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CopyCop Deepens Its Playbook with New Websites and Targets
CopyCop Deepens Its Playbook with New Websites and Targets
PUBLISHED ON 18 SEP 2025 recordedfuture.com Insikt Group® Executive Summary Since March 2025, Insikt Group has observed CopyCop (also known as Storm-1516), a Russian covert influence network, creating at least 200 new fictional media websites targeting the United States (US), France, and Canada, in addition to websites impersonating media brands and political parties and movements in France, Canada, and Armenia. CopyCop has also established a regionalized network of websites posing as a fictional fact-checking organization publishing content in Turkish, Ukrainian, and Swahili, languages never featured by the network before. Including the 94 websites targeting Germany reported by Insikt Group in February 2025, this amounts to over 300 websites established by CopyCop’s operators in the year to date, marking a significant expansion from our initial reporting on the network in 2024, and with many yet to be publicly documented. These websites are very likely operated by John Mark Dougan with support from the Moscow-based Center for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE) and the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU). CopyCop uses these websites as infrastructure to disseminate influence content targeting pro-Western leadership and publish artificial intelligence (AI)-generated content with pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian themes in support of Russia’s offensive operations in the global information environment. While the network’s scope in terms of target languages and countries has expanded, its primary objectives almost certainly remain unchanged: undermining support for Ukraine and exacerbating political fragmentation in Western countries backing Ukraine. Insikt Group has also observed CopyCop engaging in additional secondary objectives like advancing Russia’s geopolitical objectives in its broader sphere of influence, such as Armenia and Moldova. CopyCop’s narratives and content in support of these objectives are routinely amplified by an ecosystem of social media influencers in addition to other Russian influence networks like Portal Kombat and InfoDefense. Similar to its objectives, CopyCop’s tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) remain broadly unchanged, with marginal improvements designed to strengthen the network’s reach, resilience, and credibility. Tactics and techniques used for content dissemination typically include deepfakes, lengthy dossiers intending to embarrass targets, and fake interviews of alleged whistleblowers making claims about political leaders in NATO member states like the US, France, and Germany. Insikt Group also identified new evidence that CopyCop uses self-hosted, uncensored large language models (LLMs) based on Meta’s Llama 3 open-source models to generate AI content rather than relying on Western AI service providers. Relative to other Russian influence networks, CopyCop’s impact remains significant: targeted influence content promoted by its websites and an ecosystem of pro-Russian social media influencers and so-called “journalists” regularly obtains high rates of organic engagement across multiple social media platforms, and has a precedent for breaking into mainstream political discourse. Persistently identifying and publicly exposing these networks should remain a priority for governments, journalists, and researchers seeking to defend democratic institutions from Russian influence. Key Findings To date, in 2025, CopyCop has widened its target languages to include Turkish, Ukrainian, and Swahili, and its geographic scope to include Moldova, Canada, and Armenia while sustaining influence operations targeting the US and France. The network is also leveraging new infrastructure to publish content, marking a significant expansion of its activities targeting new audiences. CopyCop’s core influence objectives remain eroding public support for Ukraine and undermining democratic processes and political leaders in Western countries supporting Ukraine. CopyCop’s TTPs are broadly unchanged from previous assessments, with only marginal improvements to increase the network’s reach, resilience, and credibility. Newly observed TTPs include evidence of CopyCop using self-hosted LLMs for content generation, employing subdomains as mirrors, and impersonating media outlets. Insikt Group has identified two uncensored versions of Meta’s Llama-3-8b model that are likely being used by CopyCop to generate articles. The network is also increasingly conducting influence operations within Russia’s sphere of influence, including targeting Moldova and Armenia ahead of their parliamentary elections in 2025 and 2026, respectively. This is a broader trend observed across the Russian influence ecosystem. Background Insikt Group previously documented CopyCop in May and June 2024, in addition to the network’s attempts at influencing the 2024 French snap elections, 2024 US presidential elections, and 2025 German federal elections. Reporting from other organizations such as Clemson University, VIGINUM, NewsGuard, Microsoft, European External Action Service, and Gnida Project has broadly corroborated our initial assessments of the network’s objectives, targets, and infrastructure, in addition to our attribution of part of the network’s activities to John Mark Dougan, a US citizen based in Moscow. The Washington Post and the US Department of the Treasury have also since established links between Dougan, the CGE, and the GRU. The GRU reportedly helped fund self-hosted LLM infrastructure, while the CGE was likely responsible, with Dougan’s assistance and direction from the GRU, for the creation of deepfakes and inauthentic content targeting political leaders in the US, Ukraine, France, and other countries.
