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Inside the Open Directory of the “You Dun” Threat Group
Inside the Open Directory of the “You Dun” Threat Group
  • Analysis of an open directory found a Chinese speaking threat actor’s toolkit and history of activity. The threat actor displayed extensive scanning and exploitation using WebLogicScan, Vulmap, and Xray, targeting organizations in South Korea, China, Thailand, Taiwan, and Iran. The Viper C2 framework was present as well as a Cobalt Strike kit which included TaoWu and Ladon extensions. * The Leaked LockBit 3 builder was used to create a LockBit payload with a custom ransom note that included reference to a Telegram group which we investigated further in the report.
#thedfirreport#EN#2024#Analysis#open-directory#LockBit#operational#You-Dun#group#China#tools#scan
·thedfirreport.com·
Inside the Open Directory of the “You Dun” Threat Group
IcedID Brings ScreenConnect and CSharp Streamer to ALPHV Ransomware Deployment – The DFIR Report
IcedID Brings ScreenConnect and CSharp Streamer to ALPHV Ransomware Deployment – The DFIR Report
Key Takeaways In October 2023, we observed an intrusion that began with a spam campaign, distributing a forked IcedID loader. The threat actor used Impacket’s wmiexec and RDP to install Scree…
#thedfirreport#EN#2024#analysis#IceID#ScreenConnect#incident#ALPHV#Ransomware
·thedfirreport.com·
IcedID Brings ScreenConnect and CSharp Streamer to ALPHV Ransomware Deployment – The DFIR Report
BumbleBee Zeros in on Meterpreter
BumbleBee Zeros in on Meterpreter
In this intrusion from May 2022, the threat actors used BumbleBee as the initial access vector from a Contact Forms campaign. We have previously reported on two BumbleBee intrusions (1, 2), and this report is a continuation of a series of reports uncovering multiple TTPs seen by BumbleBee post exploitation operators. The intrusion began with the delivery of an ISO file that contained an LNK and a DLL. The threat actors leveraged BumbleBee to load a Meterpreter agent and Cobalt Strike Beacons. They then performed reconnaissance, used two different UAC bypass techniques, dumped credentials, escalated privileges using a ZeroLogon exploit, and moved laterally through the environment.
#thedfirreport#EN#2022#bumblebee#case#analysis
·thedfirreport.com·
BumbleBee Zeros in on Meterpreter
BumbleBee Zeros in on Meterpreter
BumbleBee Zeros in on Meterpreter
In this intrusion from May 2022, the threat actors used BumbleBee as the initial access vector from a Contact Forms campaign. We have previously reported on two BumbleBee intrusions (1, 2), and this report is a continuation of a series of reports uncovering multiple TTPs seen by BumbleBee post exploitation operators. The intrusion began with the delivery of an ISO file that contained an LNK and a DLL. The threat actors leveraged BumbleBee to load a Meterpreter agent and Cobalt Strike Beacons. They then performed reconnaissance, used two different UAC bypass techniques, dumped credentials, escalated privileges using a ZeroLogon exploit, and moved laterally through the environment.
#thedfirreport#EN#2022#bumblebee#case#analysis
·thedfirreport.com·
BumbleBee Zeros in on Meterpreter