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Intel Outside: Hacking every Intel employee and various internal websites
Intel Outside: Hacking every Intel employee and various internal websites
eaton-works.com 2025/08/18 - Hardcoded credentials, pointless encryption, and generous APIs exposed details of every employee and made it possible to break into internal websites. Key Points / Summary It was possible to bypass the corporate login on an internal business card ordering website and exploit it to download the details of more than 270k Intel employees/workers. An internal “Product Hierarchy” website had easily decryptable hardcoded credentials that provided a second way to download the details of every Intel employee. More hardcoded credentials made it possible to gain admin access to the system. An internal “Product Onboarding” website had easily decryptable hardcoded credentials that provided a third way to download the details of every Intel employee. More hardcoded credentials made it possible to gain admin access to the system. It was possible to bypass the corporate login on Intel’s SEIMS Supplier Site and further exploit it to download the details of every Intel employee (the fourth way). Additional client-side modifications made it possible to gain full access to the system to view large amounts of confidential information about Intel’s suppliers. Intel needs no introduction. The storied chipmaker is a mainstay in modern computing and an Intel chip has been inside basically every computer I have ever owned. They’ve had their fair share of security vulnerabilities, from Meltdown and Spectre to side channel attacks and more. There have been many hardware security vulnerabilities over the years, but what about Intel websites? You never hear about vulnerabilities there. Probably because hardware vulnerabilities are worth up to $100k while website bugs are basically relegated to a black-hole inbox (more on that later). I managed to find some very serious issues in several internal Intel websites. Please note that all tokens and credentials shown below are now expired/rotated and can no longer be used. ... Intel’s Response and Timeline Intel’s bug bounty program has been around a while and is well-known. There are some great rewards too – up to $100k. After discovering multiple critical website vulnerabilities, I was excited about the potential rewards I would get. Then I read the fine print: Credentials: Username, password, account identifier, keys, certificates, or other credentials that have been published, leaked, or exposed in some way should be reported to this program to ensure they can be properly investigated, cleaned up, and secured. Credentials are out of Scope for rewards. Is Intel’s Web Infrastructure, i.e..intel.com in scope? Intel’s web infrastructure, i.e., website domains owned and/or operated by Intel, fall out of Scope. Please send security vulnerability reports against Intel.com and/or related web presence to external.security.research@intel.com. Obviously disappointing, but the right thing to do was to still report the vulnerabilities, and that is what I did. That is the only official correspondence I ever received from Intel. The good news is that everything was fixed, so while the email inbox was essentially a one-way black hole, at least the reports got to the right people eventually. The full timeline: October 14, 2024: Business Card vulnerability report sent. October 29, 2024: Hierarchy Management and Product Onboarding vulnerability reports sent. November 11, 2024: Follow-up email sent on the Hierarchy Management and Product Onboarding thread with more information as to what specific steps should be taken to fix the vulnerabilities. November 12, 2024: SEIMS vulnerability report sent. December 2, 2024: Follow-up email sent on the Hierarchy Management and Product Onboarding thread letting them know they must rotate the leaked credentials. February 28, 2025: At this point, it has been more than 90 days since my first report and all vulnerabilities have been resolved. A new email was sent to alert Intel about the intent to publish. August 18, 2025: Published. The good news is that Intel has recently expanded their bug bounty coverage to include services. Hopefully they will include blanket coverage for .intel.com in the future for bug bounty rewards.
·eaton-works.com·
Intel Outside: Hacking every Intel employee and various internal websites
Aptly Named: How the Leakzone Exposed Access Logs
Aptly Named: How the Leakzone Exposed Access Logs
UpGuard discovered an unauthenticated Elasticsearch database containing 22 million records of user traffic for hacking forum leakzone.net. On Friday, July 18 UpGuard discovered an unauthenticated Elasticsearch database containing about 22 million objects. Each of the objects was a record of a web request containing the domain to which the request was sent, the user’s IP address, and metadata like their location and internet provider. In this case, 95% of the requests were sent to leakzone.net, a “leaking and cracking forum” in the tradition of Raid Forums. This sizeable data set can thus give us an inside view of visitor activity to a very active website used for the distribution of hacking tools, exploits, and compromised accounts. About Leakzone Leakzone is part of a long line of forum sites that trade in illicit cyber materials like lists of usernames and passwords, pornography collections, and hacking tools. While law enforcement has shut down many other clearweb leak sites in that time period– the original Raid Forums was seized in 2022, and the founder of its replacement, Breach Forums, was arrested in 2023–Leakzone has survived. Archive.org shows the site beginning to take off in the second half of 2020 and continuing on to the present. Attribution On initial inspection of the exposed data, we saw that “leakzone.net” was mentioned very frequently in the “domain” field of the database schema. After downloading the available data, we were able to confirm that 95% of records named leakzone.net, making this data almost entirely about traffic to that site. The second most common domain, mentioned in 2.7% of records, was accountbot.io, a site for selling compromised accounts. In all, there are 281 unique values, though the other sites have only a fraction of the traffic and include mainstream sports and news sites– unaffiliated sites that may have been mentioned in the logs as part of redirects from Leakzone. ... Significance The IP addresses, and what they tell us about visitors to Leakzone and its ilk, are the most interesting part of the collection. GDPR even classifies client IP addresses as PII because of their utility for identifying a person across web properties. Public Proxies The data set contained 185k unique IP addresses– more than Leakzone’s entire user base of 109k, which certainly wouldn’t have all been using the site during this time period. (If they had 100% of their users active during a three week period they would be the most successful website of all time). The most likely explanation for the number of unique IPs is that some users were routing traffic through servers with dynamic IP addresses to hide their real IP addresses.
