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Mac.c Stealer Takes on AMOS:A New Rival Shakes Up the macOS Infostealer Market | HackerNoon
Mac.c Stealer Takes on AMOS:A New Rival Shakes Up the macOS Infostealer Market | HackerNoon
hackernoon.com - Moonlock analysed Mac.c stealer, a new rival to AMOS. Learn its tactics, code reuse, and "building in public" strategy. The story of the Mac.c stealer doesn’t begin with a major campaign or breach. It starts in the hushed corners of darknet forums, where a threat actor named 'mentalpositive' first emerged, drawing attention with a set of unusual traits that set him apart from other stealer developers. Moonlock, the cybersecurity division of MacPaw, has been tracking mentalpositive for the past four months. We can already see that it is a new actor taking advantage of a macOS malware market that remains far less saturated than its Windows counterpart, marking the rise of the new wave of threat actors who are both technically skilled and commercially ambitious. Although only recently active, Mac.c is already competing with larger, more established stealer operations like Atomic macOS Stealer. While it borrows heavily from AMOS and Rodrigo4 malware, it's tailored for quicker, high-impact data theft. As more URLs are added to its command-and-control infrastructure, Mac.c appears to be part of a larger underground ecosystem targeting macOS users. What also stands out is a methodical and unusually transparent approach to building in public. 'mentalpositive' shared progress updates and even collected feedback on Mac.c builds — a surprising level of openness in the typically secretive world of macOS malware development. In this article, we trace the evolution of Mac.c, unpack mentalpositive’s tactics, and examine how this stealer fits into the broader landscape of threats targeting Apple platforms. A new player on the market About four months ago, Moonlock Lab first noticed the emergence of the Mac.c stealer and attributed it to a developer under the alias 'mentalpositive'. This threat actor was one of many new players entering the macOS malware market, a space still far less crowded than the Windows-targeting malware industry. Similar to other threat actors, 'mentalpositive' adopts recent trends in malware development: modular architecture for use across different campaigns, advanced obfuscation techniques, and increasingly complex command-and-control (C2) infrastructures. However, the target profile and data exfiltration scope of mentalpositive’s Mac.c stand out. It harvests iCloud Keychain credentials, browser-stored passwords, crypto wallets, system metadata, and even files from specific locations on macOS — all using credentials obtained through phishing. By relying on standard system APIs and staged communication methods, it evades many traditional endpoint defences. Building in public Beyond technical design, 'mentalpositive' exhibited unusual behavior across darknet forums. Over the span of several months, this threat actor used one underground forum to showcase incremental updates to Mac.c, engage with potential users, and actively solicit feedback. Such publicity may signal an intent to raise visibility and carve out a distinct market presence. It also appears to lay the groundwork for a custom stealer-as-a-service business model aimed squarely at the macOS threat niche. The screenshots below show how the forum posts evolved over time as new features were announced. Since the original posts were written in Russian, we’ve included a brief explanation for each. The first screenshot shows an early advertisement offering a subscription to stealer updates for $1,500 per month.
·hackernoon.com·
Mac.c Stealer Takes on AMOS:A New Rival Shakes Up the macOS Infostealer Market | HackerNoon
Atomic macOS infostealer adds backdoor for persistent attacks
Atomic macOS infostealer adds backdoor for persistent attacks
Malware analyst discovered a new version of the Atomic macOS info-stealer (also known as 'AMOS') that comes with a backdoor, to attackers persistent access to compromised systems. Malware analyst discovered a new version of the Atomic macOS info-stealer (also known as 'AMOS') that comes with a backdoor, to attackers persistent access to compromised systems. The new component allows executing arbitrary remote commands, it survives reboots, and permits maintaining control over infected hosts indefinitely. MacPaw's cybersecurity division Moonlock analyzed the backdoor in Atomic malware after a tip from independent researcher g0njxa, a close observer of infostealer activity. "AMOS malware campaigns have already reached over 120 countries, with the United States, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada among the most affected," the researchers say. "The backdoored version of Atomic macOS Stealer now has the potential to gain full access to thousands of Mac devices worldwide."
