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Mac.c Stealer Takes on AMOS:A New Rival Shakes Up the macOS Infostealer Market | HackerNoon
Mac.c Stealer Takes on AMOS:A New Rival Shakes Up the macOS Infostealer Market | HackerNoon
hackernoon.com - Moonlock analysed Mac.c stealer, a new rival to AMOS. Learn its tactics, code reuse, and "building in public" strategy. The story of the Mac.c stealer doesn’t begin with a major campaign or breach. It starts in the hushed corners of darknet forums, where a threat actor named 'mentalpositive' first emerged, drawing attention with a set of unusual traits that set him apart from other stealer developers. Moonlock, the cybersecurity division of MacPaw, has been tracking mentalpositive for the past four months. We can already see that it is a new actor taking advantage of a macOS malware market that remains far less saturated than its Windows counterpart, marking the rise of the new wave of threat actors who are both technically skilled and commercially ambitious. Although only recently active, Mac.c is already competing with larger, more established stealer operations like Atomic macOS Stealer. While it borrows heavily from AMOS and Rodrigo4 malware, it's tailored for quicker, high-impact data theft. As more URLs are added to its command-and-control infrastructure, Mac.c appears to be part of a larger underground ecosystem targeting macOS users. What also stands out is a methodical and unusually transparent approach to building in public. 'mentalpositive' shared progress updates and even collected feedback on Mac.c builds — a surprising level of openness in the typically secretive world of macOS malware development. In this article, we trace the evolution of Mac.c, unpack mentalpositive’s tactics, and examine how this stealer fits into the broader landscape of threats targeting Apple platforms. A new player on the market About four months ago, Moonlock Lab first noticed the emergence of the Mac.c stealer and attributed it to a developer under the alias 'mentalpositive'. This threat actor was one of many new players entering the macOS malware market, a space still far less crowded than the Windows-targeting malware industry. Similar to other threat actors, 'mentalpositive' adopts recent trends in malware development: modular architecture for use across different campaigns, advanced obfuscation techniques, and increasingly complex command-and-control (C2) infrastructures. However, the target profile and data exfiltration scope of mentalpositive’s Mac.c stand out. It harvests iCloud Keychain credentials, browser-stored passwords, crypto wallets, system metadata, and even files from specific locations on macOS — all using credentials obtained through phishing. By relying on standard system APIs and staged communication methods, it evades many traditional endpoint defences. Building in public Beyond technical design, 'mentalpositive' exhibited unusual behavior across darknet forums. Over the span of several months, this threat actor used one underground forum to showcase incremental updates to Mac.c, engage with potential users, and actively solicit feedback. Such publicity may signal an intent to raise visibility and carve out a distinct market presence. It also appears to lay the groundwork for a custom stealer-as-a-service business model aimed squarely at the macOS threat niche. The screenshots below show how the forum posts evolved over time as new features were announced. Since the original posts were written in Russian, we’ve included a brief explanation for each. The first screenshot shows an early advertisement offering a subscription to stealer updates for $1,500 per month.
·hackernoon.com·
Mac.c Stealer Takes on AMOS:A New Rival Shakes Up the macOS Infostealer Market | HackerNoon
SVG Phishing Malware Being Distributed with Analysis Obstruction Feature
SVG Phishing Malware Being Distributed with Analysis Obstruction Feature
AhnLab SEcurity intelligence Center (ASEC) recently identified a phishing malware being distributed in Scalable Vector Graphics (SVG) format. SVG is an XML-based vector image file format commonly used for icons, logos, charts, and graphs, and it allows the use of CSS and JS scripts within the code. In November 2024, the ASEC Blog introduced SVG […]
·asec.ahnlab.com·
SVG Phishing Malware Being Distributed with Analysis Obstruction Feature
How Adversary Telegram Bots Help to Reveal Threats: Case Study  - ANY.RUN's Cybersecurity Blog
How Adversary Telegram Bots Help to Reveal Threats: Case Study  - ANY.RUN's Cybersecurity Blog
Discover how to intercept data stolen by cybercriminals via Telegram bots and learn to use it to clarify related threat landscape. While analyzing malware samples uploaded to ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox, one particular case marked as “phishing” and “Telegram” drew the attention of our security analysts. Although this analysis session wasn’t attributed to any known malware family or threat actor group, the analysis revealed that Telegram bots were being used for data exfiltration. This led us to apply a message interception technique for Telegram bots, previously described on the ANY.RUN blog. The investigation resulted in a clear and practical case study demonstrating how intercepting Telegram bot communications can aid in profiling the threat actor behind a relatively obscure phishing campaign. Key outcomes of this analysis include: Examination and technical analysis of a lesser known phishing campaign Demonstration of Telegram API-based data interception techniques Collection of threat intelligence (TI) indicators to help identify the actor Recommendations for detecting this type of threat
·any.run·
How Adversary Telegram Bots Help to Reveal Threats: Case Study  - ANY.RUN's Cybersecurity Blog
LockBit Ransomware v4.0
LockBit Ransomware v4.0
Malware Analysis Report - LockBit Ransomware v4.0 In this blog post, I’m going over my analysis for the latest variant of LockBit ransomware - version 4.0. Throughout this blog, I’ll walk through all the malicious functionalities discovered, complete with explanations and IDA screenshots to show my reverse engineering process step by step. This new version of LockBit 4.0 implements a hybrid-cryptography approach, combining Curve25519 with XChaCha20 for its file encryption scheme. This version shares similarities with the older LockBit Green variant that is derived from Conti ransomware. While the multi-threading architecture seems more streamlined than previous versions, it still delivers an encryption speed that outpaces most other ransomware families. As always, LockBit is still my most favorite malware to look at, and I certainly enjoyed doing a deep dive to understand how this version works.
