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Our plan for a more secure npm supply chain
Our plan for a more secure npm supply chain
The GitHub Blog github.blog Xavier René-Corail·@xcorail September 22, 2025 Open source software is the bedrock of the modern software industry. Its collaborative nature and vast ecosystem empower developers worldwide, driving efficiency and progress at an unprecedented scale. This scale also presents unique vulnerabilities that are continually tested and under attack by malicious actors, making the security of open source a critical concern for all. Transparency is central to maintaining community trust. Today, we’re sharing details of recent npm registry incidents, the actions we took towards remediation, and how we’re continuing to invest in npm security. Recent attacks on the open source ecosystem The software industry has faced a recent surge in damaging account takeovers on package registries, including npm. These ongoing attacks have allowed malicious actors to gain unauthorized access to maintainer accounts and subsequently distribute malicious software through well-known, trusted packages. On September 14, 2025, we were notified of the Shai-Hulud attack, a self-replicating worm that infiltrated the npm ecosystem via compromised maintainer accounts by injecting malicious post-install scripts into popular JavaScript packages. By combining self-replication with the capability to steal multiple types of secrets (and not just npm tokens), this worm could have enabled an endless stream of attacks had it not been for timely action from GitHub and open source maintainers. In direct response to this incident, GitHub has taken swift and decisive action including: Immediate removal of 500+ compromised packages from the npm registry to prevent further propagation of malicious software. npm blocking the upload of new packages containing the malware’s IoCs (Indicators of Compromise), cutting off the self-replicating pattern. Such breaches erode trust in the open source ecosystem and pose a direct threat to the integrity and security of the entire software supply chain. They also highlight why raising the bar on authentication and secure publishing practices is essential to strengthening the npm ecosystem against future attacks. npm’s roadmap for hardening package publication GitHub is committed to investigating these threats and mitigating the risks that they pose to the open source community. To address token abuse and self-replicating malware, we will be changing authentication and publishing options in the near future to only include: Local publishing with required two-factor authentication (2FA). Granular tokens which will have a limited lifetime of seven days. Trusted publishing. To support these changes and further improve the security of the npm ecosystem, we will: Deprecate legacy classic tokens. Deprecate time-based one-time password (TOTP) 2FA, migrating users to FIDO-based 2FA. Limit granular tokens with publishing permissions to a shorter expiration. Set publishing access to disallow tokens by default, encouraging usage of trusted publishers or 2FA enforced local publishing. Remove the option to bypass 2FA for local package publishing. Expand eligible providers for trusted publishing. We recognize that some of the security changes we are making may require updates to your workflows. We are going to roll these changes out gradually to ensure we minimize disruption while strengthening the security posture of npm. We’re committed to supporting you through this transition and will provide future updates with clear timelines, documentation, migration guides, and support channels. Strengthening the ecosystem with trusted publishing Trusted publishing is a recommended security capability by the OpenSSF Securing Software Repositories Working Group as it removes the need to securely manage an API token in the build system. It was pioneered by PyPI in April 2023 as a way to get API tokens out of build pipelines. Since then, trusted publishing has been added to RubyGems (December 2023), crates.io (July 2025), npm (also July 2025), and most recently NuGet (September 2025), as well as other package repositories. When npm released support for trusted publishing, it was our intention to let adoption of this new feature grow organically. However, attackers have shown us that they are not waiting. We strongly encourage projects to adopt trusted publishing as soon as possible, for all supported package managers. Actions that npm maintainers can take today These efforts, from GitHub and the broader software community, underscore our global commitment to fortifying the security of the software supply chain. The security of the ecosystem is a shared responsibility, and we’re grateful for the vigilance and collaboration of the open source community. Here are the actions npm maintainers can take now: Use npm trusted publishing instead of tokens. Strengthen publishing settings on accounts, orgs, and packages to require 2FA for any writes and publishing actions. When configuring two-factor authentication, use WebAuthn instead of TOTP. True resilience requires the active participation and vigilance of everyone in the software industry. By adopting robust security practices, leveraging available tools, and contributing to these collective efforts, we can collectively build a more secure and trustworthy open source ecosystem for all.
