Trustonomics

Evolutionary pressures drove the formation of tribes who encoded their values in myths and symbols. Was this cooperation cursed?

This thesis focuses on the ontological status of the mind according to various interpretative traditions of Spinoza scholarship and Indo-Tibetan Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. It compares two texts: Ethics by Spinoza (1632-1677) and The Way of the Bodhisattva by Śāntideva (c. 7-8th century). I argue against the materialist interpretation of Spinoza on the basis that it reduces his concept of monism to extension and mistakenly frames Spinoza’s insights in terms of Cartesian rationality. I then explain Śāntideva’s non-dual concept of mind as the middle between the extremes of nihilism and essentialism, and compare these to the materialist interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of mind as non-existent, and the non-materialist view that the essence of the mind is basic self-assertion (conatus). I conclude that for Spinoza the mind exists, whereas for Śāntideva the mind is beyond concepts of existence and non-existence. Chapter 1: Spinoza’s concept of mind The concept of monism describes reality as one substance with infinite attributes, which human beings encounter as thought or extension, through the modes of individual minds and bodies respectively. For strict materialists, only extended modes actually exist and the concept of the mind is correlated with changes in the body, such as neural activity, or with the conceivability of the order of nature. I argue that despite rejecting Descartes’ concept of mental substance, materialists have transferred the dualism between intellect and feeling to their interpretation of Spinoza’s concept of mind. The non-materialist interpretation of Spinoza such as that of Deleuze, attends to the distinction between essence and existence, and describes the mind as inherently existing to the extent that it participates in substance. For panpsychists, singular minds exist as subjects striving for existence while immersed in the influences of nature. Chapter two: The Mahāyāna Buddhist Concept of Mind Śāntideva refutes the views of earlier Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools in the famous Wisdom chapter of The Way of the Bodhisattva. Śāntideva argues that the mind is beyond the concepts of existence and non-existence using Nāgārjuna’s (c.1-2nd century) view of relative and ultimate truth and Dharmakīrti’s (c. 5th century) logic of valid cognition. The view of selflessness describes the mind as empty: it appears relatively, but ultimately it does not exist as an independent, permanent thing. It is an ephemeral gathering together of the five aggregates (skandha), which describe the interconnectedness of thoughts, feelings and dispositions of the mind and body. Chapter three: A comparison of the monist and non-dualist concepts of mind In this chapter I compare Spinoza’s monism and Śāntideva’s non-dualism and I argue that for Spinoza, the mind exists as “basic self-assertion” whereas Śāntideva presents the view of “selflessness”, which is distinct from a view of nihilism. I recognise that although the cultural and historical contexts are very different there are striking similarities in the structure of Spinoza’s and Śāntideva’s theories, including the relationship between the mind and body, thoughts and feelings, and the interconnectedness with nature.

