Russia, the defense measures included in this blog are broadly applicable and can help organizations in any region reduce their risk from similar threats. Microsoft is also tracking other groups using similar techniques, including those documented by ESET in a previous publication. AiTM and ApolloShadow deployment In February 2025, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed Secret Blizzard conducting a cyberespionage campaign against foreign embassies located in Moscow, Russia, using an AiTM position to deploy the ApolloShadow malware to maintain persistence and collect intelligence from diplomatic entities. An adversary-in-the-middle technique is when an adversary positions themself between two or more networks to support follow-on activity. The Secret Blizzard AiTM position is likely facilitated by lawful intercept and notably includes the installation of root certificates under the guise of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV). We assess this allows for TLS/SSL stripping from the Secret Blizzard AiTM position, rendering the majority of the target’s browsing in clear text including the delivery of certain tokens and credentials. Secret Blizzard has exhibited similar techniques in past cyberespionage campaigns to infect foreign ministries in Eastern Europe by tricking users to download a trojanized Flash installer from an AiTM position.
·microsoft.com·
Frozen in transit: Secret Blizzard’s AiTM campaign against diplomats
GreyNoise Discovers Stealthy Backdoor Campaign Affecting Thousands of ASUS Routers
GreyNoise Discovers Stealthy Backdoor Campaign Affecting Thousands of ASUS Routers
GreyNoise uncovers a stealth campaign exploiting ASUS routers, enabling persistent backdoor access via CVE-2023-39780 and unpatched techniques. Learn how attackers evade detection, how GreyNoise discovered it with AI-powered tooling, and what defenders need to know. This activity was first discovered by GreyNoise on March 18, 2025. Public disclosure was deferred as we coordinated the findings with government and industry partners. ‍GreyNoise has identified an ongoing exploitation campaign in which attackers have gained unauthorized, persistent access to thousands of ASUS routers exposed to the internet. This appears to be part of a stealth operation to assemble a distributed network of backdoor devices — potentially laying the groundwork for a future botnet. The tactics used in this campaign — stealthy initial access, use of built-in system features for persistence, and careful avoidance of detection — are consistent with those seen in advanced, long-term operations, including activity associated with advanced persistent threat (APT) actors and operational relay box (ORB) networks. While GreyNoise has made no attribution, the level of tradecraft suggests a well-resourced and highly capable adversary. ‍The attacker’s access survives both reboots and firmware updates, giving them durable control over affected devices. The attacker maintains long-term access without dropping malware or leaving obvious traces by chaining authentication bypasses, exploiting a known vulnerability, and abusing legitimate configuration features. ‍The activity was uncovered by Sift — GreyNoise’s proprietary AI-powered network payload analysis tool — in combination with fully emulated ASUS router profiles running in the GreyNoise Global Observation Grid. These tools enabled us to detect subtle exploitation attempts buried in global traffic and reconstruct the full attack sequence. ‍Read the full technical analysis. ‍ Timeline of Events March 17, 2025: GreyNoise’s proprietary AI technology, Sift, observes anomalous traffic. March 18, 2025: GreyNoise researchers become aware of Sift report and begin investigating. March 23, 2025: Disclosure deferred as we coordinated the findings with government and industry partners. May 22, 2025: Sekoia announces compromise of ASUS routers as part of ‘ViciousTrap.’ May 28, 2025: GreyNoise publishes this blog. ‍
·greynoise.io·
GreyNoise Discovers Stealthy Backdoor Campaign Affecting Thousands of ASUS Routers
SuperCard X: exposing a Chinese-speaker MaaS for NFC Relay fraud operation
SuperCard X: exposing a Chinese-speaker MaaS for NFC Relay fraud operation
This report details a newly identified and active fraud campaign, highlighting the emergence of sophisticated mobile malware leveraging innovative techniques: SuperCard X Malware: A novel Android malware offered through a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) model, enabling NFC relay attacks for fraudulent cash-outs. Evolving Threat Landscape: Demonstrates the continuous advancement of mobile malware in the financial sector, with NFC relay representing a significant new capability. Combined Attack Vectors: Employs a multi-stage approach combining social engineering (via smishing and phone calls), malicious application installation, and NFC data interception for highly effective fraud. Low Detection Rate: SuperCard X currently exhibits a low detection rate among antivirus solutions due to its focused functionality and minimalistic permission model.‍ * Broad Target Scope: The fraud scheme targets customers of banking institutions and card issuers, aiming to compromise payment card data.
