The chatbot might replace all software with a prompt - ‘software is dead’. I’m skeptical about this, as I’ve written here, but Apple is proposing the opposite: that generative AI is a technology, not a product.

Apple is, I think, signalling a view that generative AI, and ChatGPT itself, is a commodity technology that is most useful when it is: Embedded in a system that gives it broader context about the user (which might be search, social, a device OS, or a vertical application) and Unbundled into individual features (ditto), which are inherently easier to run as small power-efficient models on small power-efficient devices on the edge (paid for by users, not your capex budget) - which is just as well, because… This stuff will never work for the mass-market if we have marginal cost every time the user presses ‘OK’ and we need a fleet of new nuclear power-stations to run it all.

Apple has built its own foundation models, which (on the benchmarks it published) are comparable to anything else on the market, but there’s nowhere that you can plug a raw prompt directly into the model and get a raw output back - there are always sets of buttons and options shaping what you ask, and that’s presented to the user in different ways for different features. In most of these features, there’s no visible bot at all. You don’t ask a question and get a response: instead, your emails are prioritised, or you press ‘summarise’ and a summary appears. You can type a request into Siri (and Siri itself is only one of the many features using Apple’s models), but even then you don’t get raw model output back: you get GUI. The LLM is abstracted away as an API call.

Apple is treating this as a technology to enable new classes of features and capabilities, where there is design and product management shaping what the technology does and what the user sees, not as an oracle that you ask for things.

Apple is drawing a split between a ‘context model’ and a ‘world model’. Apple’s models have access to all the context that your phone has about you, powering those features, and this is all private, both on device and in Apple’s ‘Private Cloud’. But if you ask for ideas for what to make with a photo of your grocery shopping, then this is no longer about your context, and Apple will offer to send that to a third-party world model - today, ChatGPT.

that’s clearly separated into a different experience where you should have different expectations, and it’s also, of course, OpenAI’s brand risk, not Apple’s. Meanwhile, that world model gets none of your context, only your one-off prompt.

Neither OpenAI nor any of the other cloud models from new companies (Anthropic, Mistral etc) have your emails, messages, locations, photos, files and so on.

Apple is letting OpenAI take the brand risk of creating pizza glue recipes, and making error rates and abuse someone else’s problem, while Apple watches from a safe distance.

The next step, probably, is to take bids from Bing and Google for the default slot, but meanwhile, more and more use-cases will be quietly shifted from the third party to Apple’s own models. It’s Apple’s own software that decides where the queries go, after all, and which ones need the third party at all.

A lot of the compute to run Apple Intelligence is in end-user devices paid for by the users, not Apple’s capex budget, and Apple Intelligence is free.

Commoditisation is often also integration. There was a time when ‘spell check’ was a separate product that you had to buy, for hundreds of dollars, and there were dozens of competing products on the market, but over time it was integrated first into the word processor and then the OS. The same thing happened with the last wave of machine learning - style transfer or image recognition were products for five minutes and then became features. Today ‘summarise this document’ is AI, and you need a cloud LLM that costs $20/month, but tomorrow the OS will do that for free. ‘AI is whatever doesn’t work yet.’

Apple is big enough to take its own path, just as it did moving the Mac to its own silicon: it controls the software and APIs on top of the silicon that are the basis of those developer network effects, and it has a world class chip team and privileged access to TSMC.

Apple is doing something slightly different - it’s proposing a single context model for everything you do on your phone, and powering features from that, rather than adding disconnected LLM-powered features at disconnected points across the company.

The left side of figure 5-1 indicates that when there is a performance gap — when product functionality and reliability are not yet good enough to address the needs of customers in a given tier of the market — companies must compete by making the best possible products. In the race to do this, firms that build their products around proprietary, interdependent architectures enjoy an important competitive advantage against competitors whose product architectures are modular, because the standardization inherent in modularity takes too many degrees of design freedom away from engineers, and they cannot not optimize performance.

The issue I have with this analysis of vertical integration — and this is exactly what I was taught at business school — is that the only considered costs are financial. But there are other, more difficult to quantify costs. Modularization incurs costs in the design and experience of using products that cannot be overcome, yet cannot be measured. Business buyers — and the analysts who study them — simply ignore them, but consumers don’t. Some consumers inherently know and value quality, look-and-feel, and attention to detail, and are willing to pay a premium that far exceeds the financial costs of being vertically integrated.