·bleepingcomputer.com·
Atomic macOS infostealer adds backdoor for persistent attacks
NimDoor crypto-theft macOS malware revives itself when killed
NimDoor crypto-theft macOS malware revives itself when killed
North Korean state-backed hackers have been using a new family of macOS malware called NimDoor in a campaign that targets web3 and cryptocurrency organizations. Researchers analyzing the payloads discovered that the attacker relied on unusual techniques and a previously unseen signal-based persistence mechanism. The attack chain, which involves contacting victims via Telegram and luring them into running a fake Zoom SDK update, delivered via Calendly and email, resembles the one Huntress managed security platform recently linked to BlueNoroff. Advanced macOS malware In a report today, researchers at cybersecurity company SentinelOne says that the threat actor used C++ and Nim-compiled binaries (collectively tracked as NimDoor ) on macOS, which "is a more unusual choice." One of the Nim-compiled binaries, 'installer', is responsible for the initial setup and staging, preparing directories and config paths. It also drops other two binaries - 'GoogIe LLC,' 'CoreKitAgent', onto the victim's system. GoogIe LLC takes over to collect environment data and generate a hex-encoded config file, writing it to a temp path. It sets up a macOS LaunchAgent (com.google.update.plist) for persistence, which re-launches GoogIe LLC at login and stores authentication keys for later stages. The most advanced componentused in the attack is CoreKitAgent, the main payload of the NimDoor framework, which operates as an event-driven binary, using macOS's kqueue mechanism to asynchronously manage execution. It implements a 10-case state machine with a hardcoded state transition table, allowing flexible control flow based on runtime conditions. The most distinctive feature is its signal-based persistence mechanisms, where it installs custom handlers for SIGINT and SIGTERM.
·bleepingcomputer.com·
NimDoor crypto-theft macOS malware revives itself when killed
Threat of TCC Bypasses on macOS
Threat of TCC Bypasses on macOS
TCC on macOS isn't just an annoying prompt—it's the last line of defense between malware and your private data. Read this article to learn why. Lately, I have been reporting many vulnerabilities in third-party applications that allowed for TCC bypass, and I have discovered that most vendors do not understand why they should care. For them, it seems like just an annoying and unnecessary prompt. Even security professionals tasked with vulnerability triage frequently struggle to understand TCC’s role in protecting macOS users’ privacy against malware. Honestly, I don’t blame them for that because, two years ago, I also didn’t understand the purpose of those “irritating” pop-up notifications. It wasn’t until I started writing malware for macOS. I realized how much trouble an attacker faces because of TCC in actually harming a victim. I wrote this article for Application Developers in mind so that, after reading it, they do not underestimate the vulnerabilities that allow bypassing TCC. It is also intended for Vulnerability Researchers to illustrate an attack vector for further research.
·afine.com·
Threat of TCC Bypasses on macOS
Apple Patches Major Security Flaws in iOS, macOS Platforms
Apple Patches Major Security Flaws in iOS, macOS Platforms
Apple rolls out iOS and macOS platform updates to fix serious security bugs that could be triggered simply by opening an image or video file. Apple on Monday pushed out patches for security vulnerabilities across the macOS, iPhone and iPad software stack, warning that code-execution bugs that could be triggered simply by opening a rigged image, video or website. The new iOS 18.5 update, rolled out alongside patches for iPadOS, covers critical bugs in AppleJPEG and CoreMedia with a major warning from Cupertino that attackers could craft malicious media files to run arbitrary code with the privileges of the targeted app. The company also documented serious file-parsing vulnerabilities patched in CoreAudio, CoreGraphics, and ImageIO, each capable of crashing apps or leaking data if booby-trapped content is opened. The iOS 18.5 update also provides cover for at least 9 documented WebKit flaws, some serious enough to lead to exploits that allow a hostile website to execute code or crash the Safari browser engine. The company also patched a serious ‘mute-button’ flaw in FaceTime that exposes the audio conversation even after muting the microphone. Beneath the interface, Apple said iOS 18.5 hardens the kernel against two memory-corruption issues and cleans up a libexpat flaw (CVE-2024-8176) that affects a broad range of software projects. Other notable fixes include an issue in Baseband (CVE-2025-31214) that allows attackers in a privileged network position to intercept traffic on the new iPhone 16e line; a privilege escalation bug in mDNSResponder (CVE-2025-31222); an issue in Notes that expose data from a locked iPhone screen; and security gaps in FrontBoard, iCloud Document Sharing, and Mail Addressing.
