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Inside FireScam : An Information Stealer with Spyware Capabilities
Inside FireScam : An Information Stealer with Spyware Capabilities
  • FireScam is an information stealing malware with spyware capabilities. It is distributed as a fake ‘Telegram Premium’ APK via a phishing website hosted on the GitHub.io domain, mimicking the RuStore app store. The phishing website delivers a dropper that installs the FireScam malware disguised as the Telegram Premium application. The malware exfiltrates sensitive data, including notifications, messages, and other app data, to a Firebase Realtime Database endpoint. FireScam monitors device activities such as screen state changes, e-commerce transactions, clipboard activity, and user engagement to gather valuable information covertly. Captures notifications across various apps, including system apps, to potentially steal sensitive information and track user activities. It employs obfuscation techniques to hide its intent and evade detection by security tools and researchers. FireScam performs checks to identify if it is running in an analysis or virtualized environment. The malware leverages Firebase for command-and-control communication, data storage, and to deliver additional malicious payloads. Exfiltrated data is temporarily stored in the Firebase Realtime Database, filtered for valuable content, and later removed. The Firebase database reveals potential Telegram IDs linked to the threat actors and contains URLs to other malware specimens hosted on the phishing site. By exploiting the popularity of messaging apps and other widely used applications, FireScam poses a significant threat to individuals and organizations worldwide.
·cyfirma.com·
Inside FireScam : An Information Stealer with Spyware Capabilities
When Guardians Become Predators: How Malware Corrupts the Protectors
When Guardians Become Predators: How Malware Corrupts the Protectors
We often trust our security software to stand as an unbreakable wall against malware and attacks, but what happens when that very wall is weaponized against us? Our Trellix Advanced Research Center team recently uncovered a malicious campaign that does just that. Instead of bypassing defenses, this malware takes a more sinister route: it drops a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit driver (aswArPot.sys) and manipulates it to carry out its destructive agenda. The malware exploits the deep access provided by the driver to terminate security processes, disable protective software, and seize control of the infected system.
·trellix.com·
When Guardians Become Predators: How Malware Corrupts the Protectors
FrostyGoop’s Zoom-In: A Closer Look into the Malware Artifacts, Behaviors and Network Communications
FrostyGoop’s Zoom-In: A Closer Look into the Malware Artifacts, Behaviors and Network Communications
We analyze FrostyGoop malware, which targets OT systems. This article walks through newly discovered samples, indicators, and also examines configurations and network communications. We analyze FrostyGoop malware, which targets OT systems. This article walks through newly discovered samples, indicators, and also examines configurations and network communications.
·unit42.paloaltonetworks.com·
FrostyGoop’s Zoom-In: A Closer Look into the Malware Artifacts, Behaviors and Network Communications
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Analyzing DPRK's SpectralBlur
Analyzing DPRK's SpectralBlur
In both his twitter (err, X) thread and in a subsequent posting he provided a comprehensive background and triage of the malware dubbed SpectralBlur. In terms of its capabilities he noted: SpectralBlur is a moderately capable backdoor, that can upload/download files, run a shell, update its configuration, delete files, hibernate or sleep, based on commands issued from the C2. -Greg He also pointed out similarities to/overlaps with the DPRK malware known as KandyKorn (that we covered in our “Mac Malware of 2024” report), while also pointing out there was differences, leading him to conclude: We can see some similarities ... to the KandyKorn. But these feel like families developed by different folks with the same sort of requirements. -Greg
·objective-see.org·
Analyzing DPRK's SpectralBlur
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
The ASEC analysis team recently discovered that a Linux malware developed with Shc has been installing a CoinMiner. It is presumed that after successful authentication through a dictionary attack on inadequately managed Linux SSH servers, various malware were installed on the target system. Among those installed were the Shc downloader, XMRig CoinMiner installed through the former, and DDoS IRC Bot, developed with Perl.
·asec.ahnlab.com·
Shc Linux Malware Installing CoinMiner
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Here we go with another episode about our (not so) old friend, BRATA. In almost one year, threat actors (TAs) have further improved the capabilities of this malware. In our previous blog post [1] we defined three main BRATA variants, which appeared during two different waves detected by our telemetries at the very end of 2021. However, during the last months we have observed a change in the attack pattern commonly used.
·cleafy.com·
BRATA is evolving into an Advanced Persistent Threat
Rhadamanthys v0.5.0 - a deep dive into the stealer’s components
Rhadamanthys v0.5.0 - a deep dive into the stealer’s components
  • The Rhadamanthys stealer is a multi-layer malware, sold on the black market, and frequently updated. Recently the author released a new major version, 0.5.0. In the new version, the malware expands its stealing capabilities and also introduces some general-purpose spying functions. A new plugin system makes the malware expandable for specific distributor needs. The custom executable formats, used for modules, are unchanged since our last publication (XS1 and XS2 formats are still in distribution). Check Point Research (CPR) provides a comprehensive review of the agent modules, presenting their capabilities and implementation, with a focus on how the stealer components are loaded and how they work.
·research.checkpoint.com·
Rhadamanthys v0.5.0 - a deep dive into the stealer’s components