·recordedfuture.com·
CopyCop Deepens Its Playbook with New Websites and Targets
Threat Hunting Case Study: Uncovering Turla | Intel 471
Threat Hunting Case Study: Uncovering Turla | Intel 471
Russia has long been a military power, a nuclear power, a space power and in recent decades, a cyber power. It has been one of the most capable cyber actors, going back to the late 1990s when Russian state hackers stole classified documents and military research from U.S. universities and government agencies. The stolen documents, if stacked on top of one another, would have been taller than the Washington Monument (555 feet or 169 meters). These incidents, dubbed “Moonlight Maze” as described in Thomas Rid’s book “Rise of the Machines,” marked one of the world’s first advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks. Russia’s intelligence and security agencies continue to operate highly skilled groups of offensive attackers. Those APT groups are spread across its intelligence and security agencies and the Ministry of Defense. They engage in a broad range of cyber and influence operations tied to Russia’s strategic objectives. These include exploiting adversary systems, establishing footholds, conducting cyber espionage operations and running disinformation and misinformation campaigns designed to undermine Western narratives. One of the most effective and long-running Russian groups is Turla, a unit known as Center 16 housed within Russia’s Federal Security Service, or FSB. Researchers found that this group, which is active today, may have been connected with Moonlight Maze.
·intel471.com·
Threat Hunting Case Study: Uncovering Turla | Intel 471
Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor | Microsoft Security Blog
Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor | Microsoft Security Blog
Microsoft attributes several campaigns to a distinct Russian state-sponsored threat actor tracked as Cadet Blizzard (DEV-0586), including the WhisperGate destructive attack, Ukrainian website defacements, and the hack-and-leak front “Free Civilian”.
·microsoft.com·
Cadet Blizzard emerges as a novel and distinct Russian threat actor | Microsoft Security Blog
SEKOIA.IO analysis of the #VulkanFiles leak
SEKOIA.IO analysis of the #VulkanFiles leak
* Exfiltrated Russian-written documents provide insights into cyber offensive tool projects contracted by Vulkan private firm for the Russian Ministry of Defense. * Scan-AS is a database used to map adversary networks in parallel or prior to cyber operations. Scan-AS is a subsystem of a wider management system used to conduct, manage and capitalize results of cyber operations. * Amezit is an information system aimed at managing the information flow on a limited geographical area. It allows communications interception, analysis and modification, and can create wide information campaigns through social media, email, altered websites or phone networks.
·blog.sekoia.io·
SEKOIA.IO analysis of the #VulkanFiles leak
SEKOIA.IO analysis of the #VulkanFiles leak
SEKOIA.IO analysis of the #VulkanFiles leak
  • Exfiltrated Russian-written documents provide insights into cyber offensive tool projects contracted by Vulkan private firm for the Russian Ministry of Defense. * Scan-AS is a database used to map adversary networks in parallel or prior to cyber operations. Scan-AS is a subsystem of a wider management system used to conduct, manage and capitalize results of cyber operations. * Amezit is an information system aimed at managing the information flow on a limited geographical area. It allows communications interception, analysis and modification, and can create wide information campaigns through social media, email, altered websites or phone networks.
·blog.sekoia.io·
SEKOIA.IO analysis of the #VulkanFiles leak
Preparing for a Russian cyber offensive against Ukraine this winter
Preparing for a Russian cyber offensive against Ukraine this winter
As we report more fully below, in the wake of Russian battlefield losses to Ukraine this fall, Moscow has intensified its multi-pronged hybrid technology approach to pressure the sources of Kyiv’s military and political support, domestic and foreign. This approach has included destructive missile and cyber strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, cyberattacks on Ukrainian and now foreign-based supply chains, and cyber-enabled influence operations[1]—intended to undermine US, EU, and NATO political support for Ukraine, and to shake the confidence and determination of Ukrainian citizens.
·blogs.microsoft.com·
Preparing for a Russian cyber offensive against Ukraine this winter
Preparing for a Russian cyber offensive against Ukraine this winter
Preparing for a Russian cyber offensive against Ukraine this winter
As we report more fully below, in the wake of Russian battlefield losses to Ukraine this fall, Moscow has intensified its multi-pronged hybrid technology approach to pressure the sources of Kyiv’s military and political support, domestic and foreign. This approach has included destructive missile and cyber strikes on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, cyberattacks on Ukrainian and now foreign-based supply chains, and cyber-enabled influence operations[1]—intended to undermine US, EU, and NATO political support for Ukraine, and to shake the confidence and determination of Ukrainian citizens.
·blogs.microsoft.com·
Preparing for a Russian cyber offensive against Ukraine this winter
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Killnet makes three announcements The past month seemed to be a turning point for the pro-Russian hacktivist group “Killnet”—and it was very eager to tell the world about it.  First, on July 27, “Killmilk”—the founder and the head of the group who led its transformation from a DDoS-for-hire outlet i
·linkedin.com·
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Killnet makes three announcements The past month seemed to be a turning point for the pro-Russian hacktivist group “Killnet”—and it was very eager to tell the world about it.  First, on July 27, “Killmilk”—the founder and the head of the group who led its transformation from a DDoS-for-hire outlet i
·linkedin.com·
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists
Killnet makes three announcements The past month seemed to be a turning point for the pro-Russian hacktivist group “Killnet”—and it was very eager to tell the world about it.  First, on July 27, “Killmilk”—the founder and the head of the group who led its transformation from a DDoS-for-hire outlet i
·linkedin.com·
Making Sense of the Killnet, Russia’s Favorite Hacktivists