·cleafy.com·
SuperCard X: exposing a Chinese-speaker MaaS for NFC Relay fraud operation
Threat actors misuse Node.js to deliver malware and other malicious payloads | Microsoft Security Blog
Threat actors misuse Node.js to deliver malware and other malicious payloads | Microsoft Security Blog
Since October 2024, Microsoft Defender Experts has observed and helped multiple customers address campaigns leveraging Node.js to deliver malware and other payloads that ultimately lead to information theft and data exfiltration.
·microsoft.com·
Threat actors misuse Node.js to deliver malware and other malicious payloads | Microsoft Security Blog
Phishing campaign impersonates Booking .com, delivers a suite of credential-stealing malware
Phishing campaign impersonates Booking .com, delivers a suite of credential-stealing malware
Starting in December 2024, leading up to some of the busiest travel days, Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a phishing campaign that impersonates online travel agency Booking.com and targets organizations in the hospitality industry. The campaign uses a social engineering technique called ClickFix to deliver multiple credential-stealing malware in order to conduct financial fraud and theft. […]
·microsoft.com·
Phishing campaign impersonates Booking .com, delivers a suite of credential-stealing malware
Meet NailaoLocker: a ransomware distributed in Europe by ShadowPad and PlugX backdoors
Meet NailaoLocker: a ransomware distributed in Europe by ShadowPad and PlugX backdoors
  • An unknown threat cluster has been targeting at least between June and October 2024 European organizations, notably in the healthcare sector. Tracked as Green Nailao by Orange Cyberdefense CERT, the campaign relied on DLL search-order hijacking to deploy ShadowPad and PlugX – two implants often associated with China-nexus targeted intrusions. The ShadowPad variant our reverse-engineering team analyzed is highly obfuscated and uses Windows services and registry keys to persist on the system in the event of a reboot. In several Incident Response engagements, we observed the consecutive deployment of a previously undocumented ransomware payload. The campaign was enabled by the exploitation of CVE-2024-24919 (link for our World Watch and Vulnerability Intelligence customers) on vulnerable Check Point Security Gateways. IoCs and Yara rules can be found on our dedicated GitHub page here.
·orangecyberdefense.com·
Meet NailaoLocker: a ransomware distributed in Europe by ShadowPad and PlugX backdoors
Storm-2372 conducts device code phishing campaign
Storm-2372 conducts device code phishing campaign
Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center discovered an active and successful device code phishing campaign by a threat actor we track as Storm-2372. Our ongoing investigation indicates that this campaign has been active since August 2024 with the actor creating lures that resemble messaging app experiences including WhatsApp, Signal, and Microsoft Teams. Storm-2372’s targets during this time have included government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), information technology (IT) services and technology, defense, telecommunications, health, higher education, and energy/oil and gas in Europe, North America, Africa, and the Middle East. Microsoft assesses with medium confidence that Storm-2372 aligns with Russian interests, victimology, and tradecraft.
·microsoft.com·
Storm-2372 conducts device code phishing campaign
New TorNet backdoor seen in widespread campaign
New TorNet backdoor seen in widespread campaign
Cisco Talos discovered an ongoing malicious campaign operated by a financially motivated threat actor targeting users, predominantly in Poland and Germany. The actor has delivered different payloads, including Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger, and a new undocumented backdoor we are calling TorNet, dropped by PureCrypter malware. The actor is running a Windows scheduled task on victim machines—including on endpoints with a low battery—to achieve persistence. The actor also disconnects the victim machine from the network before dropping the payload and then connects it back to the network, allowing them to evade detection by cloud antimalware solutions. We also found that the actor connects the victim’s machine to the TOR network using the TorNet backdoor for stealthy command and control (C2) communications and detection evasion.
