Community Alert: Ongoing Malicious Campaign Impacting Azure Cloud Environments
Over the past weeks, Proofpoint researchers have been monitoring an ongoing cloud account takeover campaign impacting dozens of Microsoft Azure environments and compromising hundreds of user accoun...
Compromising Google Accounts: Malwares Exploiting Undocumented OAuth2 Functionality for session hijacking
A detailed blog on Analysis of the Global Malware Trend: Exploiting Undocumented OAuth2 Functionality to Regenerate Google Service Cookies Regardless of IP or Password Reset.
As a result, today we are publishing details of activity by a sophisticated nation-state sponsored threat actor that gained unauthorized access to our systems to target a small and specific set of our customers. Prior to sharing this information, we notified and worked with the impacted customers. We have also been working with our incident response (IR) partners and law enforcement on both our investigation and steps designed to make our systems and our customers’ operations even more secure. The attack vector used by the threat actor has been mitigated.
3CX VoIP Software Compromise & Supply Chain Threats
The 3CX VoIP Desktop Application has been compromised to deliver malware via legitimate 3CX updates. Huntress has been investigating this incident and working to validate and assess the current supply chain threat to the security community.
3CX VoIP Software Compromise & Supply Chain Threats
The 3CX VoIP Desktop Application has been compromised to deliver malware via legitimate 3CX updates. Huntress has been investigating this incident and working to validate and assess the current supply chain threat to the security community.
The recent (2022) compromise of Lastpass included email addresses, home addresses, names, and encrypted customer vaults. In this post I will demonstrate how attackers may leverage tools like Hashcat to crack an encrypted vault with a weak password.
The recent (2022) compromise of Lastpass included email addresses, home addresses, names, and encrypted customer vaults. In this post I will demonstrate how attackers may leverage tools like Hashcat to crack an encrypted vault with a weak password.
In 2017, a team of New York Times journalists revealed that, beginning in 2010, Beijing’s counterintelligence apparatus had systematically rolled up the CIA’s sources in China.
In 2017, a team of New York Times journalists revealed that, beginning in 2010, Beijing’s counterintelligence apparatus had systematically rolled up the CIA’s sources in China.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
Cloudflare’s investigation of the January 2022 Okta compromise
Today, March 22, 2022 at 03:30 UTC we learnt of a compromise of Okta. We use Okta internally for employee identity as part of our authentication stack. We have investigated this compromise carefully and do not believe we have been compromised as a result. We do not use Okta for customer accounts; customers do not need to take any action unless they themselves use Okta.
![[Security Update] Incident Details](https://rdl.ink/render/https%3A%2F%2Fjumpcloud.com%2F%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2023%2F07%2FOcean-blue-JC-logo-blog-image.png?width=92&height=&ar=&mode=&format=avif&dpr=2){kind=logo}