#github.blog#EN#2025#response#npm#Supply-Chain-Attack
·github.blog·
Our plan for a more secure npm supply chain
Self-Replicating Worm Hits 180+ Software Packages
Self-Replicating Worm Hits 180+ Software Packages
krebsonsecurity.com Brian Krebs September 16, 2025 At least 187 code packages made available through the JavaScript repository NPM have been infected with a self-replicating worm that steals credentials from developers and publishes those secrets on GitHub, experts warn. The malware, which briefly infected multiple code packages from the security vendor CrowdStrike, steals and publishes even more credentials every time an infected package is installed. The novel malware strain is being dubbed Shai-Hulud — after the name for the giant sandworms in Frank Herbert’s Dune novel series — because it publishes any stolen credentials in a new public GitHub repository that includes the name “Shai-Hulud.” “When a developer installs a compromised package, the malware will look for a npm token in the environment,” said Charlie Eriksen, a researcher for the Belgian security firm Aikido. “If it finds it, it will modify the 20 most popular packages that the npm token has access to, copying itself into the package, and publishing a new version.” At the center of this developing maelstrom are code libraries available on NPM (short for “Node Package Manager”), which acts as a central hub for JavaScript development and provides the latest updates to widely-used JavaScript components. The Shai-Hulud worm emerged just days after unknown attackers launched a broad phishing campaign that spoofed NPM and asked developers to “update” their multi-factor authentication login options. That attack led to malware being inserted into at least two-dozen NPM code packages, but the outbreak was quickly contained and was narrowly focused on siphoning cryptocurrency payments. In late August, another compromise of an NPM developer resulted in malware being added to “nx,” an open-source code development toolkit with as many as six million weekly downloads. In the nx compromise, the attackers introduced code that scoured the user’s device for authentication tokens from programmer destinations like GitHub and NPM, as well as SSH and API keys. But instead of sending those stolen credentials to a central server controlled by the attackers, the malicious nx code created a new public repository in the victim’s GitHub account, and published the stolen data there for all the world to see and download. Last month’s attack on nx did not self-propagate like a worm, but this Shai-Hulud malware does and bundles reconnaissance tools to assist in its spread. Namely, it uses the open-source tool TruffleHog to search for exposed credentials and access tokens on the developer’s machine. It then attempts to create new GitHub actions and publish any stolen secrets. “Once the first person got compromised, there was no stopping it,” Aikido’s Eriksen told KrebsOnSecurity. He said the first NPM package compromised by this worm appears to have been altered on Sept. 14, around 17:58 UTC. The security-focused code development platform socket.dev reports the Shai-Halud attack briefly compromised at least 25 NPM code packages managed by CrowdStrike. Socket.dev said the affected packages were quickly removed by the NPM registry. In a written statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity, CrowdStrike said that after detecting several malicious packages in the public NPM registry, the company swiftly removed them and rotated its keys in public registries. “These packages are not used in the Falcon sensor, the platform is not impacted and customers remain protected,” the statement reads, referring to the company’s widely-used endpoint threat detection service. “We are working with NPM and conducting a thorough investigation.” A writeup on the attack from StepSecurity found that for cloud-specific operations, the malware enumerates AWS, Azure and Google Cloud Platform secrets. It also found the entire attack design assumes the victim is working in a Linux or macOS environment, and that it deliberately skips Windows systems. StepSecurity said Shai-Hulud spreads by using stolen NPM authentication tokens, adding its code to the top 20 packages in the victim’s account. “This creates a cascading effect where an infected package leads to compromised maintainer credentials, which in turn infects all other packages maintained by that user,” StepSecurity’s Ashish Kurmi wrote. Eriksen said Shai-Hulud is still propagating, although its spread seems to have waned in recent hours. “I still see package versions popping up once in a while, but no new packages have been compromised in the last ~6 hours,” Eriksen said. “But that could change now as the east coast starts working. I would think of this attack as a ‘living’ thing almost, like a virus. Because it can lay dormant for a while, and if just one person is suddenly infected by accident, they could restart the spread. Especially if there’s a super-spreader attack.” For now, it appears that the web address the attackers were using to exfiltrate collected data was disabled due to rate limits, Eriksen said. Nicholas Weaver is a researcher with the International Computer Science Institute, a nonprofit in Berkeley, Calif. Weaver called the Shai-Hulud worm “a supply chain attack that conducts a supply chain attack.” Weaver said NPM (and all other similar package repositories) need to immediately switch to a publication model that requires explicit human consent for every publication request using a phish-proof 2FA method. “Anything less means attacks like this are going to continue and become far more common, but switching to a 2FA method would effectively throttle these attacks before they can spread,” Weaver said. “Allowing purely automated processes to update the published packages is now a proven recipe for disaster.”