Google trains and runs its Gemini family of models on its own TPU processors, which are only available on Google’s cloud infrastructure. Developers can access Gemini through Vertex AI, Google’s fully-managed AI development platform; and, to the extent Vertex AI is similar to Google’s internal development environment, that is the platform on which Google is building its own consumer-facing AI apps. It’s all Google, from top-to-bottom, and there is evidence that this integration is paying off: Gemini 1.5’s industry leading 2 million token context window almost certainly required joint innovation between Google’s infrastructure team and its model-building team.

On the other extreme is AWS, which doesn’t have any of its own models; instead its focus has been on its Bedrock managed development platform, which lets you use any model. Amazon’s other focus has been on developing its own chips, although the vast majority of its AI business runs on Nvidia GPUs.

Microsoft is in the middle, thanks to its close ties to OpenAI and its models. The company added Azure Models-as-a-Service last year, but its primary focus for both external customers and its own internal apps has been building on top of OpenAI’s GPT family of models; Microsoft has also launched its own chip for inference, but the vast majority of its workloads run on Nvidia.

Google is certainly building products for the consumer market, but those products are not devices; they are Internet services. And, as you might have noticed, the historical discussion didn’t really mention the Internet. Both Google and Meta, the two biggest winners of the Internet epoch, built their services on commodity hardware. Granted, those services scaled thanks to the deep infrastructure work undertaken by both companies, but even there Google’s more customized approach has been at least rivaled by Meta’s more open approach. What is notable is that both companies are integrating their models and their apps, as is OpenAI with ChatGPT.

It may be the case that selling hardware, which has to be perfect every year to justify a significant outlay of money by consumers, provides a much better incentive structure for maintaining excellence and execution than does being an Aggregator that users access for free.

Google’s collection of moonshots — from Waymo to Google Fiber to Nest to Project Wing to Verily to Project Loon (and the list goes on) — have mostly been science projects that have, for the most part, served to divert profits from Google Search away from shareholders. Waymo is probably the most interesting, but even if it succeeds, it is ultimately a car service rather far afield from Google’s mission statement “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”

The only thing that drives meaningful shifts in platform marketshare are paradigm shifts, and while I doubt the v1 version of Pixie [Google’s rumored Pixel-only AI assistant] would be good enough to drive switching from iPhone users, there is at least a path to where it does exactly that.

the fact that Google is being mocked mercilessly for messed-up AI answers gets at why consumer-facing AI may be disruptive for the company: the reason why incumbents find it hard to respond to disruptive technologies is because they are, at least at the beginning, not good enough for the incumbent’s core offering. Time will tell if this gives more fuel to a shift in smartphone strategies, or makes the company more reticent.

while I was very impressed with Google’s enterprise pitch, which benefits from its integration with Google’s infrastructure without all of the overhead of potentially disrupting the company’s existing products, it’s going to be a heavy lift to overcome data gravity, i.e. the fact that many enterprise customers will simply find it easier to use AI services on the same clouds where they already store their data (Google does, of course, also support non-Gemini models and Nvidia GPUs for enterprise customers). To the extent Google wins in enterprise it may be by capturing the next generation of startups that are AI first and, by definition, data light; a new company has the freedom to base its decision on infrastructure and integration.

Amazon is certainly hoping that argument is correct: the company is operating as if everything in the AI value chain is modular and ultimately a commodity, which insinuates that it believes that data gravity will matter most. What is difficult to separate is to what extent this is the correct interpretation of the strategic landscape versus a convenient interpretation of the facts that happens to perfectly align with Amazon’s strengths and weaknesses, including infrastructure that is heavily optimized for commodity workloads.

Meta’s open source approach to Llama: the company is focused on products, which do benefit from integration, but there are also benefits that come from widespread usage, particularly in terms of optimization and complementary software. Open source accrues those benefits without imposing any incentives that detract from Meta’s product efforts (and don’t forget that Meta is receiving some portion of revenue from hyperscalers serving Llama models).

The iPhone maker, like Amazon, appears to be betting that AI will be a feature or an app; like Amazon, it’s not clear to what extent this is strategic foresight versus motivated reasoning.

achieving something approaching AGI, whatever that means, will require maximizing every efficiency and optimization, which rewards the integrated approach.

the most value will be derived from building platforms that treat models like processors, delivering performance improvements to developers who never need to know what is going on under the hood.

in their efforts to provide better products than their competitors and earn higher prices and margins, suppliers often “overshoot” their market: They give customers more than they need or ultimately are willing to pay for. And more importantly, it means that disruptive technologies that may underperform today, relative to what users in the market demand, may be fully performance-competitive in that same market tomorrow. This was the basis for insisting that the iPhone must have a low-price model: surely Apple would soon run out of new technology to justify the prices it charged for high-end iPhones, and consumers would start buying much cheaper Android phones instead! In fact, as I discussed in after January’s earnings results, the company has gone in the other direction: more devices per customer, higher prices per device, and an increased focus on ongoing revenue from those same customers.