Abstract Monism, characterized by Jonathan Schaffer as the thesis that the cosmos is the one and only basic actual concrete object, has been the subject of a great deal of recent interest. Spinoza is often taken, rightly, to be an important forebear. This article seeks to explain the distinctive content and basis of Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics and to compare it to contemporary Monism. It then argues that although Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics is not strictly a version of Monism as defined, it has a number of theoretical advantages that make central aspects of it worthy of serious consideration. The last decade has seen a major revival of interest in monistic metaphysics. In his seminal article, “Monism: The Priority of the Whole,” Jonathan Schaffer characterizes Monism as the thesis that the cosmos is the one and only basic actual concrete object.1 Because Spinoza famously holds that there is only one substance, it is not surprising that he is often cited—including by Schaffer—as an important historical forebear of contemporary versions of monistic metaphysics. Schaffer expresses reluctance to assert without deeper historical investigation that Spinoza is a monist in his sense, however, for reasons that he also applies to other apparent monistic metaphysicians of the past.2 One reason he gives is that each of the philosophers “has his own idiosyncratic doctrines,” making “highly doubtful that there is any one precisely formulated monistic doctrine that would fit” them all. A second is that “many of the texts in this tradition are notoriously opaque, subject to scholarly controversy, and liable to contradictory impulses.”3 After a brief but essential summary of some aspects of the contemporary debate around Monism, I will seek in what follows to explain, by appeal to Spinoza’s texts as I understand them,4 the content and basis of his monistic metaphysics and how it compares with contemporary Monism. On the basis of that comparison, I will then argue that his monistic metaphysics, while not strictly a version of Monism as Schaffer defines it, offers a number of distinctive theoretical advantages. This will not, of course, establish that Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics is true, nor even that any doctrine reasonably describable as monistic is true. I do hope, however, that it will provide good reasons to think that some of the philosophical resources offered by Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics are worthy of serious consideration. 1. Monism: The Contemporary Debate Each of the main terms of Schaffer’s Monism—that there is only one basic actual concrete object, the cosmos—calls for some explanation. By ‘basic’, he means metaphysically fundamental in such a way as not to depend metaphysically on any concrete object.5 By ‘actual’, he presumably means “really existing,” as contrasted with whatever kind of being applies to mere possibilia. Although he does not define ‘concrete’, metaphysicians typically consider concrete things (i.e., “concreta”) to be those that (i) are not generated by, or conceivable only through, a process of abstraction; (ii) have actual spatial existence; and/or (iii) are causally efficacious.6 Schaffer also does not define ‘object’, but he contrasts objects with mere properties and qualities, and he also mentions that “deities and spirits, if such there be” are not his concern. Finally, he defines ‘the cosmos’ as “a maximal actual concrete object … of which all actual concrete objects are parts.”7 Assuming that a concrete object is an (improper) part of itself, this definition of ‘the cosmos’ can be satisfied even if there is only one actual concrete object; and the thesis that there is only one such object Schaffer calls Existence Monism. He rejects this strong thesis, however, on the grounds that it conflicts with such apparent perception-based truisms as G.E. Moore’s “here is one hand … and here is another.” He defends only the weaker thesis of Monism previously characterized—according to which there is only one basic actual concrete object, of which any other concrete objects are proper parts—which he also dubs Priority Monism8 in order to distinguish it from the stronger thesis of Existence Monism. Because he frequently assumes that there is more than one concrete object, however, he sometimes characterizes Priority Monism in ways that presuppose that the cosmos has proper parts. In “Monism: The Priority of the Whole,” Schaffer offers two main arguments in favor of Monism. One argument appeals to a principle that all fundamental metaphysical truths are metaphysically necessary. Given the further assumption that either Monism or its denial must be a fundamental metaphysical truth, it follows that the mere metaphysical possibility of Monism entails its truth, and also its necessity. But, he continues, there is a metaphysically possible world containing atomless gunk—that is, concrete matter that is infinitely divisible, composed of parts that are composed of parts that are themselves composed of further parts and so on without termination. Furthermore, he argues, the additional metaphysically necessary principle that there must be ultimate grounds would require the truth of Monism in such a world. Hence, Monism is at least metaphysically possible, and so Monism must be true. Schaffer’s second argument appeals to our best current physical theory: relativistic quantum field theory. According to this theory, the cosmos is an “entangled system” in which the quantum mechanical state of the whole is an emergent property, in the sense that it is not determined simply by the intrinsic properties of constituent particles taken together with the fundamental relations between them. But, Schaffer argues, systems having such emergent properties are best understood as basic unities that are metaphysically prior to their parts; hence, again, Monism is true. He also argues that, given the principle that fundamental metaphysical truths are necessarily true, the truth of Monism follows from the mere metaphysical possibility that the cosmos is an entangled system. In a later article, “The Action of the Whole” (2013), Schaffer offers an argument for a slightly different thesis that he calls Spinozan Monism: “The cosmos is the one and only substance.” He defines a substance as a thing that is both metaphysically fundamental (i.e., basic) and integrated (i.e., “constituting a natural unity”). His argument for Spinozan Monism depends on two premises. The first he calls Leibnizian Substance: “Something is a substance if and only if it evolves by the fundamental laws.” The second he calls Russellian Laws: “The cosmos is the one and only thing that evolves by the fundamental laws.” If supplemented with the premise that something is fundamental only if it is integrated—a premise that Schaffer evidently finds highly plausible—Spinozan Monism entails Monism. Objections have been raised to each of these three arguments. For example, E.J. Lowe (2012), Max Siegel (2016), and Kelly Trogdan (2017) each argue that Monism may be metaphysically contingent, while Jacek Brzozowski (2016) argues that the possibility of atomless gunk is just as problematic for Monism as it is for the pluralistic alternative. Lowe (2012) and Claudio Calosi (2014, 2018) argue that the best interpretation of quantum mechanics may not require priority monism. Elizabeth Miller (2014) argues that a thing can be metaphysically fundamental even if it merely co-evolves together with other equally fundamental things that, together with it, compose a whole. But critics have also argued more directly that Monism is false. For example, Alex Steinberg (2015) argues that if Monism were true then no whole could depend metaphysically on its parts—a claim that is highly implausible for at least many mundane wholes, such as violins and heaps of sand. Lowe (2012) argues more radically that whatever is a mereological sum or fusion—as Schaffer understands the cosmos to be—must by that very fact depend metaphysically on the parts that compose them. In contrast, Horgan and Potrč (2012) have defended not just Monism but the stronger thesis of Existence Monism. They accept Schaffer’s two main arguments that there can only be one basic actual concrete object, but they argue further that any other actual concrete objects would have to be ontologically vague—for example, not fully determinate in composition by parts or in spatiotemporal boundaries—which, they assert, is metaphysically impossible. Although they provide a semantics intended to vindicate (as common sense requires) the truthfulness of some ordinary vague language and thought, the only concrete object that strictly exists in the correct ontology, on their view, is the blobject: a concrete object that is diversely qualified but admits of no concrete objects as parts at all. Although Schaffer rejects Existence Monism primarily on the grounds that it is incompatible with obvious truths about the multiplicity of concrete things, he also objects that the cosmos must have real concrete parts in order to ground many of the truths about it that Horgan and Potrč must deploy in implementing their semantics (2012). Goff (2012) further objects to Existence Monism that it is incompatible with the truth—knowable partly by immediate consciousness and partly by simple observation of others—that “there currently exists something that feels pain but no pleasure and something that feels pleasure but no pain.” 2. Spinoza’s Monistic Metaphysics In order to understand Spinoza’s monistic metaphysics and its relations to Monism, we must understand its three core theses, his demonstrations of those theses, and a further underlying reason for his adoption of those theses. Three core theses In his Ethics,9 Spinoza aims to demonstrate a pantheistic yet naturalistic monism about substances: Pantheistic Substance Monism: Except God [i.e., Nature], no substance can be or be conceived. (E1p14) He also aims to demonstrate a thesis about certain of

Abstract. Monism, characterized by Jonathan Schaffer as the thesis that the cosmos is the one and only basic actual concrete object, has been the subject of a g

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This chart shows trustworthy and untrustworthy types of organizations.

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