#krebsonsecurity.com#EN#2025#Worm#NPM#Supply-Chain-Attack#GitHub
·krebsonsecurity.com·
Self-Replicating Worm Hits 180+ Software Packages
Thousands of Developer Credentials Stolen in macOS “s1ngularity” Attack
Thousands of Developer Credentials Stolen in macOS “s1ngularity” Attack
https://hackread.com by Deeba Ahmed August 28, 2025 A supply chain attack called “s1ngularity” on Nx versions 20.9.0-21.8.0 stole thousands of macOS developer credentials with the help of AI tools. Asophisticated cyberattack, dubbed the “s1ngularity” attack, has compromised Nx, a popular build platform widely used by software developers. The attack, which began on August 26, 2025, is a supply chain attack, a type of security breach where hackers sneak malicious code into a widely used piece of software, which then infects all the people who use it. The attack was designed to steal a wide variety of sensitive data, including GitHub tokens, npm authentication keys, and SSH private keys. These credentials are essentially digital keys that provide access to a user’s accounts and systems. The malicious software also went a step further, targeting API keys for popular AI tools like Gemini, Claude, and Q, demonstrating a new focus on emerging technologies. In addition to stealing data, the attackers installed a destructive payload that modified users’ terminal startup files, causing their terminal sessions to crash. GitGuardian’s analysis shared with Hackread.com revealed some surprising details about the attack and its victims. The firm found that 85% of the infected systems were running macOS, highlighting the attack’s particular impact on the developer community, which frequently uses Apple computers. In a curious turn, GitGuardian found that of the hundreds of systems where AI tools were targeted, many of the AI clients unexpectedly resisted the malicious requests. They either outright refused to run the commands or gave responses suggesting they knew they were being asked to do something wrong, showing a potential, though unintentional, new layer of security. The stolen credentials were not only valuable but also widespread. GitGuardian’s monitoring platform, which tracks public GitHub activity, discovered 1,346 repositories used by the attackers to store stolen data. To avoid detection, the attackers double-encoded the stolen data before uploading it. This number is far higher than the ten publicly visible repositories, as GitHub was quickly working to delete the rest. An analysis of these repositories revealed 2,349 distinct secrets, with over 1,000 still valid and working at the time of the report. The most common secrets were for GitHub and popular AI platforms. For anyone who used the malicious Nx versions 20.9.0 through 21.8.0, the most crucial step is to immediately assume that their credentials have been exposed. GitGuardian has created a free service called HasMySecretLeaked that allows developers to check for compromised credentials without ever revealing their actual keys. This attack reminds us that simply deleting a compromised file is not enough; the actual secret keys and tokens must be revoked and rotated to prevent further access by the attackers.