Apple seems to have mostly saturated the high end, slowly adding switchers even as existing iPhone users hold on to their phones longer; what is not happening, though, is what disruption predicts: Apple isn’t losing customers to low-cost competitors for having “overshot” and overpriced its phones. It seems my thesis was right: a superior experience can never be too good — or perhaps I didn’t go far enough.

Jeff Bezos has been writing an annual letter to shareholders since 1997, and he attaches that original letter to one he pens every year. It included this section entitled Obsess Over Customers: From the beginning, our focus has been on offering our customers compelling value. We realized that the Web was, and still is, the World Wide Wait. Therefore, we set out to offer customers something they simply could not get any other way, and began serving them with books. We brought them much more selection than was possible in a physical store (our store would now occupy 6 football fields), and presented it in a useful, easy-to-search, and easy-to-browse format in a store open 365 days a year, 24 hours a day. We maintained a dogged focus on improving the shopping experience, and in 1997 substantially enhanced our store. We now offer customers gift certificates, 1-Click shopping, and vastly more reviews, content, browsing options, and recommendation features. We dramatically lowered prices, further increasing customer value. Word of mouth remains the most powerful customer acquisition tool we have, and we are grateful for the trust our customers have placed in us. Repeat purchases and word of mouth have combined to make Amazon.com the market leader in online bookselling.

This year, after highlighting just how much customers love Amazon (answer: a lot), Bezos wrote: One thing I love about customers is that they are divinely discontent. Their expectations are never static — they go up. It’s human nature. We didn’t ascend from our hunter-gatherer days by being satisfied. People have a voracious appetite for a better way, and yesterday’s ‘wow’ quickly becomes today’s ‘ordinary’. I see that cycle of improvement happening at a faster rate than ever before. It may be because customers have such easy access to more information than ever before — in only a few seconds and with a couple taps on their phones, customers can read reviews, compare prices from multiple retailers, see whether something’s in stock, find out how fast it will ship or be available for pick-up, and more. These examples are from retail, but I sense that the same customer empowerment phenomenon is happening broadly across everything we do at Amazon and most other industries as well. You cannot rest on your laurels in this world. Customers won’t have it.

when it comes to Internet-based services, this customer focus does not come at the expense of a focus on infrastructure or distribution or suppliers: while those were the means to customers in the analog world, in the online world controlling the customer relationship gives a company power over its suppliers, the capital to build out infrastructure, and control over distribution. Bezos is not so much choosing to prioritize customers insomuch as he has unlocked the key to controlling value chains in an era of aggregation.

consumer expectations are not static: they are, as Bezos’ memorably states, “divinely discontent”. What is amazing today is table stakes tomorrow, and, perhaps surprisingly, that makes for a tremendous business opportunity: if your company is predicated on delivering the best possible experience for consumers, then your company will never achieve its goal.

In the case of Amazon, that this unattainable and ever-changing objective is embedded in the company’s culture is, in conjunction with the company’s demonstrated ability to spin up new businesses on the profits of established ones, a sort of perpetual motion machine

Owning the customer relationship by means of delivering a superior experience is how these companies became dominant, and, when they fall, it will be because consumers deserted them, either because the companies lost control of the user experience (a danger for Facebook and Google), or because a paradigm shift made new experiences matter more (a danger for Google and Apple).

Meta, today, has roughly the right price and is working forward to the right device: Apple has started with the right device and will work back to the right price. Meta is trying to catalyse an ecosystem while we wait for the right hardware - Apple is trying to catalyse an ecosystem while we wait for the right price.

one of the things I wondered before the event was how Apple would show a 3D experience in 2D. Meta shows either screenshots from within the system (with the low visual quality inherent in the spec you can make and sell for $500) or shots of someone wearing the headset and grinning - neither are satisfactory. Apple shows the person in the room, with the virtual stuff as though it was really there, because it looks as though it is.

For Meta, the device places you in ‘the metaverse’ and there could be many experiences within that. For Apple, this device itself doesn’t take you anywhere - it’s a screen and there could be five different ‘metaverse’ apps. This iPhone was a piece of glass that could be anything - this is trying to be a piece of glass that can show anything.