·chuongdong.com·
LockBit Ransomware v4.0
Threat actors misuse Node.js to deliver malware and other malicious payloads | Microsoft Security Blog
Threat actors misuse Node.js to deliver malware and other malicious payloads | Microsoft Security Blog
Since October 2024, Microsoft Defender Experts has observed and helped multiple customers address campaigns leveraging Node.js to deliver malware and other payloads that ultimately lead to information theft and data exfiltration.
·microsoft.com·
Threat actors misuse Node.js to deliver malware and other malicious payloads | Microsoft Security Blog
New TorNet backdoor seen in widespread campaign
New TorNet backdoor seen in widespread campaign
Cisco Talos discovered an ongoing malicious campaign operated by a financially motivated threat actor targeting users, predominantly in Poland and Germany. The actor has delivered different payloads, including Agent Tesla, Snake Keylogger, and a new undocumented backdoor we are calling TorNet, dropped by PureCrypter malware. The actor is running a Windows scheduled task on victim machines—including on endpoints with a low battery—to achieve persistence. The actor also disconnects the victim machine from the network before dropping the payload and then connects it back to the network, allowing them to evade detection by cloud antimalware solutions. We also found that the actor connects the victim’s machine to the TOR network using the TorNet backdoor for stealthy command and control (C2) communications and detection evasion.
·blog.talosintelligence.com·
New TorNet backdoor seen in widespread campaign
Inside FireScam : An Information Stealer with Spyware Capabilities
Inside FireScam : An Information Stealer with Spyware Capabilities
  • FireScam is an information stealing malware with spyware capabilities. It is distributed as a fake ‘Telegram Premium’ APK via a phishing website hosted on the GitHub.io domain, mimicking the RuStore app store. The phishing website delivers a dropper that installs the FireScam malware disguised as the Telegram Premium application. The malware exfiltrates sensitive data, including notifications, messages, and other app data, to a Firebase Realtime Database endpoint. FireScam monitors device activities such as screen state changes, e-commerce transactions, clipboard activity, and user engagement to gather valuable information covertly. Captures notifications across various apps, including system apps, to potentially steal sensitive information and track user activities. It employs obfuscation techniques to hide its intent and evade detection by security tools and researchers. FireScam performs checks to identify if it is running in an analysis or virtualized environment. The malware leverages Firebase for command-and-control communication, data storage, and to deliver additional malicious payloads. Exfiltrated data is temporarily stored in the Firebase Realtime Database, filtered for valuable content, and later removed. The Firebase database reveals potential Telegram IDs linked to the threat actors and contains URLs to other malware specimens hosted on the phishing site. By exploiting the popularity of messaging apps and other widely used applications, FireScam poses a significant threat to individuals and organizations worldwide.
·cyfirma.com·
Inside FireScam : An Information Stealer with Spyware Capabilities
When Guardians Become Predators: How Malware Corrupts the Protectors
When Guardians Become Predators: How Malware Corrupts the Protectors
We often trust our security software to stand as an unbreakable wall against malware and attacks, but what happens when that very wall is weaponized against us? Our Trellix Advanced Research Center team recently uncovered a malicious campaign that does just that. Instead of bypassing defenses, this malware takes a more sinister route: it drops a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit driver (aswArPot.sys) and manipulates it to carry out its destructive agenda. The malware exploits the deep access provided by the driver to terminate security processes, disable protective software, and seize control of the infected system.
·trellix.com·
When Guardians Become Predators: How Malware Corrupts the Protectors
FrostyGoop’s Zoom-In: A Closer Look into the Malware Artifacts, Behaviors and Network Communications
FrostyGoop’s Zoom-In: A Closer Look into the Malware Artifacts, Behaviors and Network Communications
We analyze FrostyGoop malware, which targets OT systems. This article walks through newly discovered samples, indicators, and also examines configurations and network communications. We analyze FrostyGoop malware, which targets OT systems. This article walks through newly discovered samples, indicators, and also examines configurations and network communications.
·unit42.paloaltonetworks.com·
FrostyGoop’s Zoom-In: A Closer Look into the Malware Artifacts, Behaviors and Network Communications
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat