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Intro and plan for the Sanctum EDR - 0xflux Red Team Manual
Intro and plan for the Sanctum EDR - 0xflux Red Team Manual
fluxsec.red/ - Discover the project plan for building Sanctum, an open-source EDR in Rust. Learn about the features, milestones, and challenges in developing an effective EDR and AV system. Sanctum is an experimental proof-of-concept EDR, designed to detect modern malware techniques, above and beyond the capabilities of antivirus. Sanctum is going to be an EDR, built in Rust, designed to perform the job of both an antivirus (AV) and Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR). It is no small feat building an EDR, and I am somewhat anxious about the path ahead; but you have to start somewhere and I’m starting with a blog post. If nothing else, this series will help me convey my own development and learning, as well as keep me motivated to keep working on this - all too often with personal projects I start something and then jump to the next shiny thing I think of. If you are here to learn something, hopefully I can impart some knowledge through this process. I plan to build this EDR also around offensive techniques I’m demonstrating for this blog, hopefully to show how certain attacks could be stopped or detected - or it may be I can’t figure out a way to stop the attack! Either way, it will be fun! Project rework Originally, I was going to write the Windows Kernel Driver in Rust, but the bar for Rust Windows Driver development seemed quite high. I then swapped to C, realised how much I missed Rust, and swapped back to Rust! So this Windows Driver will be fully written in Rust, both the driver and usermode module. Why Rust for driver development? Traditionally, drivers have been written in C & C++. While it might seem significantly easier to write this project in C, as an avid Rust enthusiast, I found myself longing for Rust’s features and safety guarantees. Writing in C or C++ made me miss the modern tooling and expressive power that Rust provides. Thanks to Rust’s ability to operate in embedded and kernel development environments through libcore no_std, and with Microsoft’s support for developing drivers in Rust, Rust comes up as an excellent candidate for a “safer” approach to driver development. I use “safer” in quotes because, despite Rust’s safety guarantees, we still need to interact with unsafe APIs within the operating system. However, Rust’s stringent compile-time checks and ownership model significantly reduce the likelihood of common programming errors & vulnerabilities. I saw a statistic somewhere recently that some funky Rust kernels or driver modules were only like 5% unsafe code, I much prefer the safety of that than writing something which is 100% unsafe! With regards to safety, even top tier C programmers will make occasional mistakes in their code; I am not a top tier C programmer (far from it!), so for me, the guarantee of a safer driver is much more appealing! The runtime guarantees you get with a Rust program (i.e. no access violations, dangling pointers, use after free’s [unless in those limited unsafe scopes]) are welcomed. Rust really is a great language. The Windows Driver Kit (WDK) crate ecosystem provides essential tools that make driver development in Rust more accessible. With these crates, we can easily manage heap memory and utilize familiar Rust idioms like println!(). The maintainers of these crates have done a fantastic job bridging the gap between Rust and Windows kernel development. https://github.com/0xflux/Sanctum
·fluxsec.red·
Intro and plan for the Sanctum EDR - 0xflux Red Team Manual
Process Mockingjay: Echoing RWX In Userland To Achieve Code Execution
Process Mockingjay: Echoing RWX In Userland To Achieve Code Execution
Our research team is committed to continuously identifying potential security vulnerabilities and techniques that threat actors may exploit to bypass existing security controls. In this blog post, our team is detailing on a comprehensive research specifically focused on process injection techniques utilized by attackers to deceive robust security products integrated into the security stack, such as EDRs and XDRs. Throughout the blog post, we will delve into various process injection techniques e
·securityjoes.com·
Process Mockingjay: Echoing RWX In Userland To Achieve Code Execution
ChatGPT creates mutating malware that evades detection by EDR
ChatGPT creates mutating malware that evades detection by EDR
A global sensation since its initial release at the end of last year, ChatGPT's popularity among consumers and IT professionals alike has stirred up cybersecurity nightmares about how it can be used to exploit system vulnerabilities. A key problem, cybersecurity experts have demonstrated, is the ability of ChatGPT and other large language models (LLMs) to generate polymorphic, or mutating, code to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems.
