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PROSPERO & Proton66: Tracing Uncovering the links between bulletproof networks
PROSPERO & Proton66: Tracing Uncovering the links between bulletproof networks
  • The Russian autonomous system PROSPERO (AS200593) could be linked with a high level of confidence to Proton66 (AS198953), another Russian AS, that we believe to be connected to the bulletproof services named ‘SecureHost‘ and ‘BEARHOST‘. We notably observed that both network’s configurations are almost identical in terms of peering agreements and their respective share of loads throughout time. Amongst the activities shared by the two networks, we noticed that both GootLoader and SpyNote malwares recently changed their infrastructure of command-and-control servers and phishing pages from to Proton66. Additionally, the domains hosting the phishing pages deploying SpyNote were hosted on either one of the two AS and had already been used in previous campaigns delivering revoked AnyDesk and LiveChat versions for both Windows and Mac. Regarding the other malicious activities found on PROSPERO’s IPs, we found that throughout September, multiple SMS spam campaigns targeting citizens from various countries were leading to phishing domains hosted on PROSPERO and Proton66. While most phishing templates were usurping bank login pages to steal credit card details, we also noticed that some of them were used to deploy android spywares such as Coper (a.k.a. Octo). * SocGholish, another initial access broker (IAB) that we found to be hosting a major part of its infrastructure on Proton66, continues to leverage this autonomous system to host fingerprinting scripts contained on the websites it infects. Along SocGholish, we found out that FakeBat, another loader that infects systems through compromised websites, was using the same IPs to host both screening and redirection script
·intrinsec.com·
PROSPERO & Proton66: Tracing Uncovering the links between bulletproof networks
APT27 - One Year To Exfiltrate Them All: Intrusion In-Depth Analysis
APT27 - One Year To Exfiltrate Them All: Intrusion In-Depth Analysis
During Spring 2022, a company discovered that one of their equipments was communicating with a known command and control server. As a result, the company decided to contact CERT Intrinsec in order to get help to handle the security breach and manage the crisis. CERT Intrinsec gathered information about malicious activities that were discovered on victim’s information system, and past incidents. Our in-depth analysis led us to conclude that an advanced persistent threat dubbed APT27 (a.k.a LuckyMouse, EmissaryPanda) actually compromised the company’s internal network for more than a year by exploiting a public facing application. Our analysis showed that the threat actor managed to compromise five different domains and to gain persistence on many equipments while trying to hide in plain sight. Besides, APT27 operators collected technical and business-related informations and exfiltrate almost three terabytes of data. As investigations went on, we observed tactics, techniques and procedures that had already been documented in papers, but we discovered new ones as well. CERT Intrinsec wanted to share with the community fresh and actionnable threat-intelligence related to APT27. That is why this report presents a timeline of actions taken by the attackers and the tactics, techniques and procedures seen during our incident response. It provides as well a MITRE ATT&CK diagram and several recommendations to follow if you came across such incident, and to prevent them.
·intrinsec.com·
APT27 - One Year To Exfiltrate Them All: Intrusion In-Depth Analysis
APT27 - One Year To Exfiltrate Them All: Intrusion In-Depth Analysis
APT27 - One Year To Exfiltrate Them All: Intrusion In-Depth Analysis
During Spring 2022, a company discovered that one of their equipments was communicating with a known command and control server. As a result, the company decided to contact CERT Intrinsec in order to get help to handle the security breach and manage the crisis. CERT Intrinsec gathered information about malicious activities that were discovered on victim’s information system, and past incidents. Our in-depth analysis led us to conclude that an advanced persistent threat dubbed APT27 (a.k.a LuckyMouse, EmissaryPanda) actually compromised the company’s internal network for more than a year by exploiting a public facing application. Our analysis showed that the threat actor managed to compromise five different domains and to gain persistence on many equipments while trying to hide in plain sight. Besides, APT27 operators collected technical and business-related informations and exfiltrate almost three terabytes of data. As investigations went on, we observed tactics, techniques and procedures that had already been documented in papers, but we discovered new ones as well. CERT Intrinsec wanted to share with the community fresh and actionnable threat-intelligence related to APT27. That is why this report presents a timeline of actions taken by the attackers and the tactics, techniques and procedures seen during our incident response. It provides as well a MITRE ATT&CK diagram and several recommendations to follow if you came across such incident, and to prevent them.
·intrinsec.com·
APT27 - One Year To Exfiltrate Them All: Intrusion In-Depth Analysis