·securityweek.com·
Apple Patches Major Security Flaws in iOS, macOS Platforms
Can You Really Trust That Permission Pop-Up On macOS? (CVE-2025-31250) | Watch This Space
Can You Really Trust That Permission Pop-Up On macOS? (CVE-2025-31250) | Watch This Space
It's time to update your Macs again! This time, I'm not burying the lede. CVE-2025-31250, which was patched in today's release of macOS Sequoia 15.5, allowed for… …any Application A to make macOS show a permission consent prompt… …appearing as if it were coming from any Application B… …with the results of the user's consent response being applied to any Application C. These did not have to be different applications. In fact, in most normal uses, they would all likely be the same application. Even a case where Applications B and C were the same but different than Application A would be relatively safe (if somewhat useless from Application A's perspective). However, prior to this vulnerability being patched, a lack of validation allowed for Application B (the app the prompt appears to be from) to be different than Application C (the actual application the user's consent response is applied to). Spoofing these kinds of prompts is not exactly new. In fact, the HackTricks wiki has had a tutorial on how to perform a similar trick on their site for a while. However, their method requires: the building of an entire fake app in a temporary directory, the overriding of a shortcut on the Dock, and the simple hoping that the user clicks on the (now) fake shortcut. This vulnerability requires none of the above. TCC As I explained in my first ever article on this site, TCC is the core permissions system built into Apple's operating systems. It is used by sending messages to the tccd daemon (or rather, by using functions in the private TCC framework). The framework is a private API, so developers don't call the functions directly (instead, public API's call the functions under-the-hood as needed). However, all this wrapping cannot hide the fact that the control mechanism is still simply sending messages to the daemon. The daemon uses Apple's public (but proprietary) XPC API for messaging (specifically the lower-level dictionary-based API). Prior to this vulnerability being patched, any app with the ability to send XPC messages to tccd could send it a specifically-crafted message that, as described above, would make it display a permission prompt as if it were from one app but then apply the user's response to a completely separate app. But how was this possible, and was it even hard? Before I answer these questions, we need to detour into what will, at first, seem like a completely unrelated topic.
·wts.dev·
Can You Really Trust That Permission Pop-Up On macOS? (CVE-2025-31250) | Watch This Space
macOS Vulnerabilities: A Year of Security Research at Kandji
macOS Vulnerabilities: A Year of Security Research at Kandji
Kandji researchers uncovered and disclosed key macOS vulnerabilities over the past year. Learn how we protect customers through detection and patching. When we discover weaknesses before attackers do, everyone wins. History has shown that vulnerabilities like Gatekeeper bypass and TCC bypass zero-days don't remain theoretical for long—both of these recent vulnerabilities were exploited in the wild by macOS malware. By investing heavily in new security research, we're helping strengthen macOS for everyone. Once reported to Apple, the fix for these vulnerabilities is not always obvious. Depending on the complexity, it can take a few months to over a year, especially if it requires major architectural changes to the operating system. Apple’s vulnerability disclosure program has been responsive and effective. Of course, we don't just report issues and walk away. We ensure our products can detect these vulnerabilities and protect our customers from potential exploitation while waiting for official patches.
·kandji.io·
macOS Vulnerabilities: A Year of Security Research at Kandji
TCCing is Believing
TCCing is Believing
Apple finally adds TCC events to Endpoint Security! Since the majority of macOS malware circumvents TCC through explicit user approval, it would be incredibly helpful for any security tool to detect this — and possibly override the user’s risky decision. Until now the best (only?) option was to ingest log messages generated by the TCC subsystem. This approach was implemented in a tool dubbed Kronos, written by Calum Hall Luke Roberts (now, of Phorion fame). Unfortunately, as they note, this approach did have it drawbacks:
·objective-see.org·
TCCing is Believing
An Update on Fake Updates: Two New Actors, and New Mac Malware
An Update on Fake Updates: Two New Actors, and New Mac Malware
Key findings  Proofpoint identified and named two new cybercriminal threat actors operating components of web inject campaigns, TA2726 and TA2727.  Proofpoint identified a new Proofpoint identified and named two new cybercriminal threat actors operating components of web inject campaigns, TA2726 and TA2727. Proofpoint identified a new MacOS malware delivered via web inject campaigns that our researchers called FrigidStealer. * The web inject campaign landscape is increasing, with a variety of copycat threat actors conducting similar campaigns, which can make it difficult for analysts to track.
·proofpoint.com·
An Update on Fake Updates: Two New Actors, and New Mac Malware
Banshee: The Stealer That "Stole Code" From MacOS XProtect
Banshee: The Stealer That "Stole Code" From MacOS XProtect
Since September, Check Point Research has been monitoring a new version of the Banshee macOS stealer, a malware linked to Russian-speaking cyber criminals targeting macOS users. This new version had been undetected for over two months until the original version of Banshee Stealer was leaked on XSS forums, which resembled similarities with the malware’s core functionality. One notable difference between the leaked source code and the version discovered by Check Point Research is the use of a string encryption algorithm. This algorithm is the same as Apple uses in its Xprotect antivirus engine for MacOS. One method of distributing Banshee Stealer involved malicious GitHub repositories, targeting Windows users with Lumma Stealer and macOS users with Banshee Stealer. Banshee operated as a ‘stealer-as-a-service’, priced at $3,000, and was advertised through Telegram and forums such as XSS and Exploit. On November 23, 2024, the malware’s source code was leaked, leading the author to shut down the operations the following day. Despite shutting down the operation, threat actors continue to distribute the new version of Banshee via phishing websites.
