A common example of diminishing returns is choosing to hire more people on a factory floor to alter current manufacturing and production capabilities. Given that the capital on the floor (e.g. manufacturing machines, pre-existing technology, warehouses) is held constant, increasing from one employee to two employees is, theoretically, going to more than double production possibilities and this is called increasing returns. If we now employ 50 people, at some point, increasing the number of employees by two percent (from 50 to 51 employees) would increase output by two percent and this is called constant returns. However, if we look further along the production curve to, for example 100 employees, floor space is likely getting crowded, there are too many people operating the machines and in the building, and workers are getting in each other's way. Increasing the number of employees by two percent (from 100 to 102 employees) would increase output by less than two percent and this is called "diminishing returns."

In software development, technical debt (also known as design debt[1] or code debt) is the implied cost of additional rework caused by choosing an easy (limited) solution now instead of using a better approach that would take longer.[2] Analogous with monetary debt,[3] if technical debt is not repaid, it can accumulate "interest", making it harder to implement changes. Unaddressed technical debt increases software entropy and cost of further rework.

Common causes of technical debt include: Ongoing development, long series of project enhancements over time renders old solutions sub-optimal.

Parallel development on multiple branches accrues technical debt because of the work required to merge the changes into a single source base. The more changes done in isolation, the more debt.

I think Sanctuary, Hydraulics, and XXIX are proving this assumption wrong. As designers and developers, we create tools for a living. That includes tools for helping other teams make great decisions. Tools to help their coworkers ask and offer feedback. Tools to help their peers get clear on where they want to grow. We obsess over making tools that improve the way we work. When we see an opportunity to improve, we upgrade our tools. Or build a new tool, toss the old one, and thank it for serving its purpose (Marie Kondo style).

We intend to revise those skills so that they reflect what good leadership looks like in a distributed organization. Things like:Noticing a problem/opportunity and proposing an experiment to solve itKnowing how to offer and give helpful feedbackKnowing how to receive feedbackActive listeningHelping others get clear on where they want to growCoaching (rather than managing) others toward their goals

It’s not just a question of “how do we make this usable?” it’s more about “how do we make this usable for users and increase feature adoption which will drive more revenue?“

The reason startups are so counterintuitive is that they're so different from most people's other experiences. No one knows what it's like except those who've done it. Which is why YC partners should usually have been founders themselves.

the essence of what happens at YC is to figure out which problems matter most, then cook up ideas for solving them — ideally at a resolution of a week or less — and then try those ideas and measure how well they worked. The focus is on action, with measurable, near-term results.

A small improvement in navigational ability can make you a lot faster, because it has a double effect: the path is shorter, and you can travel faster along it when you're more certain it's the right one. That's where a lot of YC's value lies, in helping founders get an extra increment of focus that lets them move faster. And since moving fast is the essence of a startup, YC in effect makes startups more startup-like.Speed defines startups. Focus enables speed. YC improves focus.

However good you are, good colleagues make you better. Indeed, very ambitious people probably need colleagues more than anyone else, because they're so starved for them in everyday life.

An overemphasis on data can harm your culture through two different channels. One is the suspension of disbelief. Metrics are important, says your organization, so you just proceed to introduce metrics in areas where they don’t belong and everybody just ignores the fact that they are meaningless. Two is the streetlight effect. Metrics are important, says the organization, so you encourage your engineers to focus disproportionately on improvements that are easy to measure through metrics - i.e. you focus too much on engagement, growth hacks, small, superficial changes that can be A/B tested, vs. sophisticated, more nuanced improvements whose impact is more meaningful but harder or impossible to measure.

So using that hook of “simplicity”, the best advice for “doing agile” is: Read the manifesto Figure out what makes you happy. And do that.

I’m in meetings completely credulous, believing whatever anyone says, even though Lucy from Peanuts taught me that that’s a mistake. I don’t have an intuitive sense for where money is. I spend hours on laborious projects that will make me just enough money to buy me four burritos, and fail to follow up on opportunities that would pay my rent for months. I have almost 80,000 followers on Twitter, and have made maybe only $1000 off the platform, most of which has been in the form of meal kits I’ve had to beg companies to send me after they used my Tweets without compensation on their Instagram page.

My job is actually one billion smaller jobs in a trench coat, many of which I’m actually not preternaturally gifted at or even experienced in.

Mixed in with seeing Disney movies, at age 10, she discovered John Cassavetes’ Minnie And Moskowitz and thought, “To see that and to say, ‘What’s this world out there and how do I fit in it?’ that to me is the most important part of filmmaking and being in films.

Again, this is just another example of the U.S.’ harmful obsession with megamergers, consolidation, purposeless (outside of stock fluffing) deal making, and growth for growth’s sake. All of these deals make perfect sense to the executives, lawyers, and accounting magicians exploiting them for tax breaks and various financial benefits, but that doesn’t make this whole saga any less preposterously pointless.

Whoever is behind the scenes of these movies fails to understand that you can actually make more money by making something that is "good". That making a "good" movie means people will want to watch your movie multiple times and then purchase it again later, and purchase more tickets, and purchase the streaming service with your movie, and purchase the box-set with your movie.

There are three ways you could make a film like this, and make it somewhat "good", whatever that term may mean. You could:A) Make a good movie. Make a movie that is artistically fulfilling, filled to the brim with interesting themes and ideas, passionate craftwork, talented artistry. Something that makes people proud that they went to the movies.B) Make a good Jurassic Park/World movie. Make something that builds on the source material before it in an interesting way and gives itself a purpose to exist in the first place outside of being just a cash cow. Something that makes people proud to be a fan of the franchise.C) Make a good dinosaur movie. Just show a bunch of fucking dinosaurs crashing into each other. Something stupid but ultimately fun. Something that makes people proud to have eyes and ears so that they can see something cool.

Discord stands at an exciting moment in history, in which brands and businesses evolve from a Web2 mindset to a Web3 mindset where more dynamic and organic communities come first. The expansion of Discord from a gaming platform to one all brands can leverage is a clear sign that gamification is becoming the new mainstream: designing for niche-driven communities who are seeking co-creation opportunities and rewards for participation