A lot of what Apple shows is possibility and experiment - it could be this, this or that, just as when Apple launched the watch it suggested it as fitness, social or fashion, and it turn out to work best for fitness (and is now a huge business).

Mark Zuckerberg, speaking to a Meta all-hands after Apple’s event, made the perfectly reasonable point that Apple hasn’t shown much that no-one had thought of before - there’s no ‘magic’ invention. Everyone already knows we need better screens, eye-tracking and hand-tracking, in a thin and light device.

It’s worth remembering that Meta isn’t in this to make a games device, nor really to sell devices per se - rather, the thesis is that if VR is the next platform, Meta has to make sure it isn’t controlled by a platform owner who can screw them, as Apple did with IDFA in 2021.

On the other hand, the Vision Pro is an argument that current devices just aren’t good enough to break out of the enthusiast and gaming market, incremental improvement isn’t good enough either, and you need a step change in capability.

Apple’s privacy positioning, of course, has new strategic value now that it’s selling a device you wear that’s covered in cameras

the genesis of the current wave of VR was the realisation a decade ago that the VR concepts of the 1990s would work now, and with nothing more than off-the-shelf smartphone components and gaming PCs, plus a bit more work. But ‘a bit more work’ turned out to be thirty or forty billion dollars from Meta and God only knows how much more from Apple - something over $100bn combined, almost certainly.

So it might be that a wearable screen of any kind, no matter how good, is just a staging post - the summit of a foothill on the way to the top of Everest. Maybe the real Reality device is glasses, or contact lenses projecting onto your retina, or some kind of neural connection, all of which might be a decade or decades away again, and the piece of glass in our pocket remains the right device all the way through.

I think the price and the challenge of category creation are tightly connected. Apple has decided that the capabilities of the Vision Pro are the minimum viable product - that it just isn’t worth making or selling a device without a screen so good you can’t see the pixels, pass-through where you can’t see any lag, perfect eye-tracking and perfect hand-tracking. Of course the rest of the industry would like to do that, and will in due course, but Apple has decided you must do that.

For VR, better screens are merely better, but for AR Apple thinks this this level of display system is a base below which you don’t have a product at all.

For Meta, the device places you in ‘the metaverse’ and there could be many experiences within that. For Apple, this device itself doesn’t take you anywhere - it’s a screen and there could be five different ‘metaverse’ apps. The iPhone was a piece of glass that could be anything - this is trying to be a piece of glass that can show anything.

This reminds me a little of when Meta tried to make a phone, and then a Home Screen for a phone, and Mark Zuckerberg said “your phone should be about people.” I thought “no, this is a computer, and there are many apps, some of which are about people and some of which are not.” Indeed there’s also an echo of telco thinking: on a feature phone, ‘internet stuff’ was one or two icons on your portable telephone, but on the iPhone the entire telephone was just one icon on your computer. On a Vision Pro, the ‘Meta Metaverse’ is one app amongst many. You have many apps and panels, which could be 2D or 3D, or could be spaces.

Betting against a first-generation Apple product is a bad trade — from infamous dismissals of the iPhone to disappointment with the original iPad. In fact, this is a reflection of Apple’s strategy: Start with a product that’s more an elegant proof-of-concept than a prime-time hit; rely on early adopters to provide enough runway for its engineers to keep iterating; and trust in unmatched capital, talent, brand equity, and staying power to morph a first-gen toy into a third-gen triumph

We are a long way from making three screens, a glass shield, and an array of supporting hardware light enough to wear for an extended period. Reviewers were (purposefully) allowed to wear the Vision Pro for less than half an hour, and nearly every one said comfort was declining even then. Avatar: The Way of Water is 3 hours and 12 minutes.

Meta’s singular strategic objective is to escape second-tier status and, like Apple and Alphabet, control its distribution. And its path to independence runs through Apple Park. Zuckerberg is spending the GDP of a small country to invent a new world, the metaverse, where Apple doesn’t own the roads or power stations. Vision Pro is insurance against the metaverse evolving into anything more than an incel panic room.

The only product category where VR makes difference is good VR games. Price is not limiting factor, the quality of VR experience is. Beat Saber is good and fun and physical exercise. Half Life: Alyx, is amazing. VR completely supercharges horror games, and scary stalking shooters. Want to fear of your life and get PTSD in the comfort of your home? You can do it. Games can connect people and provide physical exercise. If the 3rd iteration of Vision Pro is good for 2 hours of playing for $2000 Apple will kill the console market. Playstations no more. Apple is not a gaming company, but if Vision Pro becomes better and slightly cheaper, Apple becomes gaming company against its will.