·csoonline.com·
ChatGPT creates mutating malware that evades detection by EDR
2023-05-31 // SITUATIONAL AWARENESS // Spyboy Defense Evasion Tool Advertised Online
2023-05-31 // SITUATIONAL AWARENESS // Spyboy Defense Evasion Tool Advertised Online
On May 21, 2023, an online persona named spyboy began advertising an endpoint defense evasion tool for the Windows operating system via the Russian-language forum Ramp. The author claims that the software — seen in a demonstration video as being titled “Terminator” — can bypass twenty three (23) EDR and AV controls. At time of writing, spyboy is pricing the software from $300 USD (single bypass) to $3,000 USD (all-in-one bypass).
·reddit.com·
2023-05-31 // SITUATIONAL AWARENESS // Spyboy Defense Evasion Tool Advertised Online
EDR bypassing via memory manipulation techniques | WithSecure™ Labs
EDR bypassing via memory manipulation techniques | WithSecure™ Labs
Endpoint Detection & Response systems (EDR), delivered by in-house teams or as part of a managed service, are a feature of modern intrusion detection and remediation operations. This success is a problem for attackers, and malicious actors have worked to find new ways to evade EDR detection capabilities. PDF Document
·labs.withsecure.com·
EDR bypassing via memory manipulation techniques | WithSecure™ Labs
Following the Scent of TrickGate: 6-Year-Old Packer Used to Deploy the Most Wanted Malware
Following the Scent of TrickGate: 6-Year-Old Packer Used to Deploy the Most Wanted Malware
* Initially observed in July 2016, TrickGate is a shellcode-based packer offered as a service to hide malware from EDRs and antivirus programs. * Over the last 6 years, TrickGate was used to deploy the top members of the “Most Wanted Malware” list, such as Cerber, Trickbot, Maze, Emotet, REvil, Cobalt Strike, AZORult, Formbook, AgentTesla and more. * TrickGate managed to stay under the radar for years because it is transformative – it undergoes changes periodically. This characteristic caused the research community to identify it by numerous attributes and names. * While the packer’s wrapper changed over time, the main building blocks within TrickGate shellcode are still in use today. * Check Point Threat Emulation successfully detects and blocks the TrickGate packer.
·research.checkpoint.com·
Following the Scent of TrickGate: 6-Year-Old Packer Used to Deploy the Most Wanted Malware
Following the Scent of TrickGate: 6-Year-Old Packer Used to Deploy the Most Wanted Malware
Following the Scent of TrickGate: 6-Year-Old Packer Used to Deploy the Most Wanted Malware
  • Initially observed in July 2016, TrickGate is a shellcode-based packer offered as a service to hide malware from EDRs and antivirus programs. * Over the last 6 years, TrickGate was used to deploy the top members of the “Most Wanted Malware” list, such as Cerber, Trickbot, Maze, Emotet, REvil, Cobalt Strike, AZORult, Formbook, AgentTesla and more. * TrickGate managed to stay under the radar for years because it is transformative – it undergoes changes periodically. This characteristic caused the research community to identify it by numerous attributes and names. * While the packer’s wrapper changed over time, the main building blocks within TrickGate shellcode are still in use today. * Check Point Threat Emulation successfully detects and blocks the TrickGate packer.
·research.checkpoint.com·
Following the Scent of TrickGate: 6-Year-Old Packer Used to Deploy the Most Wanted Malware
Cyberattaque : comment Caen a évité le pire grâce à l’EDR d’HarfangLab
Cyberattaque : comment Caen a évité le pire grâce à l’EDR d’HarfangLab
Caen a profité des suites d’un démonstrateur de l'EDR d'HarfangLab en attente de contractualisation pour détecter les prémices du possible déploiement d’un rançongiciel. L’intrusion est avérée, un nettoyage en cours, mais le chiffrement a été évité. Et très probablement le vol de données aussi.
·lemagit.fr·
Cyberattaque : comment Caen a évité le pire grâce à l’EDR d’HarfangLab
Cyberattaque : comment Caen a évité le pire grâce à l’EDR d’HarfangLab
Cyberattaque : comment Caen a évité le pire grâce à l’EDR d’HarfangLab
Caen a profité des suites d’un démonstrateur de l'EDR d'HarfangLab en attente de contractualisation pour détecter les prémices du possible déploiement d’un rançongiciel. L’intrusion est avérée, un nettoyage en cours, mais le chiffrement a été évité. Et très probablement le vol de données aussi.
·lemagit.fr·
Cyberattaque : comment Caen a évité le pire grâce à l’EDR d’HarfangLab