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UK and allies expose China-based technology companies for enabling global cyber campaign against critical networks
UK and allies expose China-based technology companies for enabling global cyber campaign against critical networks
ncsc.gov.uk The NCSC and international partners share technical details of malicious activities and urge organisations to take mitigative actions. GCHQ’s National Cyber Security Centre and international partners link three China-based companies to campaign targeting foreign governments and critical networks. Commercial cyber ecosystem with links to the Chinese intelligence services has enabled global malicious activity. New advisory supports UK organisations in critical sectors bolster their security against China state-sponsored cyber activity Network defenders urged to proactively hunt for activity and take steps to mitigate threat from attackers exploiting avoidable weaknesses The UK and international allies have today (Wednesday) publicly linked three technology companies based in China with a global malicious cyber campaign targeting critical networks. In a new advisory published today, the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) – a part of GCHQ - and international partners from twelve other countries have shared technical details about how malicious cyber activities linked with these China-based commercial entities have targeted nationally significant organisations around the world. Since at least 2021, this activity has targeted organisations in critical sectors including government, telecommunications, transportation, lodging, and military infrastructure globally, with a cluster of activity observed in the UK. The activities described in the advisory partially overlaps with campaigns previously reported by the cyber security industry most commonly under the name Salt Typhoon. The data stolen through this activity can ultimately provide the Chinese intelligence services the capability to identify and track targets’ communications and movements worldwide. The advisory describes how the threat actors have had considerable success taking advantage of known common vulnerabilities rather than relying on bespoke malware or zero-day vulnerabilities to carry out their activities, meaning attacks via these vectors could have been avoided with timely patching. Organisations of national significance in the UK are encouraged to proactively hunt for malicious activity and implement mitigative actions, including ensuring that edge devices are not exposed to known vulnerabilities and implementing security updates. NCSC Chief Executive Dr Richard Horne said: “We are deeply concerned by the irresponsible behaviour of the named commercial entities based in China that has enabled an unrestrained campaign of malicious cyber activities on a global scale. “It is crucial organisations in targeted critical sectors heed this international warning about the threat posed by cyber actors who have been exploiting publicly known – and so therefore fixable – vulnerabilities. “In the face of sophisticated threats, network defenders must proactively hunt for malicious activity, as well as apply recommended mitigations based on indicators of compromise and regularly reviewing network device logs for signs of unusual activity.” The UK has led globally in helping to improve cyber risk management with leading legislation including the Telecommunications (Security) Act 2021 and the associated Code of Practice, for which the NCSC was the technical authority. The government's forthcoming Cyber Security and Resilience Bill will further strengthen the UK’s cyber defences, protecting the services the public rely on to go about their normal lives. The NCSC and government partners have previously warned about the growing range of cyber threats facing critical sectors and provides a range of guidance and resources to improve resilience. The NCSC's Early Warning service provides timely notifications about potential security issues, including known vulnerabilities, and malicious activities affecting users’ networks. All UK organisations can sign up to this free service. The three China-based technology companies provide cyber-related services to the Chinese intelligence services and are part of a wider commercial ecosystem in China, which includes information security companies, data brokers and hackers for hire. The named entities are: Sichuan Juxinhe Network Technology Co Ltd, Beijing Huanyu Tianqiong Information Technology Co, and Sichuan Zhixin Ruijie Network Technology Co Ltd. The NCSC has co-sealed this advisory alongside agencies from the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland and Spain.