·research.checkpoint.com·
Banshee: The Stealer That "Stole Code" From MacOS XProtect
Microsoft: macOS bug lets hackers install malicious kernel drivers
Microsoft: macOS bug lets hackers install malicious kernel drivers
Apple recently addressed a macOS vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass System Integrity Protection (SIP) and install malicious kernel drivers by loading third-party kernel extensions. #Apple #Computer #InfoSec #Integrity #Microsoft #Protection #SIP #Security #System #Vulnerability #macOS
·bleepingcomputer.com·
Microsoft: macOS bug lets hackers install malicious kernel drivers
Lateral Movement on macOS: Unique and Popular Techniques and In-the-Wild Examples
Lateral Movement on macOS: Unique and Popular Techniques and In-the-Wild Examples
We uncover macOS lateral movement tactics, such as SSH key misuse and AppleScript exploitation. Strategies to counter this attack trend are also discussed. We uncover macOS lateral movement tactics, such as SSH key misuse and AppleScript exploitation. Strategies to counter this attack trend are also discussed.
·unit42.paloaltonetworks.com·
Lateral Movement on macOS: Unique and Popular Techniques and In-the-Wild Examples
Gergely's hack blog – badmalloc (CVE-2023-32428) - a macOS LPE
Gergely's hack blog – badmalloc (CVE-2023-32428) - a macOS LPE
I recently realised that I still owe you guys some writeups, so since OBTSv7 is around the corner here's the one for badmalloc. I found this back in March 2023, and it got fixed in October. About the bug There's a bug in MallocStackLogging, Apple's "magical" framework that allows developers …
·gergelykalman.com·
Gergely's hack blog – badmalloc (CVE-2023-32428) - a macOS LPE
Apple fixes two zero-days used in attacks on Intel-based Macs
Apple fixes two zero-days used in attacks on Intel-based Macs
Apple released emergency security updates to fix two zero-day vulnerabilities that were exploited in attacks on Intel-based Mac systems. "Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited," the company said in an advisory issued on Tuesday. The two bugs were found in the macOS Sequoia JavaScriptCore (CVE-2024-44308) and WebKit (CVE-2024-44309) components of macOS.
·bleepingcomputer.com·
Apple fixes two zero-days used in attacks on Intel-based Macs
Stealthy Attributes of APT Lazarus: Evading Detection with Extended Attributes
Stealthy Attributes of APT Lazarus: Evading Detection with Extended Attributes
APT Lazarus has begun attempting to smuggle code using custom extended attributes. Extended attributes are metadata that can be associated with files and directories in various file systems. They allow users to store additional information about a file beyond the standard attributes like file size, timestamps, and permissions.
·group-ib.com·
Stealthy Attributes of APT Lazarus: Evading Detection with Extended Attributes
A New Era of macOS Sandbox Escapes: Diving into an Overlooked Attack Surface and Uncovering 10+ New Vulnerabilities – Mickey's Blogs – Exploring the world with my sword of debugger :)
A New Era of macOS Sandbox Escapes: Diving into an Overlooked Attack Surface and Uncovering 10+ New Vulnerabilities – Mickey's Blogs – Exploring the world with my sword of debugger :)
A New Era of macOS Sandbox Escapes: Diving into an Overlooked Attack Surface and Uncovering 10+ New Vulnerabilities This is a blog post for my presentation at the conference POC2024. The slides are uploaded here. In the macOS system, most processes are running in a restricted sandbox environment, whether they are Apple’s own services or third-party applications. Consequently, once an attacker gains Remote Code Execution (RCE) from these processes, their capabilities are constrained. The next step for the attacker is to circumvent the sandbox to gain enhanced execution capabilities and broader file access permissions. But how to discover sandbox escape vulnerabilities? Upon reviewing the existing issues, I unearthed a significant overlooked attack surface and a novel attack technique. This led to the discovery of multiple new sandbox escape vulnerabilities: CVE-2023-27944, CVE-2023-32414, CVE-2023-32404, CVE-2023-41077, CVE-2023-42961, CVE-2024-27864, CVE-2023-42977, and more.
·jhftss.github.io·
A New Era of macOS Sandbox Escapes: Diving into an Overlooked Attack Surface and Uncovering 10+ New Vulnerabilities – Mickey's Blogs – Exploring the world with my sword of debugger :)