·upguard.com·
Aptly Named: How the Leakzone Exposed Access Logs
iPhone wingman app leaks 160K chat screenshots
iPhone wingman app leaks 160K chat screenshots
  • FlirtAI wingman app leaked 160K chat screenshots through unprotected cloud storage. Teenagers frequently used the app, making the breach more concerning for minors. Some individuals were likely unaware their conversations were screenshot and sent to third parties. Sending private screenshots to an AI-based “wingman” app is probably not the best idea. Who would have thought? Unfortunately, users of FlirtAI - Get Rizz & Dates will have to find out the hard way. The Cybernews research team recently discovered an unprotected Google Cloud Storage Bucket owned by Buddy Network GmbH, an iOS app developer. The exposed data was attributed to one of the company’s projects, FlirtAI - Get Rizz & Dates, an app that intends to analyze screenshots that users provide, promising to suggest appropriate replies. Meanwhile, the app makers leaked over 160K screenshots from messaging apps and dating profiles, belonging to individuals that users of the AI wingman wanted assistance with. What makes it worse is that, according to the team, leaked data indicates that FlirtAI - Get Rizz & Dates was often used by teenagers, who fed the AI screenshots of their conversations with their peers. “Due to the nature of the app, people most affected by the leak may be unaware that screenshots of their conversations even exist, let alone that they could be leaked on the internet,” the team said. After the team noted the company and the relevant Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), Buddy Network GmbH closed the exposed bucket. We have reached out to the company for a comment and will update the article once we receive a reply.
·cybernews.com·
iPhone wingman app leaks 160K chat screenshots
300,000+ Prometheus Servers and Exporters Exposed to DoS Attacks
300,000+ Prometheus Servers and Exporters Exposed to DoS Attacks
In this research, we uncovered several vulnerabilities and security flaws within the Prometheus ecosystem. These findings span across three major areas: information disclosure, denial-of-service (DoS), and code execution. We found that exposed Prometheus servers or exporters, often lacking proper authentication, allowed attackers to easily gather sensitive information, such as credentials and API keys. Additionally, we identified an alarming risk of DoS attacks stemming from the exposure of pprof debugging endpoints, which, when exploited, could overwhelm and crash Prometheus servers, Kubernetes pods and other hosts.
·aquasec.com·
300,000+ Prometheus Servers and Exporters Exposed to DoS Attacks
Deloitte Says No Threat to Sensitive Data After Hacker Claims Server Breach
Deloitte Says No Threat to Sensitive Data After Hacker Claims Server Breach
A notorious hacker has announced the theft of data from an improperly protected server allegedly belonging to Deloitte. The hacker known as IntelBroker announced late last week on the BreachForums cybercrime forum the availability of “internal communications” obtained from Deloitte, specifically an internet-exposed Apache Solr server that was accessible with default credentials.
·securityweek.com·
Deloitte Says No Threat to Sensitive Data After Hacker Claims Server Breach
CVE-2024-21591 - Juniper J-Web OOB Write vulnerability
CVE-2024-21591 - Juniper J-Web OOB Write vulnerability
  • Juniper Networks recently patched a critical pre-authentication Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in the J-Web configuration interface across all versions of Junos OS on SRX firewalls and EX switches. Unauthenticated actors could exploit this vulnerability to gain root access or initiate Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on devices that have not been patched. Ensure your systems are updated promptly to mitigate this risk. Check for exposed J-Web configuration interfaces using this Censys Search query: services.software.uniform_resource_identifier: cpe:2.3:a:juniper:jweb:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. * As emphasized last year in CISA’s BOD 23-02 guidance, exposed network management interfaces continue to pose a significant risk. Restrict access to these interfaces from the public internet wherever possible.
·censys.com·
CVE-2024-21591 - Juniper J-Web OOB Write vulnerability
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
We have recently began scanning for  accessible MySQL server instances on port 3306/TCP.  These are instances that respond to our MySQL connection request with a Server Greeting. Surprisingly to us, we found around 2.3M IPv4 addresses responding with such a greeting to our queries. Even more surprisingly, we found over 1.3M IPv6 devices responding as well (though mostly associated with a single AS). IPv4 and IPv6 scans together uncover 3.6M accessible MySQL servers worldwide.
·shadowserver.org·
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
We have recently began scanning for  accessible MySQL server instances on port 3306/TCP.  These are instances that respond to our MySQL connection request with a Server Greeting. Surprisingly to us, we found around 2.3M IPv4 addresses responding with such a greeting to our queries. Even more surprisingly, we found over 1.3M IPv6 devices responding as well (though mostly associated with a single AS). IPv4 and IPv6 scans together uncover 3.6M accessible MySQL servers worldwide.
·shadowserver.org·
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6
We have recently began scanning for  accessible MySQL server instances on port 3306/TCP.  These are instances that respond to our MySQL connection request with a Server Greeting. Surprisingly to us, we found around 2.3M IPv4 addresses responding with such a greeting to our queries. Even more surprisingly, we found over 1.3M IPv6 devices responding as well (though mostly associated with a single AS). IPv4 and IPv6 scans together uncover 3.6M accessible MySQL servers worldwide.
·shadowserver.org·
Over 3.6 million exposed MySQL servers on IPv4 and IPv6