·ncsc.gov.uk·
UK and allies expose China-based technology companies for enabling global cyber campaign against critical networks
Seeking Deeper: Assessing China’s AI Security Ecosystem
Seeking Deeper: Assessing China’s AI Security Ecosystem
cetas.turing.ac.uk/ Research Report As AI increasingly shapes the global economic and security landscape, China’s ambitions for global AI dominance are coming into focus. This CETaS Research Report, co-authored with Adarga and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, explores the mechanisms through which China is strengthening its domestic AI ecosystem and influencing international AI policy discourse. The state, industry and academia all play a part in the process, with China’s various regulatory interventions and AI security research trajectories linked to government priorities. The country’s AI security governance is iterative and is rapidly evolving: it has moved from having almost no AI-specific regulations to developing a layered framework of laws, guidelines and standards in just five years. In this context, the report synthesises open-source research and millions of English- and Chinese-language data points to understand China’s strategic position in global AI competition and its approach to AI security. This CETaS Research Report, co-authored with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Adarga, examines China’s evolving AI ecosystem. It seeks to understand how interactions between the state, the private sector and academia are shaping the country’s strategic position in global AI competition and its approach to AI security. The report is a synthesis of open-source research conducted by IISS and Adarga, leveraging millions of English- and Chinese-language data points. Key Judgements China’s political leadership views AI as one of several technologies that will enable the country to achieve global strategic dominance. This aligns closely with President Xi’s long-term strategy of leveraging technological revolutions to establish geopolitical strength. China has pursued AI leadership through a blend of state intervention and robust private-sector innovation. This nuanced approach challenges narratives of total government control, demonstrating significant autonomy and flexibility within China’s AI ecosystem. Notably, the development and launch of the DeepSeek-R1 model underscored China's ability to overcome significant economic barriers and technological restrictions, and almost certainly caught China’s political leadership by surprise – along with Western chip companies. While the Chinese government retains ultimate control of the most strategically significant AI policy decisions, it is an oversimplification to describe this model as entirely centrally controlled. Regional authorities also play significant roles, leading to a decentralised landscape featuring multiple hubs and intense private sector competition, which gives rise to new competitors such as DeepSeek. In the coming years, the Chinese government will almost certainly increase its influence over AI development through closer collaboration with industry and academia. This will include shaping regulation, developing technical standards and providing preferential access to funding and resources. China's AI regulatory model has evolved incrementally, but evidence suggests the country is moving towards more coherent AI legislation. AI governance responsibilities in China remain dispersed across multiple organisations. However, since February 2025, the China AI Safety and Development Association (CnAISDA) has become what China describes as its counterpart to the AI Security Institute. This organisation consolidates several existing institutions but does not appear to carry out independent AI testing and evaluation. The Chinese government has integrated wider political and social priorities into AI governance frameworks, emphasising what it describes as “controllable AI” – a concept interpreted uniquely within the Chinese context. These broader priorities directly shape China’s technical and regulatory approaches to AI security. Compared to international competitors, China’s AI security policy places particular emphasis on the early stages of AI model development through stringent controls on pre-training data and onerous registration requirements. Close data sharing between the Chinese government and domestic AI champions, such as Alibaba’s City Brain, facilitates rapid innovation but would almost certainly encounter privacy and surveillance concerns if attempted elsewhere. The geographical distribution of China's AI ecosystem reveals the strategic clustering of resources, talent and institutions. Cities such as Beijing, Hangzhou and Shenzhen have developed unique ecosystems that attract significant investments and foster innovation through supportive local policies, including subsidies, incentives and strategic infrastructure development. This regional specialisation emerged from long-standing Chinese industrial policy rather than short-term incentives. China has achieved significant improvements in domestic AI education. It is further strengthening its domestic AI talent pool as top-tier AI researchers increasingly choose to remain in or return to China, due to increasingly attractive career opportunities within China and escalating geopolitical tensions between China and the US. Chinese institutions have significantly expanded domestic talent pools, particularly through highly selective undergraduate and postgraduate programmes. These efforts have substantially reduced dependence on international expertise, although many key executives and researchers continue to benefit from an international education. Senior scientists hold considerable influence over China’s AI policymaking process, frequently serving on government advisory panels. This stands in contrast to the US, where corporate tech executives tend to have greater influence over AI policy decisions. Government support provides substantial benefits to China-based tech companies. China’s government actively steers AI development, while the US lets the private sector lead (with the government in a supporting role) and the EU emphasises regulating outcomes and funding research for the public good. This means that China’s AI ventures often have easier access to capital and support for riskier projects, while a tightly controlled information environment mitigates against reputational risk. US export controls have had a limited impact on China’s AI development. Although export controls have achieved some intended effects, they have also inadvertently stimulated innovation within certain sectors, forcing companies to do more with less and resulting in more efficient models that may even outperform their Western counterparts. Chinese AI companies such as SenseTime and DeepSeek continue to thrive despite their limited access to advanced US semiconductors.
·cetas.turing.ac.uk·
Seeking Deeper: Assessing China’s AI Security Ecosystem