·blog.talosintelligence.com·
New TorNet backdoor seen in widespread campaign
New Star Blizzard spear-phishing campaign targets WhatsApp accounts | Microsoft Security Blog
New Star Blizzard spear-phishing campaign targets WhatsApp accounts | Microsoft Security Blog
In mid-November 2024, Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed the Russian threat actor we track as Star Blizzard sending their typical targets spear-phishing messages, this time offering the supposed opportunity to join a WhatsApp group. This is the first time we have identified a shift in Star Blizzard’s longstanding tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to leverage a […]
·microsoft.com·
New Star Blizzard spear-phishing campaign targets WhatsApp accounts | Microsoft Security Blog
Effective Phishing Campaign Targeting European Companies and Organizations
Effective Phishing Campaign Targeting European Companies and Organizations
A phishing campaign targeting European companies used fake forms made with HubSpot's Free Form Builder, leading to credential harvesting and Azure account takeover. A phishing campaign targeting European companies used fake forms made with HubSpot's Free Form Builder, leading to credential harvesting and Azure account takeover.
·unit42.paloaltonetworks.com·
Effective Phishing Campaign Targeting European Companies and Organizations
HijackLoader evolution: abusing genuine signing certificates
HijackLoader evolution: abusing genuine signing certificates
Since mid-September 2024, our telemetry has revealed a significant increase in “Lumma Stealer”1 malware deployments via the “HijackLoader”2 malicious loader. On October 2, 2024, HarfangLab EDR detected and blocked yet another HijackLoader deployment attempt – except this time, the malware sample was properly signed with a genuine code-signing certificate. In response, we initiated a hunt for code-signing certificates (ab)used to sign malware samples. We identified and reported more of such certificates. This report briefly presents the associated stealer threat, outlines the methodology for hunting these certificates, and providees indicators of compromise.
·harfanglab.io·
HijackLoader evolution: abusing genuine signing certificates
Behind the CAPTCHA: A Clever Gateway of Malware
Behind the CAPTCHA: A Clever Gateway of Malware
McAfee Labs recently observed an infection chain where fake CAPTCHA pages are being leveraged to distribute malware, specifically Lumma Stealer. We are observing a campaign targeting multiple countries. Below is a map showing the geolocation of devices accessing fake CAPTCHA URLs, highlighting the global distribution of the attack.
·mcafee.com·
Behind the CAPTCHA: A Clever Gateway of Malware
Extension Trojan Malware Campaign
Extension Trojan Malware Campaign
Malwares make no distinction between corporate and personal devices. Therefore, past perceptions of different levels of antivirus for businesses and households must be challenged. ReasonLabs is the first endpoint protection based on a multilayered machine-learning engine, that provides enterprise-grade security for all your personal devices.
·reasonlabs.com·
Extension Trojan Malware Campaign
SeleniumGreed Cryptomining Campaign Exploiting Grid Services | Wiz Blog
SeleniumGreed Cryptomining Campaign Exploiting Grid Services | Wiz Blog
SeleniumGreed is an active crypto-mining campaign targeting older versions of Grid services. Explore the risks, attack methods, and essential security measures. Wiz Research has detected an ongoing threat campaign that exploits exposed Selenium Grid services for cryptomining, dubbed “SeleniumGreed”. Selenium is among the most commonly used testing frameworks. Our data shows that the technology can be found in 30% of cloud environments, and the official selenium/hub docker image has over 100 million pulls in Docker Hub. Unbeknownst to most users, Selenium WebDriver API enables full interaction with the machine itself, including reading and downloading files, and running remote commands. By default, authentication is not enabled for this service. This means that many publicly accessible instances are misconfigured and can be accessed by anyone and abused for malicious purposes. We have identified a threat actor targeting publicly exposed instances of Selenium Grid and leveraging features of Selenium WebDriver API to run Python with a reverse shell to deploy scripts that download a XMRig miner. The threat actor is still active as of this blog post’s date of publication. * We believe this is the first documentation of this misconfiguration being exploited in the wild.
·wiz.io·
SeleniumGreed Cryptomining Campaign Exploiting Grid Services | Wiz Blog
entagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic
entagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic
The U.S. military launched a clandestine program amid the COVID crisis to discredit China’s Sinovac inoculation – payback for Beijing’s efforts to blame Washington for the pandemic. One target: the Filipino public. Health experts say the gambit was indefensible and put innocent lives at risk.
·reuters.com·
entagon ran secret anti-vax campaign to undermine China during pandemic