Neuroscience techniques can only reliably answer “how” people behave or process information, but they should never answer “why” people behave the way they do.

So how often should information be boostered? We recommend that you send boosters out in three phases. You can keep this in mind by remembering 2+2+2. Send out boosters after two days, two weeks, and two months.

This first set of boosters should be “recognition boosters.” The strategy here is just to get people to try to recognize the right answer from a list of options.

The second phase of boosters should be sent about two weeks after the training and at this time you should send out “generative boosters.” In a generative booster, the learner does not just recognize the right answer from a list. Instead, they have to think about the topic and then create an answer out of their head.

The third phase of boosters should be sent about two months after the training, and at this time you should send out “integrative boosters.” An integrative booster again prompts the learner to retrieve the information, but this question specifically asks them to provide concrete examples of how they have made use of this information in their job.

We work in organizations that believe harmful myths. We’re pressured to work as if the myths are true, and we can’t or don’t take the time we need to keep our knowledge up to date and combat the myths.

Numerous contradictions of cognitive load theory’s predictions have been found, but with germane cognitive load, they can still be explained away.&nbsp; de Jong does not use this term (unfalsifiable) but instead states that germane cognitive load is a <em>post-hoc</em> explanation with no theoretical basis: “there seems to be no grounds for asserting that processes that lead to (correct) schema acquisition will impose a higher cognitive load than learning processes that do not lead to (correct) schemas” (2009).

2. <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Poor external validity of lab-based studies</span>.&nbsp; Moreno doesn’t touch on something in the de Jong article – the fact that most cognitive load (and multimedia learning) studies are conducted in labs that “includes participants who have no specific interest in learning the domain involved and who are also given a very short study time” (de Jong, 2009), often only a few minutes.&nbsp; Quite a number of findings from these studies have not held up as strongly when tested in classrooms or real-world scenarios, or have even reversed (<a href="http://www.txwes.edu/professionaldevelopment/materials/Multimedia%20Instructions.pdf">such as the modality effect</a>, but see <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.learninstruc.2007.09.010">this refutation</a> and this <a href="http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&amp;cpsidt=5135499">other example of a reverse effect</a>).

35 psychological studies into the human reaction to media all point towards the simple proposition that people react towards media socially even though, at a conscious level, they believe it is not reasonable to do so. They can't help it. In short, people think that computers are people, which makes e-learning work.

As long as a media technology is consistent with social and physical rules, we will accept it. Read that last part again, 'as long as a media technology is consistent with social and physical rules'. If the media technology fails to conform to these human expectations - we will very much not accept it.

Learning styles seem intuitively sensible. Having thought about learning styles helps teachers improve their teaching and also helps increase their confidence and motivation. But there is no strong evidence that any one theory of learning styles is the best, or most true, compared to the others. Learning style theories can be useful without being true, and it isn't clear that knowing the truth about the differences in how people learn will be immediately useful or produce a more useful theory of learning styles. This difference between truth and utility is a typical dilemma of psychology.

Using a learning style theory is great, but you lose a lot of flexibility and potential for change if you start to believe that the theory is based on proven facts about the way the world is, rather than just being a useful set of habits and suggestions which might, sometimes, help guide us through the maze of teaching and learning.

For neuroscience to mean something to teachers, it must provide information beyond what is available without neuroscientific methods. It’s not enough to describe what’s happening in the brain, and pretend that you’ve learned something useful.

In general, if you are interested in describing effects at a given level of analysis, you are most likely to make progress by sticking to that level of analysis. If you’re interested in describing ways that students learn best, it makes sense to study classroom situations. To the extent that neuroscience will inform good teaching practice, it seems most likely that this influence will be funneled through the cognitive level of analysis: For example, neuroscience will help us better understand memory, and this improved understanding of memory might be used to improve classroom practice. It’s unlikely that leapfrogging the cognitive level analysis and going straight from the brain to the classroom will work out very often.

The study, which will appear in the April issue of Nature Neuroscience, is the first to provide concrete evidence that playing a musical instrument significantly enhances the brainstem's sensitivity to speech sounds. This finding has broad implications because it applies to sound encoding skills involved not only in music but also in language.