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BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
MAR-10478915-1.v1 Citrix Bleed
MAR-10478915-1.v1 Citrix Bleed
This report is provided "as is" for informational purposes only. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not provide any warranties of any kind regarding any information contained herein. The DHS does not endorse any commercial product or service referenced in this bulletin or otherwise. This document is marked TLP:CLEAR--Recipients may share this information without restriction. Sources may use TLP:CLEAR when information carries minimal or no foreseeable risk of misuse, in accordance with applicable rules and procedures for public release. Subject to standard copyright rules, TLP:CLEAR information may be shared without restriction. For more information on the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP), see http://www.cisa.gov/tlp.
·cisa.gov·
MAR-10478915-1.v1 Citrix Bleed
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2023-02-03 - DEV-0569 activity: Google ad -- FakeBat Loader -- Redline Stealer & Gozi/ISFB/Ursnif
Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2023-02-03 - DEV-0569 activity: Google ad -- FakeBat Loader -- Redline Stealer & Gozi/ISFB/Ursnif
NOTES: Zip files are password-protected. If you don't know the password, see the "about" page of this website. IOCs are listed on this page below all of the images.
·malware-traffic-analysis.net·
Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2023-02-03 - DEV-0569 activity: Google ad -- FakeBat Loader -- Redline Stealer & Gozi/ISFB/Ursnif
L’art de l’évasion How Shlayer hides its configuration inside Apple proprietary DMG files
L’art de l’évasion How Shlayer hides its configuration inside Apple proprietary DMG files
While conducting routine threat hunting for macOS malware on Ad networks, I stumbled upon an unusual Shlayer sample. Upon further analysis, it became clear that this variant was different from the known Shlayer variants such as OSX/Shlayer.D, OSX/Shlayer.E, or ZShlayer. We have dubbed it OSX/Shlayer.F.
·objective-see.org·
L’art de l’évasion How Shlayer hides its configuration inside Apple proprietary DMG files
An infostealer comes to town: Dissecting a highly evasive malware targeting Italy
An infostealer comes to town: Dissecting a highly evasive malware targeting Italy
Cluster25 researchers analyzed several campaigns (also publicly reported by CERT-AGID) that used phishing emails to spread an InfoStealer malware written in .NET through an infection chain that involves Windows Shortcut (LNK) files and Batch Scripts (BAT). Taking into account the used TTPs and extracted evidence, the attacks seem perpetrated by the same adversary (internally named AUI001).
·blog.cluster25.duskrise.com·
An infostealer comes to town: Dissecting a highly evasive malware targeting Italy
New RapperBot Campaign – We Know What You Bruting for this Time
New RapperBot Campaign – We Know What You Bruting for this Time
FortiGuard Labs provides an analysis on RapperBot focusing on comparing samples for different campaigns, including one aiming to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. Read our blog to learn more about the differences observed in this campaign vs previous RapperBot and similar campaigns in the past.
·fortinet.com·
New RapperBot Campaign – We Know What You Bruting for this Time
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2023-02-03 - DEV-0569 activity: Google ad -- FakeBat Loader -- Redline Stealer & Gozi/ISFB/Ursnif
Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2023-02-03 - DEV-0569 activity: Google ad -- FakeBat Loader -- Redline Stealer & Gozi/ISFB/Ursnif
NOTES: Zip files are password-protected. If you don't know the password, see the "about" page of this website. IOCs are listed on this page below all of the images.
·malware-traffic-analysis.net·
Malware-Traffic-Analysis.net - 2023-02-03 - DEV-0569 activity: Google ad -- FakeBat Loader -- Redline Stealer & Gozi/ISFB/Ursnif
L’art de l’évasion How Shlayer hides its configuration inside Apple proprietary DMG files
L’art de l’évasion How Shlayer hides its configuration inside Apple proprietary DMG files
While conducting routine threat hunting for macOS malware on Ad networks, I stumbled upon an unusual Shlayer sample. Upon further analysis, it became clear that this variant was different from the known Shlayer variants such as OSX/Shlayer.D, OSX/Shlayer.E, or ZShlayer. We have dubbed it OSX/Shlayer.F.
·objective-see.org·
L’art de l’évasion How Shlayer hides its configuration inside Apple proprietary DMG files
An infostealer comes to town: Dissecting a highly evasive malware targeting Italy
An infostealer comes to town: Dissecting a highly evasive malware targeting Italy
Cluster25 researchers analyzed several campaigns (also publicly reported by CERT-AGID) that used phishing emails to spread an InfoStealer malware written in .NET through an infection chain that involves Windows Shortcut (LNK) files and Batch Scripts (BAT). Taking into account the used TTPs and extracted evidence, the attacks seem perpetrated by the same adversary (internally named AUI001).
·blog.cluster25.duskrise.com·
An infostealer comes to town: Dissecting a highly evasive malware targeting Italy