#hackread.com#EN#2025#Nx#Supply-Chain-Attack#npm#s1ngularity
·hackread.com·
Thousands of Developer Credentials Stolen in macOS “s1ngularity” Attack
npm 'accidentally' removes Stylus package, breaks builds and pipelines
npm 'accidentally' removes Stylus package, breaks builds and pipelines
bleepingcomputer.com - npm has taken down all versions of the real Stylus library and replaced them with a "security holding" page, breaking pipelines and builds worldwide that rely on the package. A security placeholder webpage is typically displayed when malicious packages and libraries are removed by the admins of npmjs.com, the world's largest software registry primarily used for JavaScript and Node.js development. But that isn't quite the case for Stylus: a legitimate "revolutionary" library receiving 3 million weekly downloads and providing an expressive way for devs to generate CSS. Stylus 'accidentally banned by npmjs' As of a few hours ago, npmjs has removed all versions of the Stylus package and published a "security holding package" page in its place. "Stylus was accidentally banned by npmjs," earlier stated Stylus developer Lei Chen in a GitHub issue. The project maintainer is "currently waiting for npmjs to restore access to Stylus." "I am the current maintainer of Stylus. The Stylus library has been flagged as malicious..., which has caused many [libraries] and frameworks that depend on Stylus to fail to install," also posted Chen on X (formerly Twitter). "Please help me retweet this msg in the hope that the npmjs official team will take notice of this issue."
#bleepingcomputer.com#EN#2025#Supply#supply-chain-attack#Computer#Security#Source#npm#Chain
·bleepingcomputer.com·
npm 'accidentally' removes Stylus package, breaks builds and pipelines
Malicious npm Packages Target React, Vue, and Vite Ecosystems with Destructive Payloads
Malicious npm Packages Target React, Vue, and Vite Ecosystems with Destructive Payloads
Malicious npm packages targeting React, Vue, Vite, Node.js, and Quill remained undetected for two years while deploying destructive payloads. Socket's Threat Research Team discovered a collection of malicious npm packages that deploy attacks against widely-used JavaScript frameworks including React, Vue.js, Vite, Node.js, and the open source Quill Editor. These malicious packages have remained undetected in the npm ecosystem for more than two years, accumulating over 6,200 downloads. Masquerading as legitimate plugins and utilities while secretly containing destructive payloads designed to corrupt data, delete critical files, and crash systems, these packages remained undetected. The threat actor behind this campaign, using the npm alias xuxingfeng with a registration email 1634389031@qq[.]com, has published eight packages designed to cause widespread damage across the JavaScript ecosystem. As of this writing, these packages remain live on the npm registry. We have formally petitioned for their removal. Notably, the same account has also published several legitimate, non-malicious packages that function as advertised. This dual approach of releasing both harmful and helpful packages creates a facade of legitimacy that makes malicious packages more likely to be trusted and installed.
#socket.dev#EN#2025#malicious#npm#packages#Supply-Chain-Attack
·socket.dev·
Malicious npm Packages Target React, Vue, and Vite Ecosystems with Destructive Payloads
RATatouille: A Malicious Recipe Hidden in rand-user-agent (Supply Chain Compromise)
RATatouille: A Malicious Recipe Hidden in rand-user-agent (Supply Chain Compromise)
RATatouille: A Malicious Recipe Hidden in rand-user-agent (Supply Chain Compromise) On 5 May, 16:00 GMT+0, our automated malware analysis pipeline detected a suspicious package released, rand-user-agent@1.0.110. It detected unusual code in the package, and it wasn’t wrong. It detected signs of a supply chain attack against this legitimate package, which has about ~45.000 weekly downloads. What is the package? The package rand-user-agent generates randomized real user-agent strings based on their frequency of occurrence. It’s maintained by the company WebScrapingAPI (https://www.webscrapingapi.com/). Our analysis engine detected suspicious code in the file dist/index.js. Lets check it out, here seen through the code view on npm’s site: We’ve got a RAT (Remote Access Trojan) on our hands. Here’s an overview of it: Behavior Overview The script sets up a covert communication channel with a command-and-control (C2) server using socket.io-client, while exfiltrating files via axios to a second HTTP endpoint. It dynamically installs these modules if missing, hiding them in a custom .node_modules folder under the user's home directory.
#aikido.dev#EN#2025#supply-chain-attack#IoCs#rand-user-agent#npm
·aikido.dev·
RATatouille: A Malicious Recipe Hidden in rand-user-agent (Supply Chain Compromise)